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Preface
While looking for a method to break big problems into small solvable units, I discovered
programming for me. As a bachelor student, I became aware of the Goal-Question-
Metric approach (GQM). It allowed me to make all goals accessible by asking detailed
questions and using appropriate measurement methods to answer them.
In the course of my master’s studies, I became aware of code analysis and obfuscation,
which offered me an exciting challenge and demanded my knowledge. This led to my
decision to pursue these two topics in my dissertation.
The GQM approach allowed me to convert all goals into measurement parameters.
However, I could not always define the exact thresholds for the measurements from which
action should be taken. Since these thresholds often depended on unknown criteria, I
taught myself to use machine learning techniques during my time as a Ph.D. student.
With these techniques, I was able to extract the desired thresholds as patterns and rules
from previous decisions and the collected data.
Using all these techniques, I have designed and developed, in this dissertation, a collec-
tion of deobfuscation approaches. These approaches support analysts in the automatic
identification and recovering of obfuscated Android apps. I started my Ph.D. student
job in the project of Ben Herman under the supervision of Professor Mira Mezini in the
Software Technology Group (STG) at the Technische Universität Darmstadt. In this
project, I learned more about vulnerability and malware detection, which helped me
to find an application for my deobfuscation challenge. Afterward, I worked on other
projects for several years, which deepened my knowledge and led to this dissertation.
My life as well as this dissertation would have been more difficult without the help of
others. In the following, I try to thank all the people who supported me on my way:
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Mira Mezini, who showed me
new ways that demanded and enhanced my knowledge of software engineering and IT
security. She helped me develop a clearer view of these topics and improve the structure
of my thinking processes. Thank you for all your efforts that supported me to get to
this point of the long doctoral process.
I also want to thank Professor Awais Rashid for being the second examiner of my
dissertation. I am grateful for the long hours you spent on carefully reviewing my work.
My work would not have gotten this far without the help of people from the security
subgroup with whom I could discuss my ideas. I would like to thank Lars Baumgärt-
ner, Michael Eichberg, Dominik Helm, Ben Hermann, Florian Kübler, Johannes Lerch,
Patrick Müller, Krishna Narasimhan, Michael Reif, and Anna-Katharina Wickert for
your feedback that gave me new thinking impulses and for your patience when I pre-
sented new ideas involving black magic (machine learning).
Over the years, I enjoyed working with great students who helped me advance my
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research projects and did a great deal of the implementation work. I would like to thank
Florian Breitfelder, Mattis Manfred Kämmerer, Patrick Müller, and Jonas Schlitzer and
hope that they continue to be successful in their careers.
Of course, I also want to thank my colleagues, who took the time to proofread this
thesis and gave me their feedback. First of all, I would like to thank Lars Baumgärtner,
who read several chapters over and over again. Then I would like to thank Sven Amann,
Dominik Helm, Ragnar Mogk, Patrick Müller, Krishna Narasimhan, Michael Reif, Aditya
Oak, and Pascal Weisenburger. Their feedback helped me to improve the clarity of this
thesis.
The last years would not be as enjoyable and fruitful without my colleagues Sven
Amann, Lars Baumgärtner, Andi Bejleri, Oliver Bracevac, Ervina Cergani, Joscha Drech-
sler, Michael Eichberg, Matthias Eichholz, Sebastian Erdweg, Sylvia Grewe, Dominik
Helm, Ben Hermann, Sven Keidel, Matthias Krebs, Mirko Köhler, Florian Kübler, Edlira
Kuci, Johannes Lerch, Ingo Maier, Nafise Eskandani Masoule, Annette Miller, Ragnar
Mogk, Patrick Müller, Sarah Nadi, Krishna Narasimhan, Aditya Oak, Sebastian Proksch,
Michael Reif, David Richter, Tobias Roth, Guido Salvaneschi, Simon Schönwälder, Jan
Sinschek, Daniel Sokolowski, Jurgen van Ham, Manuel Weiel, Pascal Weisenburger, and
Anna-Katharina Wickert.
Ultimately, I would like to thank Gudrun Harris and Claudia Roßman. Gudrun, you
are the soul of the STG and a master of administration. I would surely have fallen into
some pitfalls when it concerns paperwork. You ensured that we were well funded, fulfilled
all regulations, and always had an open ear for our troubles. Claudia Roßman will be
your successor, and I want to thank her for the help with the dissertation registration.
I hope we will work together as well as we did with Gudrun. Many thanks to you both
for the continued assistance.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my wife, my family, and my friends. Thank
you all for the support with small and bigger steps in my life, and I want to share many
more amazing moments with you.
Editorial notice: Throughout this thesis, I use the term “we” and “us” to describe my
work. This is meant to underline that research is always a cooperative effort. I would
have much less (if something at all) to present here if other people had not taken time
off their own work to review, discuss, and contribute to mine. I am deeply grateful for
their effort.
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Abstract
Every day, developers add new applications (apps) to the Google Play Store, which ease
users’ lives and entertain them. The rapid development of these apps is only possible
through the provision of software libraries whose functionality can be directly integrated
into an app without creating it from scratch. For instance, some libraries provide ex-
tended possibilities for displaying content or additional support for specific networking
capabilities. All these libraries are bundled with the main application code into one
binary to avoid delays due to the loading of external functionality.
The wide distribution of Android apps and the high turnover in this market attracts
criminal actors (attackers). These attackers decompile the apps, integrate additional
ad libraries or malware, and republish them. Through this approach, they use the
apps’ popularity to trick users into downloading their repackaged apps. To prevent such
malicious practices, developers and producers of libraries have begun to obfuscate their
apps to make the decompilation process more challenging. However, the obfuscation
of apps is not only done by developers but also by attackers to make the detection of
copyright infringement harder or hide their malicious intent.
While analysts try to protect the developers’ copyright and the privacy and security
of app users, code obfuscation hinders them from identifying libraries and repackaged
apps, detecting obfuscated names and strings, and recovering them. The obfuscated
code might contain not only malware but also vulnerabilities or unauthorized access to
private data.
This dissertation introduces different approaches that support the analyses mentioned
above using static analysis, dynamic analysis, and machine learning. Since the obfusca-
tion of repackaged apps makes it difficult to distinguish between library and app code,
we present approaches for library detection, separation of app code, and mapping of
library code. We evaluated the effectiveness of these approaches under the influence of
different obfuscation techniques. Furthermore, we present our approach for identifying
repackaged apps that uses our library identification to measure the similarity between
repackaged and original apps without the influence of library code, which would distort
the measurement. Further contributions support the recovery of names from obfuscated
entities in library code. Finally, we presented an approach for identifying and recovering
obfuscated strings that supports data-flow analyses.
Using our approaches, we outperformed all state-of-the-art competitors. Furthermore,
we analyzed in total over 100,000 apps for obfuscated names, obfuscated libraries, ob-
fuscated strings, and repackaged apps.
5

Zusammenfassung
Jeden Tag fügen Entwickler dem Google Play Store neue Anwendungen (Apps) hinzu,
die das Leben der Nutzer erleichtern und sie unterhalten. Die rapide Entwicklung dieser
Apps ist nur durch die Bereitstellung von Softwarebibliotheken möglich, deren Funktion-
alität direkt in eine App integriert werden kann, ohne diese von Grund auf neu zu er-
stellen. So bieten einige Bibliotheken beispielsweise erweiterte Möglichkeiten zur Anzeige
von Inhalten oder zusätzliche Unterstützung für bestimmte Netzwerkfähigkeiten. Die
Bibliotheken werden mit dem Hauptanwendungscode in einer Binärdatei gebündelt, um
Verzögerungen durch das Laden externer Funktionalität zu vermeiden.
Die weite Verbreitung von Android-Apps und der hohe Umsatz in diesem Markt zieht
kriminelle Akteure (Angreifer) an. Diese Angreifer dekompilieren die Apps, integrieren
zusätzliche Werbebibliotheken oder Malware und veröffentlichen sie erneut. Auf diese
Weise nutzen sie die Popularität der Apps, um Benutzer zu verleiten, ihre neu ver-
packten Apps herunterzuladen. Um solche bösartigen Praktiken zu verhindern, haben
Entwickler und Hersteller von Bibliotheken damit begonnen, ihre Anwendungen zu ver-
schleiern, um den Dekompilierungsprozess schwieriger zu gestalten. Die Verschleierung
von Anwendungen wird jedoch nicht nur von Entwicklern, sondern auch von Angreifern
vorgenommen, um die Aufdeckung von Urheberrechtsverletzungen zu erschweren oder
ihre böswilligen Absichten zu verbergen.
Während Analysten versuchen, das Urheberrecht der Entwickler, die Privatsphäre und
Sicherheit der Benutzer von Anwendungen zu schützen, hindert die Code-Verschleierung
sie daran, Bibliotheken und neu-verpackte Apps zu identifizieren, verschleierte Namen
und Zeichenketten zu erkennen und wiederherzustellen. Der verschleierte Code kann
nicht nur Malware, sondern auch Schwachstellen oder unbefugten Zugriff auf private
Daten beinhalten.
In dieser Dissertation werden verschiedene Ansätze vorgestellt, die die oben genannten
Analysen mit Hilfe von statischer Analyse, dynamischer Analyse und maschinellem Ler-
nen unterstützen. Da die Verschleierung von neu-verpackten Apps es schwierig macht,
zwischen Bibliotheks- und Anwendungscode zu unterscheiden, stellen wir Ansätze zur
Erkennung von Bibliotheken, zur Trennung von Anwendungscode und zum Wiederher-
stellung von Namen von Bibliothekscodeentitäten vor. Wir haben die Wirksamkeit dieser
Ansätze unter dem Einfluss verschiedener Verschleierungstechniken analysiert. Des Weit-
eren stellen wir unseren Ansatz zur Identifizierung von neu-verpackten Apps vor, der
unsere Bibliotheksidentifikation zur Messung der Ähnlichkeit zwischen um-verpackten
und Originalanwendungen ohne den Einfluss von Bibliothekscode verwendet. Weitere
Beiträge unterstützen die Wiederherstellung von Namen aus verschleierten Entitäten im
Bibliothekscode. Schließlich stellten wir einen Ansatz zur Identifizierung und Wieder-
herstellung von verschleierten Zeichenketten vor, der Datenflussanalysen unterstützt.
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Mit unseren Ansätzen übertreffen wir alle aktuellen Konkurrenten und haben insge-
samt über 100.000 Anwendungen auf verschleierte Namen, verschleierte Bibliotheken,
verschleierte Zeichenfolgen und neu-verpackte Apps analysiert.
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1. Introduction
Google launched the Play Store in 2008 [And20d], and since then, the store contains over
2,960,000 apps [num20]. With this large number of apps, users can find their favorite
app for gaming, social networks, finance, sports, or other activities. Currently, it is even
possible for users to develop specific apps for themselves with only restricted knowledge
of software engineering using app generators [ODS+18]. While the functionality of app
generators is limited, software libraries allow developers to integrate new functionality
into their apps without writing it from scratch. Their integration boosts the development
speed of new apps and might be crucial for the Google Play store’s growth [gro20].
The large userbase of Android apps [Ann20] attracts malicious actors. They use the
reputation of established apps to trick users into downloading their payload. For that,
the malicious actors decompile apps and republish them to get financial gains from in-
serting additional ad libraries or accessing sensitive user data (e.g., credit card numbers,
bank access data) by using integrated malware [STDA+17, ARSC16, AMSS15, FGL+13,
FLB+15, LLCT13]. This practice may harm the developer’s reputation of established
apps and contribute to user distrust in the Android ecosystem. The Cybercrime Mag-
azine [dam20] estimates that by 2021 the annual loss through cybercrime, including
repackaging and other attacks, will amount to six trillion dollars.
To nurture a healthy Android ecosystem, analysts investigate the content of libraries
and apps that can pose a threat to a user’s privacy and security. During such an in-
spection, analysts use automated approaches [YFM+17, IWAM17, STDA+17, and17,
LLB+17] to detect repackaged apps and inform potentially affected developers. Fur-
thermore, analysts identify sensitive data that flows to untrusted destinations to warn
developers and users of potential dangers [ARF+14, RAMB16, ZWWJ15, BP18, WL18,
MW17, CYL+17, CFL+17]. In their investigations, analysts are hindered by obfuscated
code and data. Another difficulty for analysts is the compilation of app and library code
into a single binary since, after obfuscation, the code cannot be distinguished from one
another and needs to be analyzed as well, although the library code is known and often
not dangerous. As analysts address these challenges, they must identify and recover
obfuscated data and code locations. Since they cannot perform these tasks for millions
of apps manually, they need automated approaches. This thesis makes important con-
tributions for automating the identification and recovery process of libraries, names of
code entities, and strings in obfuscated apps.
1.1. Problem Statement
In recent years, many approaches [LWW+17, MWGC16, BBD16, ZDZ+18, WWZR18,
FR19, ZBK19] analyzed apps to identify libraries or separate them from the app code-
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base. The application scenarios of such approaches varied from the detection of vulner-
abilities in libraries, license violations, or the separation of app code to find repackaged
apps. The approaches are mainly hindered by obfuscated code, and that app and library
code is compiled into a single binary file, which makes library code indistinguishable from
app code. Additionally, most library detectors use very restricted representations that
are not sufficient to detect obfuscated libraries. For example, some detectors use white
lists of known library package names to detect libraries. If all package names in an
app were obfuscated, the white lists are useless. Furthermore, library detectors that are
used to separate app code from library code often maintain a database of all methods to
identify the exact version of a library. However, such a database can never be complete
because there is no central source that could be checked for completeness.
Due to library detectors’ mentioned limitations, other approaches using these detectors
can only perform their functions to a limited extent. For example, analysts have devel-
oped more than 40 different repackaging detection approaches [LBK19] that inspect data
flows, control flows, and views to extract heuristics for their static and dynamic anal-
yses. However, all these approaches only insufficiently identify libraries in potentially
repackaged apps or are vulnerable to various obfuscation techniques. If a repackaging
detection approach misses filtering out library code, it could lead to false positives and
false negatives. On the one hand, false positives could occur because more than 60%
of the sub-packages in an app belong to library code [WGMC15]. This high percentage
of library code increases the similarity measurements used by repackaging detection ap-
proaches and let apps that use the same libraries seem to be repackaged. On the other
hand, false negatives could be caused by malicious actors who insert additional code into
repackaged apps to reduce the similarity values of the compared apps.
Repackaging detectors profit from improved library detection but also all approaches
that analyze the entire codebase to examine the data flow [ARF+14, RAMB16, ZWWJ15,
BP18, WL18, MW17, CYL+17, CFL+17] or recover obfuscated code [BRTV16, RVK15,
VCD17, Jaf17, AZLY19, CFPK20]. For instance, if an analysis identifies that a library
contains untrusted data flows, it directly can flag all apps that use this library as con-
taining the same untrusted flow. Therefore, using a library detector improves the speed
of app analyses and enables the analyses to deal with large numbers of apps.
The detection of library code supports many approaches. However, these approaches
are still challenged by obfuscation techniques. For instance, some of the approaches
struggle with repackaged apps that contain restructured and renamed code that may
lead to a lower similarity between the repackaged and the original app. Furthermore, if
analysts ignore obfuscated code or data during their investigations, they might fail to
identify sensitive information and come to undesired conclusions.
Code and data obfuscation challenges not only repackaging and library detectors but
also approaches that try to infer names for obfuscated code entities, such as classes, fields,
and methods. We refer to these approaches as name inference approaches [BRTV16,
RVK15, VCD17, Jaf17, AZLY19, CFPK20]. They use large numbers of repositories
that contain different projects to learn a mapping between the context and the name
of a code entity. However, these projects may also contain obfuscated code entities.
Even large open-source repositories such as Maven Central [Mav17] or GitHub [git20]
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contain obfuscated code entities. Additionally, while current approaches [WHA+18,
Mir18, WR17, Don18] can easily detect manipulated names of code entities produced
by standard obfuscators, some may circumvent detection using more advanced name
manipulations. Furthermore, most of the approaches that detect obfuscated names can
only identify whether the content of an app contains obfuscated names instead of locating
each individual obfuscated name. Similar limitations have approaches that try to recover
obfuscated strings [Dex20, sim20, Jav20a, Dex19b, RAMB16, BP18, WL18, ZWWJ15].
Instead of identifying the exact obfuscated string, the approaches analyze all strings that
flow into previously specified methods. The tracking and analysis of all flows of these
strings generate a huge time overhead that inhibits these approaches to process the large
number of apps mentioned earlier. An additional limitation of some of these approaches
is that they focus on a limited number of known string obfuscation techniques. Rather
than exploiting the integrated code that is used by all obfuscators to deobfuscate the
strings at the needed positions [WHA+18].
This dissertation contributes multiple approaches to overcome the drawbacks of others
and advance research of the above-described topics. For this purpose, the dissertation
focuses on:
• the identification of library names, versions, and classes,
• the separation of app code,
• the detection of repackaged apps,
• the detection of obfuscated class, field and method names,
• the recovery of names of library code entities,
• the identification of obfuscated strings,
• and their recovery.
1.2. Contributions of this Thesis
Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the abstract goal of this thesis, its challenges, and the
contributions (lower left-hand side). The abstract challenges are derived from general
definitions of obfuscation techniques [CTL97], and the contributions involve steps se-
curity analysts perform to examine unknown code [gui17, BRTV16, RAMB16]. First,
they identify known code parts using library identification and repackaging detection.
Second, they recover these parts using code deobfuscation. Finally, they examine the
revealed data after deobfuscating it.
From the abstract items on the left-hand side, we present the items on the right-
hand side, starting at the top with the analyses that are affected by our contributions,
continuing with the concrete challenges that arose during the pursuit of our goal, and
ending at the bottom with the subject areas to which we contribute our approaches.
While Figure 1.1 presents the different topics of this thesis, Figure 1.2 shows the rela-
tion between the different topics. Library detection and app code separation are used by
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the repackaging detection to filter out libraries and thus reduce false positives. The two
topics also support the mapping of original code-entity names to their obfuscated names
for libraries. In turn, the library mapping contributes to the detection of obfuscated
names, since manipulated library names can often provide insights into the patterns
used to obfuscate other code entities. Finally, the detection of obfuscated strings is used
in string deobfuscation. An approach that tries to reveal obfuscated strings without
detecting the exact location of obfuscated strings is forced to try all possible strings in
an app, causing a tremendous effort to analyze millions of apps.
The following paragraphs briefly summarize the concrete contributions of this thesis
depicted in Figure 1.2.
1. Library Detection The first contribution is an approach to identify the name,
version, and all classes of a library. Analysts can use this approach to detect vulnerable
versions of library code or filter out library code for repackaging detection. We developed
five code representations with different precision/recall trade-offs between handling more
complex obfuscation techniques and identifying a code piece as precise as possible. Using
these five representations, our tool LibDetect identifies library methods and uses the
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methods to deduce classes, packages, and the version of a library. We evaluated LibDetect
with state-of-the-art library detection approaches on a ground truth of 1,000 apps, and
it outperformed the other approaches by orders of magnitude. To facilitate further
research, we provide our approach and the 1,000 apps that we used to evaluate all
library detection approaches in a public repository.
2. App Code Separation An approach that identifies vulnerable versions of a library
requires detailed information about each class of this library. However, if this approach is
used to separate app code from library code, this information slows down the processing
speed of the approach. For instance, repackaging detection needs only the code of an app
and not the library code for its comparison algorithm. In the second contribution, we
developed an app-code separation approach using static analysis and machine learning
to support repackaging detectors. Our tool AppSeparator does not need to store the
library’s entire code representation to split library code from app code. It is based on
the assumption that app code accesses library code but not vice versa because library
code was compiled as a single module before its integration into an app [AL12].
With this assumption, AppSeparator extracts all entry points of an app and analyzes
which classes access these entry points transitively. Since obfuscation and optimization
can blur the lines between library code and app code, AppSeparator additionally extracts
the incoming and outgoing accesses to all classes and use a classifier to predict whether
a class belongs to app or library code.
Given our app-code separation approach, an analyst can use it for repackaging detec-
tion and other measurements for which the analyst requires only the app code. During
our experiments, AppSeparator outperformed all state-of-the-art approaches that use
library detection to separate app code.
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3. Repackaging Detection The third contribution is our approach CodeMatch that
detects repackaged apps in three steps: First, it filters out the library code of an app.
Second, it uses an abstract representation of the remaining app code and uses fuzzy
hashing to transform the representation into a fingerprint. Finally, CodeMatch uses this
fingerprint to compare repackaged apps with the fingerprints of original apps. Using our
approach can assists analysts in identifying repackaged apps that are commonly used to
spread malicious content [LBK19].
We evaluated CodeMatch with four state-of-the-art repackaging detectors and Code-
Match outperformed them all. In the end, we measured the impact of repackaged apps
on five different app stores. For this analysis, we downloaded more than 47,000 apps
and examined them using CodeMatch. The analysis showed that about 15% of the apps
are repackaged. We do not only provide the implementation of our approach but also
a data set of 1,000 manually inspected apps that can be used to evaluate repackaging
detectors.
4. Library Mapping While the first contribution only identifies which classes belong to
which library version, the fourth contribution analyzes the relation between library code
entities and their names, such as class names, field names, and method names. Using the
first and second contribution, we developed LibMapper that identifies obfuscated names
of library code entities and maps to them their original names from non-obfuscated
library code. First, LibMapper uses AppSeparator and LibDetect to identify all libraries.
Afterward, it uses LibDetect to identify all potential fully-qualified class names that
might be a non-obfuscated counterpart for the class under analysis. Using these class
names, LibMapper determines appropriate mappings for the field names and the method
names. In the end, LibMapper uses the most suitable mapping to assign it to the code
entities. We refer to the process of mapping original names of library code entities to
their obfuscated counterparts as library mapping.
We compared LibMapper with the state-of-the-art library mapping approach for An-
droid apps [BRTV16], and LibMapper outperformed the approach in all our experimental
settings. Analysts can use LibMapper to understand obfuscated apps and examine which
parts of the library code is used by malware.
5. Obfuscated Name Detection The fifth contribution introduces ObfusSpot an ap-
proach that identifies obfuscated names of code entities. First, it uses anomaly detection
to identify obfuscated names that differ from non-obfuscated ones by their character-
istics. Second, ObfusSpot analyzes an app for names that occur exceptionally frequent
because non-obfuscated apps contain, on average, more unique names. In the last step,
ObfusSpot uses library mapping to identify naming patterns of obfuscated library code
entities and use these patterns to identify obfuscated names of app code entities with
the same patterns.
Using ObfusSpot, we encountered code entities with obfuscated names in 99.99% of the
100,000 investigated apps. However, only 29% of the apps contained obfuscated names in
their main code, and the rest of the obfuscated names were contained in the library code.
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Furthermore, we found that some libraries are only released in obfuscated form. Analysts
can benefit from using ObfusSpot in two forms: First, it can be used to prevent obfuscated
names from being included in the learning process of approaches that infer names for
code entities. Second, these approaches can also use ObfusSpot to identify obfuscated
names and selectively replace them. In contrast to other detectors of obfuscated names,
ObfusSpot can identify the position of an obfuscated name, instead of only determining
that an app contains obfuscated names [WHA+18, Mir18, WR17, Don18].
6. Obfuscated String Detection In the sixth contribution, we conducted a study
of string obfuscation techniques in ad libraries of 100,000 randomly selected apps. In
this study, we selected all unique strings and manually analyzed whether they were
manipulated using obfuscation. Furthermore, we singled out all unique method calls
that return a string to manually analyze whether they are used to process obfuscated
strings that are hidden in other data structures. Using this procedure, we identified
21 different string obfuscation techniques that protect the content of the strings from
unauthorized extraction.
After examining these techniques, we created two approaches that complement each
other and use machine learning. The first one classifies obfuscated strings based on
their characteristics, and the second one identifies the logic used to deobfuscate a string
[WHA+18]. Using our detectors can assist other approaches in identifying obfuscated
strings. These approaches do not need to examine all strings in an app but can focus on
the obfuscated ones to analyze their content or deobfuscate them.
For the evaluation of our detectors, we obfuscated the strings of apps that were previ-
ously not obfuscated using the 21 techniques found in our study. Afterward, we executed
the detectors to determine whether they identify the obfuscated strings or the used de-
obfuscation code. The results show that both detectors are very powerful and can detect
all obfuscated strings.
7. String Deobfuscation In the last contribution, we developed StringHound an ap-
proach that uses the detectors from the previous contribution to identify obfuscated
string to deobfuscated them. For the deobfuscation, StringHound uses slicing [Wei81]
to extract the deobfuscation logic and all necessary values of an obfuscated string to
reveal its content. By extracting as much context of the obfuscated strings as possible,
StringHound circumvents anti-deobfuscation techniques.
We evaluated StringHound against four other string-deobfuscators using a data set
that we obfuscated using the techniques identified in the study of string obfuscation
techniques. StringHound outperformed the other tools by orders of magnitude. Fur-
thermore, using StringHound, we analyzed 100,000 apps and identified vulnerabilities
and accesses to private data hidden behind obfuscated strings. Moreover, our approach
revealed obfuscated strings in malware and apps installed on over 100 million devices.
During this analysis, we noticed that obfuscated strings are not common in app code
but are mostly used in obfuscated libraries.
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1.3. Structure of this Thesis
The remainder of this dissertation consists of four parts with chapters, which are orga-
nized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the basic terminology for the remainder of the
dissertation. First, it describes the different components, files, and code sections in an
Android app. Second, it gives an overview of different obfuscation techniques, including
the information which parts of an Android app are challenging to obfuscate. Finally,
the chapter gives a brief introduction to basic machine learning techniques that we have
used for our approaches.
Part I explains which approaches are necessary for the handling of obfuscated libraries.
It begins with the explanation of the difference between library detection and separation
of app code. Chapter 3 introduces our approach LibDetect to identify the libraries of
in obfuscated apps. Afterward, the separation approach AppSeparator is introduced in
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we introduce our repackaging detection approach CodeMatch
and show the effectiveness of LibDetect and AppSeparator is shown by using them for
repackaging detection.
The following Part II describes our library mapping approach LibMapper and our ap-
proach for the detection of obfuscated names ObfusSpot. Chapter 6 describes LibMapper
that identifies obfuscated library classes using LibDetect and AppSeparator. Using both
approaches, LibMapper determines for each identified class appropriate names for the
class, its fields and its methods. Chapter 7 explains the different techniques ObfusSpot
uses to identify an obfuscated name automatically.
Part III shows our string deobfuscation approach StringHound. While the Chapters 8
and 9 elaborate the manual and automatic identification of obfuscated strings, Chapter
10 explains the slicing and recovering of string values. During our study, we identified
21 unique string obfuscation techniques that use to design two detectors for obfuscated
strings. StringHound uses these detectors and extracts the context of each obfuscated
string to reveal the content of the string.
Finally, Part IV concludes this dissertation by summarizing the combined efforts of
our deobfuscation approaches and discussing future directions.
For each approach, we present its evaluation in the chapter that describes its imple-
mentation.
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1.4. Publications
Most of the contributions presented in this thesis have previously been published at
high-quality venues of software engineering and security conferences. This section gives
an overview of the author’s publications and how this thesis extends the respective parts
of the publications.
The following lists security and software engineering publications that have been pub-
lished by the author.
[GMB+20] Leonid Glanz, Patrick Müller, Lars Baumgärtner, Michael Reif, Sven
Amann, Pauline Anthonysamy, and Mira Mezini. ”Hidden in plain
sight: Obfuscated strings threatening your privacy”. In Proceedings
of the Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
ACM, 2020. accepted for publication.
[GAE+17] Leonid Glanz, Sven Amann, Michael Eichberg, Michael Reif, Ben Her-
mann, Johannes Lerch, and Mira Mezini. ”CodeMatch: Obfuscation
Won’t Conceal Your Repackaged App”. In Proceedings of the 2017
11th Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software Engineering, pages
638-648. ACM, 2017.
[GSWH15] Leonid Glanz, Sebastian Schmidt, Sebastian Wollny, and Ben Her-
mann. ”A Vulnerability’s Lifetime: Enhancing Version Information in
CVE Databases”. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference
on Knowledge Technologies and Data-driven Business, page 28. ACM,
2015.
[EHMG15] Michael Eichberg, Ben Hermann, Mira Mezini, and Leonid Glanz.
”Hidden Truths in Dead Software Paths”. In Proceedings of the 2015
10th Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software Engineering, pages
474-484, 2015.
This thesis is based on the following publications and parts of the thesis may contain
verbatim content from these publications.
CodeMatch: Obfuscation Won’t Conceal Your Repackaged App This publication
[GAE+17] describes the different representations used in LibDetect and CodeMatch. We
evaluated LibDetect and CodeMatch against state-of-the-art approaches, measured the
ratio of repackaged apps in five different app stores and established an approach to filter
out apps produced by app generators. Compared to the paper, this dissertation extends
the discussion of work related to LibDetect in Chapter 3, and extends the evaluation of
CodeMatch (Chapter 5) with the new app-code-separation approach from Chapter 4.
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Hidden in Plain Sight: Obfuscated Strings Threatening Your Privacy In this publi-
cation [GMB+20], we conducted a study of state-of-the-art string obfuscation techniques
and developed an approach to identify and recover obfuscated strings. In comparison to
the paper, in this thesis, we provide more details about the study’s string obfuscation
techniques in Chapter 8, and extended the evaluation of the obfuscated string identifi-
cation in Chapter 9 to compare our approach with other state-of-the-art techniques.
The content of the chapters 4, 6 and 7 appears for the first time in this thesis and will
be submitted after this thesis.
Name Obfuscation Against Obfuscation Name Detection and Name Recovery Chap-
ter 4 describes an approach to separate app code from library code to improve analyses
that focus only on app code. In Chapter 6, we introduce LibMapper, an approach that
outperforms the state-of-the-art name inference approach DeGuard [BRTV16] in recov-
ering obfuscated names in libraries. Finally, we introduce, in Chapter 7, an approach
that detects obfuscated names even if they were manipulated using dictionaries.
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In this chapter, we present the background information needed to understand the content
of this dissertation. First, a general overview of the architecture of an Android app is
given, followed by obfuscation techniques for Android apps. Finally, we provide an
overview of several machine learning algorithms used in this dissertation’s approaches
and experiments.
2.1. Android Application Architecture
The Android operating system is used on smartphones, smartwatches, tablets, TVs,
and various other devices. The apps installed by users range from games to managing
finances or even remote controlling drones [and20c].
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
• Activity
• Service
• Broadcast Receiver
• Content Provider
• Permissions
• …
Compiled Code
• Application Code
• Library Code
• Resource Code
• Native Code
Resources
• Values
• Raw Content
• Assets
• …
Developer Certificate
• META-INF
• CERT.RSA
• CERT.DSA
• …
Figure 2.1.: Content of an APK
An Android application is shipped as an Android Package (APK) that contains dif-
ferent files [apk20]. It contains the Android manifest that specifies the application’s
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starting point, the developer key used to sign the APK, the executable code, and the
resources needed to run the application. All code includes the main application code,
the code of the used libraries, and the native code. While the former two are compiled
together into one file, the native code can be used from different other files. Figure 2.1
shows the content of an APK, which is used throughout this dissertation. The following
describes the content in more detail.
2.1.1. Android Manifest
The Android build system stores its manifest in the AndroidManifest.xml file that also
specifies the package name that Google uses as a unique identifier for the whole app.
This package name also defines the namespace of the application [and20a]. Additionally,
the manifest defines hardware capabilities, intent filters, icons, labels, resource values,
required permissions, and code components. The code components are used as entry
points of the app are divided into activities, services, broadcast receivers, and content
providers. The following briefly describes the purpose of all the mentioned items in the
Android manifest.
Activity: An activity provides the user with an interactive window that contains either
a full-screen window or a floating window [Act20]. For instance, in activities, a
user can access the camera to take a picture, press a button, write text into a text
field, swipe the window, or perform other activities.
Content Provider: Content providers are essential building blocks of an application
to share the encapsulated data among different applications [con20]. For instance,
content providers present a method of selecting images and triggering the transfer
of an image to another contact.
Service: A service executes long-running actions without interacting with the user
or provides other applications with additional functionality [ser20]. For instance,
after a user selects to share a picture using a content provider. A service transfers
each byte of the picture to the contact’s device in the background.
Broadcast Receiver: A broadcast receiver is a basic class that handles incoming
broadcast requests. Such requests consist of intents that specify which action
should be performed by which process. For instance, an app can use broadcast
requests to access specific functionalities of other apps or exchange messages with
them [bro20].
Permissions: The Android operating system uses permissions to protect the privacy
of the device user. Developers can specify which permissions are needed to use
their apps. Additionally, the developer may define permissions that grant other
apps the usage of the provided services. Nevertheless, users need to decide whether
they grant the permissions for an app they want to install. Since most users are
not aware of the consequences for granting specific permissions, they grant almost
every permission request.
26
2.1. Android Application Architecture
The Android system differentiates between normal, signature, and dangerous per-
mission categories to assist users in their decision process. These categories mani-
fest in different authorization procedures: The system directly grants normal per-
missions without informing the user because they have little impact on the user’s
privacy. For instance, the user is not notified if an app accesses the internet because
this permission was already granted at installation time. Signature permissions are
automatically granted by the system if an app was signed with the same developer
key as another app that already has these permissions. This category uses the fact
that the required permission was already granted at the installation time of the
app with the same signature and could be accessed via the other app. Dangerous
permissions are only granted if users explicitly give their consent because these
permissions interfere directly with the privacy of the user [per20]. For instance,
the system asks the user if an app tries to send a SMS.
Icons, Labels & Resource values: For each app, the developer can set an icon
and a label used as default if no other icon or label is specified. Resource values
reference the location of additional icons, labels, and other values that cannot be
hardcoded into the manifest file. They depend on external behaviors, such as the
device screen, the language, or other [res20].
Intent Filters: Activities, services, and broadcast receivers communicate with each
other by sending intents. Intents contain actions and the necessary data for the
actions that the intent receiver should perform. If one of the above components
activates an intent, the system directs the intent to the app that specifies, in its
manifest, the corresponding intent filter [int20a].
Hardware Capabilities: A developer defines hardware capabilities to ensure that
the device on which the user installs the app possesses these capabilities. For
instance, an app that scans barcodes of products needs the camera to perform
its function. As a result, the developer may specify the camera capability in the
Android manifest by using the uses-feature-tag. In contrast to permissions,
hardware capabilities do not define which resources should be accessed, but which
hardware should be available to allow the app to execute the full functionality or
only parts of it [and20a].
Developer Certificate Before developers can publish their apps to a public store or run
them on any device, they need to sign them. For the signing process, the developers need
to create a certificate [cer20], which they can generate using either the RSA [RSA78] or
DSA [dsa20] algorithm. After generating and signing, the Android system can attribute
a specific app to specific certificate owners. They can use signature permissions to
access specific functionality without notifying the user again because the permissions
have already been granted to another app signed with the same certificate.
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2.1.2. Executable Code
The executable code consists of the main application code, all used libraries, and the
native code. While the two former code parts interact with the Android system via
the Android class library (android.jar), the native code has direct access to the system
[and20b]. Developers write the main application code in Java or Kotlin that the compiler
bundles with the referenced dependencies and the used libraries into a Java Archive
(JAR). The Android build system transforms the JAR file from the stack-based format
of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to the register-based Dalvik Executable (DEX)
format. The transformed file is often stored using the name classes.dex. It contains
all application code, library code, and code to reference resources, but not the native
part of the app. In the following, we explain all of the different code parts:
Application Code: The application code contains all components such as activities,
services, broadcast receivers, and content providers under the namespace, which
the developer specified in the manifest. However, in addition to the code under the
namespace, the developer can also write code under all other namespaces, making
it challenging to distinguish between the main code and library code.
Library Code: Library code enables the developer to use functionality without writ-
ing it from scratch. To use it, the developer needs to reference the code in the
dependencies. An often-used library is the Android support library, which enables
the developer to write code without taking care of the version of the underlining
Android class library.
Resource Code: The developer can include a variety of resources into an app to
improve the look-and-feel for users. Resources can contain animations, assets,
pictures, colors, the structure of individual windows, fonts, values, and raw con-
tents [res20].
For each resource category, the Android system generates a corresponding R class
that contains the resource IDs for each referenced resource. The build system
stores these resource IDs in public static final fields of these classes and in
specified mapping files that can be used to load the contents of the resources.
Native Code: With native code, an app can perform tasks more efficiently or use
additional native libraries [nat20]. For communicating with native code, the de-
veloper needs to use the Java Native Interface [jni20]. For instance, developers
can use native code to improve the efficiency of their realtime games. The code is
shipped in the APK but separated from the classes.dex file.
While APKs contain Dalvik bytecode, the tools described in this dissertation operate
on Java bytecode. For this reason, we use Enjarify to transform the Dalvik code back into
a JAR file. In contrast to other DEX-to-JAR transformers, Enjarify correctly handles
Unicode names, constants, casts, and exception handlers [enj17].
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2.2. Obfuscation Techniques
Code obfuscation manipulates the syntax of a given program without changing the se-
mantics of the code [MKK07]. In contrast, data obfuscation tries to hide the content
by changing or hiding its appearance. Since an app can only work properly with the
original data, the data needs to be reversed before the app is executed. For this pur-
pose, obfuscators integrate deobfuscation logic into the app, which reveals the original
data before it is used [WHA+18]. Developers use both of the obfuscation techniques in
benign apps to protect their intellectual property. However, malware writers also use
these techniques to hide their malicious payload.
2.2.1. Obfuscation of Android Apps
This section presents common obfuscation techniques that are the subject of this disser-
tation’s analyses. Previous works [CTL98, UPSB+11, SLGL09] found these techniques
in the wild, and some of them are used by known obfuscators [All19, Das19, Dex19c,
Pro17, dex19a, ZWZJ14, str19]. We also include optimization techniques in our list
because, akin to obfuscation, they transform the code so that it is harder to identify.
Throughout this dissertation, we will refer to both techniques as obfuscation techniques.
Name Mangling: Meaningful identifiers, such as field, method, class, and package
names, are replaced by meaningless, small sequences of characters; e.g., “Person”
→ “aa”. Furthermore, Allatori [All19] replaces meaningful names by case-sensitive
sequences of characters. With this replacement, tools that operate on a case-
insensitive filesystem (e.g., Windows) would overwrite all files with the same case-
insensitive name. Therefore, these tools cannot analyze the overwritten files. Most
obfuscators cannot only replace meaningful names by sequences of characters but
also by words from a dictionary which replace meaningful names by sequences of
these words [Pro17].
An obfuscator can replace package identifiers by other characters or even by an
empty string. This change moves all classes of the package into the default package.
While shortening the names makes code analyses harder, it also improves the app’s
overall performance due to the smaller code size [Pro17].
Nevertheless, obfuscators cannot change all code-entity names because some meth-
ods inherit or overwrite methods from the Android class library. The obfuscation
of these code entities would break the inheritance relation. Additionally, if obfus-
cators manipulate resources or code components referenced by external files, they
must update these files. For instance, if an obfuscator manipulates the compo-
nents specified in the Android manifest file or referenced resources in the code by
resource IDs, it must update the manifest file, the resource files, and the code so
that the app continues to work properly [WLG+17].
Modifier Changes: Field, method, and class modifiers can mostly be changed with-
out affecting the program’s semantics. The modifications can range from raising
29
2. Background
the visibility of classes or class members to more complex ones. For instance, rais-
ing the visibility from package private to public or adding/removing the final
modifier is straightforward, but transforming an instance method into a static
one requires an extra parameter to make the this reference explicit. Deobfusca-
tors [Jav20b] filter out methods with a synthetic modifier because they assume
that a compiler generates these methods. For this reason, some obfuscators add
this modifier to all methods in order to hide them.
Structural Changes to a Method’s Implementation: A fundamental technique
is to add non-operational instructions such as NOP’s - i.e., instructions that do
not affect the method’s semantics but modify the code’s syntactic structure. The
primary effects are a larger method body and shifted targets of jump instructions,
such as, if, switch or goto. These changes affect approaches that try to identity
methods using checksums or cryptographical hashes as fingerprints of the methods.
More progressive approaches change not only the syntax but also the structure
of the methods. For instance, some approaches change the if-instruction (e.g.,
from “if >” to “if ≤”). This change affects the method’s structure because the
positions of the basic blocks that are referenced by the if-instruction need to be
switched.
Code Slicing: Most apps do not use all functions of the included libraries. Therefore,
some obfuscators extract all the necessary code by gathering the essential functions
using a technique called slicing [Wei81]. For instance, if the entire code does not
call a method, it can be removed by creating a slice of the essential code. The
removal of multiple methods can lead to the removal of entire classes if no code
accesses these classes. Moreover, the removal of classes can lead to the removal
of entire packages if the packages do not contain any class that is accessed by the
main code.
Code Restructuring: Common obfuscators can move classes between packages and
methods between classes and update the references to these code entities. Such
changes affect all call sites related to the changed class structure. As in Code
Slicing, the re-location of methods or classes can lead to the removal of entire
classes or packages.
Method Parameter Manipulation: Reordering, removing, or adding method pa-
rameters affects both the method signature and its body. These changes gener-
ally require corresponding updates of all call sites. An obfuscator can reorder
a method’s parameters if it rearranges the arguments that are passed to this
method in the same order. The removing or adding of parameters requires the
re-assignment of indexes to the load and store instructions of the calling methods
and the manipulated method.
Constant Computation: An obfuscator can replace constant values with expressions
that compute the constant. For instance, an obfuscator can replace the constant
100 by the computation 10*10. The computation of constants can also include
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the insertion of fake branches into the code. Such branches can either contain a
condition that always resolves to the same value so that only one of the branches
is used or consist of two branches that perform exactly the same computation.
Simple analyzers cannot identify any of these fake branches [CTL98].
String Obfuscation: A more advanced technique is string obfuscation [Dex19c]. It
can use encryption, encodings, and different representations to hide the content of a
string. Obfuscators add logic at the code location that processed the original string
to reveal the obfuscated string’s content before it is processed [WHA+18]. For
instance, the string "Blue" is replaced by the string "Oyhr", and during runtime,
the app executes the integrated Rot13 [Sch07] deobfuscation logic directly before
the app code needs to process the revealed string.
Fake Types: Already existing classes, in particular from libraries such as the Android
class library, are duplicated or inherited and used within the program instead of
the original class. For instance, instead of using the class java.util.HashSet
an obfuscator can use a fake type com.MySet. In more advanced cases a field’s
primitive type is changed; e.g., from int to long.
While obfuscators can duplicate as much information as possible, they cannot
completely remove all extends or implements relations of all classes inheriting
from the Android class library. Thus, deobfuscators can use these relations to
determine the original type.
Code Optimization: Code optimizations can also influence the code’s structure when-
ever an obfuscator inlines methods like Code Restructuring, propagates values as
Constant Computation, removes unused variables as Code Slicing, or modifies the
control-flow as Structural Changes to a Method’s Implementation. Code opti-
mizations include typical peephole optimizations such as removing non-used in-
structions, replacing multiple instructions by semantically equivalent ones, using
algebraic laws to simplify or reorder instructions, using special case instructions,
and resolving the computation of addresses where possible.
Resource Manipulation: As described above, Android apps use various external
resources. Some analyses use the hash sums of resource files to identify a particular
app. However, obfuscators can change resources. For instance, an obfuscator can
add pixels to a picture, change words in an external text, add sounds to audio files
and frames to video files.
Apps use resources by loading them using references in their code that are gener-
ated by the Android system. For each resource that can be accessed by the code,
the system inserts an int field in a specially designated resource class in the code
(e.g., R.style). The system assigns the field a resource ID, and the field’s name
matches exactly the name of the accessible resource file. For instance, a field that
enables access to the resource main would appear as follows:
public final static int main = 163458935; where 163458935 is the resource ID.
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Since these fields are a part of the code, obfuscators may use Constant Computation
or Name Mangling to manipulate the values or names of the fields so that an
analysis cannot read the names or follow the values of the resources. However, if
an obfuscator changes the names of such fields, it also needs to change the resources’
file names. The change of these file names, in turn, can lead to other errors, as the
respective resources might be used in other files. Consequently, most obfuscators
either do not change the names of the fields in resource classes or change them
only if the developer of the app keeps track of the changes in other files.
Hide Functionality: Sophisticated obfuscators hide functionality by encrypting, re-
compiling, compressing, and virtualizing selected classes and adding code that
reverses the effects at runtime [SLGL09]. These techniques are currently the most
effective obfuscation techniques, but generally, slow down the app’s execution time,
need advanced knowledge of the app’s internal structure, or require manual code
changes. Hence, they are rarely used in practice.
2.3. Machine Learning
In this dissertation, machine learning algorithms are used for two different purposes.
First, objects are grouped by their measurable properties, which are called features.
These groups are called clusters, and the process to create these clusters is called clus-
tering. Secondly, we use machine learning to assign classes to objects. For this purpose,
an algorithm also uses features from objects. However, during classification, an algo-
rithm learns the relationship between the features and one or more target classes, either
given or determined by the algorithm. After the algorithms have learned either clusters
or the relationship between features and classes, the learned states of the algorithms
could be stored as so-called models. Afterward, the algorithms could load these models
to process features from an unknown object as input and output to which cluster the
object belongs or to which learned class the object can be assigned.
The following briefly introduces the machine learning algorithms [MD01] used in this
thesis for clustering and classification.
Suppose we want to analyze different weather conditions to either cluster them or
extract a decision from the data when children can or cannot play outside. We collect
in Table 2.1 the features Outlook, Humidity, Windy, and past decisions to Play outside
or not as a target class.
2.3.1. Clustering
For the clustering example, we only use the features Humidity, and Windy from Table
2.1 and try to identify clusters in the weather conditions. For some algorithms [kme20],
the number of clusters needs to be specified before starting the learning process. How-
ever, since we do not know how many clusters are present in our data set, we use the
expectation maximization [DLR77] (EM) clustering algorithm that can determine the
number of clusters using cross validation.
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Outlook Humidity Windy Play
sunny 71 false true
sunny 5 true true
sunny 0 true true
sunny 15 false true
sunny 20 true true
sunny 5 false true
sunny 80 true false
sunny 90 false false
sunny 69 true false
sunny 95 true false
sunny 69 false false
sunny 68 true false
overcast 5 true true
overcast 15 false true
overcast 5 true true
overcast 20 false true
overcast 69 true false
rainy 20 false true
rainy 50 false true
rainy 30 false true
rainy 80 true false
rainy 90 true false
Table 2.1.: Data set for playing outside
Cross validation is a statistical measurement method to determine the performance
of an algorithm. Like other algorithms, the EM algorithm uses 10-fold cross-validation,
in which the data set to be processed by the algorithm is randomly divided into ten
subsets, and the algorithm is applied ten times to the entire data set. Typically, for
classification, nine of the ten subsets are used to train a classifier, and one subset is used
for validation. However, the EM algorithm uses all ten subsets to initially assign all
data points to a randomly selected cluster and determine whether all data fits into one
cluster. Afterward, if the data does not fit into one cluster, the algorithm increases the
cluster number and repeats the clustering process until the data fits in the clusters. In
our example, the algorithm uses Humidity and Windy features from our data to cluster
them in three different clusters that correspond to the Outlook-Feature in 59.10% of the
cases. Finally, the EM algorithm returns per cluster for each feature the mean value
and standard deviation, which can be used to match new data points into the clusters
or measure the distance of data points to the centers of each cluster.
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2.3.2. Classification
For the classification of data sets, our experiments analyze different classifiers to identify
which classifier offers the best performance in terms of correctly classified objects. For
these experiments, we investigated the classifiers Multilayer Perceptron, Naive Bayes,
Logistic Regression, Random Tree, Random Forest, and REP Tree from Weka [HFH+09].
Weka is a framework used in many different research papers [Kun14, MJ15, AL11], which
presents a variety of different clustering and classification algorithms. We chose the five
classifiers because they are intended to represent all categories of Weka’s classification
capabilities.
In the following, we explain the different classifiers using from Table 2.1 the columns
Outlook, Humidity, and Windy as features and Play as a target decision to be learned.
First, we introduce the three decision trees Random Tree, Random Forest, and REP
Tree, followed by the algorithms Naive Bayes, Multilayered Perceptron, and Logistic
Regression.
A decision tree consists of leaves representing the consequences of various decisions and
decision nodes that contain conditions that determine the progress of a decision [Qui96].
Given the data in Table 2.1, a possible decision tree might be constructed like the one in
Figure 2.2. The decision tree can use each feature in multiple decision nodes and increase
the likelihood of deducing a definite prediction. Continuous values like Humidity, in our
example, are divided by the decision trees into different value ranges to find the most
suitable condition for a decision node.
Play 13
Don‘t Play 9
Play 4
Don‘t Play 1
Play 3
Don‘t Play 2
rainysunny
Play 5
Don‘t Play 3
<=70
Play 1
Don‘t Play 3
>70
Play 0
Don‘t Play 2
true
Play 3
Don‘t Play 0
false
Outlook
overcast
Humidity Windy
Play 6
Don‘t Play 6
Distribution
Legend
Feature
Condition
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Figure 2.2.: A possible outcome of a decision tree [dec20]
REP Tree The REP Tree algorithm [rep20] constructs a decision tree by identifying
features that represent the best splitting point between the target classes. Those features
are positioned in nodes that are further up in the decision structure. After a feature is
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selected, the algorithm searches for the best condition to split the data. For instance, the
algorithm decided that Outlook is the top feature in Figure 2.2. Based on this decision,
the algorithm could combine the possible values of Outcome in different variants such
as {sunny, overcast}, {overcast, rainy}, or {sunny, rainy}. However, it decided that all
values should be split into separated decision nodes because it leads to an early decision
for the value overcast.
After the algorithm determined the feature and the first splitting point, it repeats this
process until the remaining data is allocated into their target classes. If all remaining
data has the same target value, it adds a leaf representing it. In contrast, if all remaining
features values cannot be further split, the algorithm uses each target value’s probability.
For instance, in Level 2 of Figure 2.2, each node of the Windy-feature contains only data
that belongs to one target value. In contrast, in Level 1, the node of overcast returns
the probability of each target value.
A REP Tree can be constructed fast, and in contrast to other classifiers, using Weka’s
source code generation, it can be directly integrated into Java or Scala code.
Random Tree The Random Tree algorithm [Bre01] builds a decision tree from a given
data set using a similar approach as the REP Tree algorithm. However, instead of
determining the best feature for a decision node, the algorithm randomly selects one of
k features at each node. This procedure allows an even faster construction of a decision
tree by reducing large feature dimensions to the number of k features. For instance, this
algorithm could use only the feature Outlook and would calculate for each decision node
the probabilities of the possible target values similar to Level 1 in Figure 2.2. Thus the
algorithm’s decision for the value sunny would entirely depend on the chosen threshold
value.
Random Forest While the Random Tree randomly selects from a set of features in each
decision node, a Random Forest constructs multiple such trees and uses the ensemble
of these trees to predict the target value [Bre01]. It calculates the target values for all
trees and uses the value that is most frequently suggested.
For instance, the Random Forest could build different Random Trees from each possi-
ble combination of features in Table 2.1 and compose the trees for the classification. Let
us assume that the Random Forest builds a single tree for each feature, calculates the
possible probability values, and composes them. Such a Random Forest would produce
the following outputs for the last row of Table 2.1: The Outlook-tree would output for
rainy Don’t Play, the Humidity-tree would return for the value > 70 Don’t Play, and
the Windy-tree would return also Don’t Play. The most frequent result corresponds to
the target value Don’t Play, which is returned by the Random Forest.
Naive Bayes Contrary to the above-described decision trees, the Naive Bayes algo-
rithm [JL95] determines a target decision by calculating the probabilities (Pr) of each
target value (A) and all feature values (B). Afterward, the Bayes theorem [Bay91] from
Equation 2.1 is used to predict based on the probabilities a result for an unseen data
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Play Outside
true false P(true) P(false) total
sunny 6 6 6/13 6/9 12/22
overcast 4 1 4/13 1/9 5/22
rainy 3 2 3/13 2/9 5/22
total 13 9 13/22 9/22 100%
Table 2.2.: Probabilities for playing outside using the Outlook-feature
point. For instance, the algorithm would determine for each feature in Table 2.1 the
number of times the target value is Play or Don’t Play and divide this number by the
overall number of Play or Don’t Play rows. If we calculated the probabilities only of the
Outlook feature, we would get the results in Table 2.2.
Pr(A|B) = Pr(B|A) Pr(A)
Pr(B)
(2.1)
Applying the Bayes theorem on the Outlook-feature produces the following results:
Play|sunny =
6
13 ∗
13
22
12
22
=
6
12
= 0.5
Don′tP lay|sunny =
6
9 ∗
9
22
12
22
=
6
12
= 0.5
Play|overcast =
4
13 ∗
13
22
5
22
=
4
5
= 0.8
Don′tP lay|overcast =
1
9 ∗
9
22
5
22
=
1
5
= 0.2
Play|overcast =
3
13 ∗
13
22
5
22
=
3
5
= 0.6
Don′tP lay|overcast =
2
9 ∗
9
22
5
22
=
2
5
= 0.4
As we can see from the calculations, the Bayes theorem’s application produces the
same output as the split on Level 1 of the decision tree in Figure 2.2.
Logistic Regression The Logistic Regression algorithm [LCVH92] calculates a regres-
sion function based on the training data. Afterward, it uses a Sigmoid function [MD01]
with a predefined threshold value to represent the target decision in binary form. Since
regression can only be performed on numeric features, the algorithm converts all possible
nominal features into binary ones. For instance, the values of the Outlook-feature from
Table 2.1 are converted to create three features (Outlook=sunny, Outlook=overcast, and
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Outlook=rainy). After the learning procedure, the algorithm returns a function that can
predict a target value.
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Figure 2.3.: Plot of the Sigmoid function for the Humidity feature
To illustrate a simple logistic regression, Figure 2.3 presents the function calculated for
the Humidity-feature with the target decision Play from the Table 2.1. This illustration
shows that the smaller the humidity, the more likely the children are going to play
outside. Depending on the chosen threshold, the function produces more true positives
or true negatives. In this example, it seems that a threshold above 60% of the y-axis
would increase the function’s predictive performance because every data point above the
humidity of 60% is considered to result in the Don’t Play decision. Consequently, only
one false negative at the right upper corner remains.
Multilayer Perceptron The Multilayer Perceptron algorithm (MLP) [HTF09] belongs
to the algorithms of neural networks. It arranges artificial neurons that learn processes
similar to real neurons in a nervous system. It mainly uses so-called perceptrons, which
correspond to neurons that only connect to forward directed neurons without back-
propagation. These perceptrons are arranged in layers so that one layer of neurons
communicates with the next layer to learn weights based on the input data.
The input layer is composed of as many perceptrons as input features. This layer is
usually connected to one or more hidden layers that are transitively connected to the
output layer. The output layer possesses as many perceptrons as output decisions are
expected. All perceptrons are trained multiple times by processing the training data in
multiple iterations to learn a function that converts input features to output decisions.
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The iterations are also known as epochs. The longer the algorithm iterates over a data
set, the better it predicts the relationship between the features and the targeted decisions;
however, longer training times make the learned model less suitable for predicting new
data (overfitting). Given the data in Table 2.1, the MLP algorithm would first convert
the nominal features into binary ones like the Logistic Regression algorithm and then
create as many input perceptrons as the number of features (after conversion, we would
get five features). Furthermore, the algorithm creates an output perceptron and as many
hidden perceptrons as selected. For instance, for the data from Table 2.1, a Multilayer
Perceptron with a hidden layer of 12 perceptrons would be connected similarly to the
one in Figure 2.4.
Input Layer ∈ ℝ⁵ Hidden Layer ∈ ℝ¹² Output Layer ∈ ℝ¹
Figure 2.4.: Example Multilayer Perceptron for the weather data1
1Source: http://alexlenail.me/NN-SVG/index.html
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Obfuscated Libraries
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Obfuscated Library Detection and
Separation of App Code
The sharing of code components as libraries positively impacts the development speed
of new software products [Boe99]. Functionalities condensed in these libraries no longer
have to be written from scratch, which led to the fact that, on average, more than 60%
of the sub-packages in each Android app belong to library code [WGMC15].
Nevertheless, many analyses need to filter out library code to run efficiently or focus
solely on application code [YFM+17, IWAM17, STDA+17, and17, LLB+17]. For in-
stance, analyses of intellectual property may focus solely on application code to identify
plagiarism and other license violations. However, the separation of application code is
challenging since the Android compiler bundles library code with the application code
in a single binary. Moreover, many developers obfuscated their binaries to reduce the
used disk space and execution time, so that the separation of application code becomes
even more laborious [pro20a, Don18].
While the separation of app code is already challenging, some analyses require the
detection of libraries. For instance, the detection of vulnerabilities and comparison
of similar functionality needs identifying all used library versions [BBD16]. If an app
contains obfuscated library code, an analyst cannot directly compare it with a library
version that contains a known vulnerability. Without identifying obfuscated library
versions, the vulnerabilities remain on the user’s device and may corrupt the user’s
privacy and security.
Previous works studied library detection and the separation of app code using different
techniques and for different platforms [CLZ14, ZZJN12, LWW+17, MWGC16, BBD16,
ZDZ+18, WWZR18, FR19, ZBK19, CWC+16, STA+16, TLS17, HLT18]. For instance,
current malware analyses [gui17], in low-level code, disassemble the machine code and
identify library functions by mapping the first 32-byte of a function with a white list
of previously collected bytes of library functions. Further analyses use white lists or
heuristics to identify library packages [CLZ14, ZZJN12]. However, neither the white
lists nor the heuristics are sufficient to identify most of the library code.
Due to the lack of effective library detection and app code separation, analyses that
require these techniques cannot do their work properly. For instance, not identified
library code may cause apps are considered as repackaged apps only because they use
the same library code. In this part, we present two approaches: One for detecting
libraries and one for separating app code. Both approaches are used by our repackaging
detection to filter out libraries in apps of different sizes.
In Chapter 3, we introduce our approach LibDetect that identifies libraries contained
in Android apps by using five representations. These representations assist LibDetect in
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identifying libraries as precisely as possible by abstracting only over as much information
as necessary.
Chapter 4 describes our AppSeparator that separates app code from library code.
For the separation, we developed a machine learning model based on features derived
from the assumption that library code does not access application code but vise versa.
We base this assumption on the fact that libraries are available as stand-alone artifacts
without depending on any application code [AL12], and, therefore, cannot access it.
To show the usage of library detection and app-code separation, we describe in Chap-
ter 5 our approach CodeMatch that identifies repackaged apps by comparing the simi-
larities of two app codebases. For the similarity measure, CodeMatch uses LibDetect and
AppSeparator to filter out library code that would otherwise bias the similarity results
of the approach.
In the end, we summarize all contributions of this part.
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Developers of Android apps use libraries to extend the spectrum of services for their
users. However, these libraries become outdated over time and may contain vulnerabil-
ities. Some developers may not be aware of this process, as certain libraries are only
available in obfuscated form. If analysts try to examine such an app, they need to detect
each library before proceeding with any further analyses. Consequently, library detec-
tion is one of the first steps taken by analysts to get an overview of an application’s
capabilities and features. For instance, library update, vulnerability, plagiarism, license
violation, and repackaging detection can use library detection as a preliminary analysis
to identify or filter out libraries.
Since the manual detection of large amounts of library code is not feasible, analysts
often use white lists of library package names to identify their apps’ code. While this
procedure may save analysis time and reveal some parts of a library, it is not suitable
to identify library packages with obfuscated names. For instance, as described in the
background, Name Mangling transforms library package names so that they are no longer
distinguishable from app packages.
As a result, more advanced library detection approaches use checksums [gui17] of
application and library classes to distinguish between them. However, a single bit-change
in such a checksum can evade such approaches. Since most apps contain obfuscated
libraries [Don18] to protect their intellectual property or reduce the required disk space,
bit-changes occur frequently and render simple checksum comparisons ineffective.
Further approaches [LWW+17, MWGC16, BBD16, ZDZ+18, WWZR18, FR19, ZBK19]
build fuzzy signatures of methods or classes that remove or replace information of a
method or class. However, these approaches combine the extracted fuzzy signatures to
entire packages or use package information in the signature, which makes them vulner-
able to Code Restructuring, Code Slicing, and Code Optimizations.
To address the drawbacks of previous approaches, we propose a new library detection
approach called LibDetect that uses representations of method bodies. Because classes
contain obfuscated code, we establish a reliable comparison of method bodies using
several hierarchically organized representations. The first one consists of the original
bytecode. Each following representation abstracts over additional aspects, such as the
used identifiers or the control flow to match method bodies with higher obfuscation
complexity. Hence, each higher level is less precise but potentially enables a higher
recall.
As a result of the precision/recall trade-off, we internally organized our library detec-
tion to use the representations step-by-step. If an obfuscator only marginally changed
a library method, LibDetect will identify the method using less abstract representation
than more effectively obfuscated methods. After identifying the library method bodies,
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LibDetect regroups them to match the potential original library classes. This procedure
enables the identification of methods and classes even if an obfuscator moved these across
class/package boundaries.
In order to evaluate the robustness of our representations, we extract roughly 200
APKs from Maven Central [Mav17], which represent samples of libraries and obfus-
cate them with a state-of-the-art obfuscator (DexGuard [Dex19c]). Afterward, we tried
to reidentify the original library methods. For the evaluation of LibDetect’s compet-
itiveness, we randomly selected 1,000 apps, identified the libraries manually to estab-
lish a gold standard, and compared the precision and recall of LibDetect against Li-
bRadar [MWGC16] and a white-list approach.
The remainder of this chapter describes state-of-the-art library detection approaches
in Section 3.1, our approach LibDetect in Section 3.2, the evaluation in Section 3.3,
threats to the validity of our experiment in Section 3.4, and conclusions in Section 3.5.
3.1. State-of-the-Art Library Detectors
In this section, we describe related work for our library detection approach. First, we
describe approaches that use simple white lists to filter out library code, followed by
more advanced techniques.
White Lists Different library detection approaches [CLZ14, ZZJN12] use common li-
brary white lists to detect and filter out library code. White lists contain package names
of known libraries, and several approaches compare them with package names contained
in Android apps. Currently, the most extensive white list is collected by Li Li et al.
[LKLT+16]; it contains over 5,000 different names of library packages. The problem
with using white lists is that if an obfuscator changes one character of a library’s pack-
age name, it can completely evade the library detection.
LibD [LWW+17] uses the sub-/super-package relation (inclusion) and the inheritance
relation between classes across packages (inheritance) to construct one reference graph
per library. The tool compares these graphs with graphs extracted from an app. LibD
constructs a graph using (sub-)package names as nodes and inheritance or inclusion
relations as directed edges.
While this approach reduces the information needed for comparing libraries to the
package level, it is vulnerable to changes that split or merge packages (i.e., Code Re-
structuring). If the package hierarchy is changed, the graph has a different number of
edges per node, and, therefore, LibD is no longer suitable for the detection of libraries.
LibRadar [MWGC16] detects libraries by extracting for each package a feature vector
consisting of the observed Android API calls and using LSH-hash [RU11] as a fingerprint
for the comparison of these package vectors.
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This approach is resilient against the renaming of packages, but cannot handle Code
Restructuring, Code Slicing, and Code Optimization because all these obfuscation tech-
niques merge or split packages, which can affect each package vector.
LibScout [BBD16] identifies obfuscated library versions by using the Android API. It
generates Merkle-tree-hash [Mer87] profiles in three steps to identify library code. First,
it extracts all method signatures from an app, removes the method names, and replaces
all types of a method signature that do not belong to the Android API with an “X”. E.g.,
the method signature MyHash addHashObject(int,String,HashBase) is transformed
to X (int,String,X). Afterward, it hashes the new method representations using a
cryptographic hash.
Second, LibScout sorts all representations of a class and hashes them together (class
hashes).
Third, it sorts the class hashes again and hashes them per package (package hashes).
Finally, it uses all hashes to identify library code depending on the obfuscation of meth-
ods, classes, or packages. If the package hash does not match, LibScout uses the class
and the method hashes to identify a library fragment. If no hash matches, the code ele-
ment does not belong to the library code. The hashes are generated for different library
versions to identify specific versions.
Since the computation of the tree hash inherently reflects the implicit tree structure
between packages, classes, and methods, LibScout is not robust against cross-class/-
package Code Restructurings. For instance, it would fail to identify all classes that belong
to a library because of the assumption that an obfuscator moved all classes into the same
package. Additionally, it is vulnerable against Method Parameter Manipulation since its
method representation does not handle reordering, addition, or removal of parameters.
LibPecker [ZDZ+18] identifies library classes by extracting different information from
the classes, their fields, and their methods. From all code entities, it extracts a selected
set of access flags, the package membership, all used types from the Android class library,
and the array dimensionality. Afterward, LibPecker compares all information extracted
from a library with information from an app by considering the number of members. If
the information of a library class matches a class the app, it is flagged as a library class.
While LibPecker can use the extracted information to identify light obfuscated classes,
it is still sensitive to Modifier Changes since the selected access flags such as static are
still forgeable by obfuscators. Additionally, it is vulnerable to Code Slicing and Code
Restructuring because the replacing or removal of methods or classes can cause massive
changes in the extracted information. Consequently, LibPecker misses library classes
that are scattered across different packages or moved into one package.
Orlis [WWZR18] identifies library classes by using Merkle-tree-hashes as LibScout.
However, Orlis does not only use the method signature, but it also extracts all transitive
method calls of a method, and represent them in the same way as the method repre-
sentations from LibScout. Afterward, it sorts the new representations and hashes all
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representation of a class or app using a rolling hash algorithm to compare the resulting
hashes with ones from apps or their classes. Orlis uses the algorithm to immunize the
fuzzy representation against small code changes.
However, unlike our approach, Orlis is vulnerable to Code Restructuring and Code
Slicing because the replacement or the slicing of large methods changes their fuzzy rep-
resentations of classes. Additionally, Orlis is vulnerable to Method Parameter Manipu-
lation because the usage of LibScout’s signatures is not safe against reordering, addition,
or removal of parameters.
Lastly, a significant threat for the Orlis approach is String Obfuscation because string
obfuscation adds calls to new deobfuscation methods to each class. Since all meth-
ods containing an obfuscated string call the deobfuscation methods, String Obfuscation
changes large propotions of Orlis’s method representations.
Feichtner et al. [FR19] propose an approach that extracts features from the abstract
syntax tree (AST) of all library methods and compares these with the ones in apps.
The tool builds a vector for each AST by counting the occurrences of parameters, local
variables, and method invocations. Afterward, it uses vectors from library classes and
packages to match app classes and packages. The matching is performed by calculating
the inclusion of the vectors in library classes and packages.
Unlike our approach, the tool is vulnerable to Code Slicing, Code Restructuring, and
String obfuscation because they change the counted instructions in the AST vectors.
Additionally, the tool is sensitive to Method Parameter Manipulation because the removal
or addition of parameters also changes the AST vector. For instance, we could remove all
parameters and replace them with field accesses. This action would completely change
the vector.
LibID [ZBK19] builds method representations by combining class access-flags, class
inheritance-information, method descriptors, and an abstract form of basic blocks. It
extracts these method representations from all libraries and compares them with all
extracted representations of apps. Afterward, LibID compares the matched method
signatures to known library class and package constellations. For method parameter-
types that can be changed by obfuscators, it replaces each type that is not from the
Android class library with a X as done by LibScout.
In contrast to our approach, LibID is vulnerable to Modifier Changes since their
method signature contains the class access flags. It is also vulnerable to Code Slic-
ing and Code Optimization because both techniques can remove certain information
and change the representation of methods. Additionally, Code Restructuring can move
methods and classes to different classes and packages, which may break LibID’s class
and package constellation matching. Furthermore, Method Parameter Manipulation can
reorder, remove, or add parameters to the method descriptor, which evades sLibID’s
representation-matching algorithm.
46
3.1. State-of-the-Art Library Detectors
LibFinder [CWC+16] extracts from each app method, a control-flow graph (CFG), and
calculates a centroid for each CFG. Physicists use centroids to describe the perfect point
to balance any given shape. To identify libraries, LibFinder compares all centroids of a
known library package with all packages in an app. The comparison is only performed
if a library and app package share a common name prefix.
Because of the usage of the name prefix, LibFinder is vulnerable to Code Restruc-
turings. If an obfuscator moves either some classes into another package or flattens
the entire package hierarchy, LibFinder can no longer identify libraries. Additionally,
since LibFinder calculates centroids for methods with bodies, it may miss interface and
abstract classes of libraries.
LibSift [STA+16] identifies libraries in a given app by excluding the primary module
of the app. For the exclusion, it extracts all packages, their hierarchy, and their depen-
dencies. As dependencies of a package, LibSift uses method calls, class inheritance, and
field references. Given the hierarchy and dependencies of all packages, LibSift merges
the packages with high cohesion and low coupling to identify the app’s primary module.
While LibSift needs no database of library packages, it is vulnerable to Code Restuc-
turings. For instance, if an obfuscator merges all packages into one or moves many of
the classes into another package, LibSift is no longer suitable to extract the primary
package.
Ordol [TLS17] abstracts method instructions, calculates n-grams of the abstracted
instructions, and matches these n-grams with the ones of known libraries. After the
method matching, Ordol matches the surrounding classes with library classes. If the
matched methods or classes violate some predefined conditions of Ordol, it refines the
method matching until the methods and classes meet these conditions. In the end, Ordol
outputs a coverage measure and its similarity score for each library.
Due to the usage of solely the method body as a similarity measure without considering
the method signature, Ordol may fail to identify all classes that belong to a library. For
instance, methods of interface and abstract classes do not contain instructions, and
therefore, Ordol misses these classes. Additionally, the instructions’ abstraction does
not consider the rearrangement of parameter-lists from method calls, which may lead to
missing methods and a less accurate library detection. String Obfuscation can also be
the cause of method mismatches since it inserts additional methods and method calls,
which may decrease libraries’ similarity score.
Hongmu Han et al. [HLT18] propose a similar approach as LibScout except that they
base their initial method signatures on the control-flow graph of a method. Despite the
different initial signatures, their approach is also vulnerable to LibSout’s drawbacks that
make their approach no longer suitable if an obfuscator uses Code Restructurings.
Discussion Table 3.1 shows a summary of each approach, its representation, and its
weaknesses against obfuscation. The above discussions and the summary indicate that
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Table 3.1.: Categories of library detection approaches
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White Lists [CLZ14, ZZJN12] Package Names 7 7 7
LibD [LWW+17] Package Inclusion/Inheritance 7
LibRadar [MWGC16] API Calls 7 7 7
LibScout [BBD16] Merkle-tree-Hashes 7 7
LibPecker [ZDZ+18] Code Entity Info. 7 7 7
Orlis [WWZR18] Transitive Method Calls 7 7 7 7
Feichtner et al. [FR19] AST Vectors 7 7 7 7
LibID [ZBK19] Basic Blocks 7 7 7 7
LibFinder [CWC+16] Centroids 7
LibSift [STA+16] Package Dependencies 7
Ordol [TLS17] Method N-Grams 7 7
Han Hongmu et al. [HLT18] Control-Flow Graph 7
none of the existing approaches can handle all obfuscation techniques. Consequently, we
need a better library detection that handles library instances with a changed package
hierarchy, string obfuscation, or other advanced obfuscation techniques. Additionally,
most of the approaches have either a missing database or are generally not publicly
available. Beyond white lists, LibRadar is the only approach that is entirely publicly
available at the moment. Both white lists and LibRadar have their specific limitations
mentioned above. These limitations result in a poor recall, as we will show in our
empirical comparison of these techniques against our new approach (cf. Section 3.3).
3.2. LibDetect
In this section, we present our approach LibDetect that enables the detection of library
code from a given Android package (APK). LibDetect relies on abstract representations
of the app’s code to handle different obfuscation techniques.
LibDetect is a code-signature-based library detection approach that can detect a li-
brary even if an obfuscator slices it down, moves its classes to another package, or puts
instances of app classes into the packages of the library. Furthermore, LibDetect ad-
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Figure 3.1.: Toolchain to detect library classes
dresses the shortcomings of existing approaches [CLZ14, ZZJN12, LKLT+16, MWGC16]
that only identify libraries based on their packages. Such an approach may miss indi-
vidual library classes or accidentally flag app classes as library code if it considers all
classes in a package as library code. In contrast, LibDetect searches for copies of library
methods and later aggregates potential matches to classes, i.e., LibDetect detects library
code at the granularity of classes.
To match individual methods, we need to deal with the obfuscation of both methods
and classes, because other methods may reference these. Since obfuscation introduces
variation in the method’s code, we counter its effects by matching our abstractions from
library code stored in our database. In this process, the degree of abstraction becomes a
tradeoff between precision and recall: If LibDetect uses a more concrete representation
to match a library method, it gets fewer or no potential matches than with more abstract
representations. Additionally, matches with the more concrete representation yield li-
brary methods with higher similarity to the matched method in the app. However, with
this representation, we might miss library methods changed by a more advanced obfus-
cator. Using a higher abstracted representation, we are more likely to find potential
matches for an app method. Nevertheless, we may also falsely match the method with
a larger number of library methods. Figure 3.1 depicts the overall process of LibDetect
which we describe in the following sections.
3.2.1. Representation
In order to deal with the obfuscation of methods and classes (see Section 2.2), we use
five different abstract representations of methods. The representations build upon one
another, each abstracting over some additional elements of the original bytecode com-
pared to its predecessors. Our approach uses the representations in a sequence, starting
with the original bytecode to more abstract ones up to the most abstract. In this pro-
cess, we consider only the findings of the least-abstract representation as our result. The
following explains the generated representations in more detail:
We use the Bytecode (BC) of a method with its opcodes, the method signature,
and offset, to reliably detect non-obfuscated library methods.
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In the Addressless Representation (AR), we remove all method modifiers, pro-
gram counters, and NOPs, since an obfuscator can use this information to manipulate a
method’s body. Additionally, we abstract over jump targets by replacing forward jumps
with the key “along” and backward jumps with “back”. Taken together, this addresses
respective Structural Changes to a Method’s Implementation and Modifier Changes.
In our example method, the column AR & NR in Table 3.2 shows that the references
of the if_icmpne →9, if_icmpge →18 and goto →19 from column BC are changed
to along and the program counters are dropped.
In the Nameless Representation (NR), we address Name Mangling and Fake
Types. To construct the representation, we remove the method names from method
signatures and invocation instructions. Additionally, we replace non-Android-API type
references in return, parameter, field, array, and invocation instructions by lists of the
types’ Android-API supertypes. These lists represent those parts of type information
that an obfuscator cannot manipulate. We obtain them by traversing up the type hierar-
chies, collecting all interface and class types defined in the Android/Java SDK, including
the type java.lang.Object. Given the type lists, we order all types alphabetically to
avoid mismatches based on different type orders.
Table 3.2.: A compare(int, int) method in BC, AR, NR, and SPR.
BC
0:iload_0
1:iload_1
2:if_icmpne→9
5:iconst_0
6:goto→19
9:iload_0
10:iload_1
11:if_icmpge→18
14:iconst_m1
15:goto→19
18:iconst_1
19:ireturn
AR & NR
iload_0
iload_1
if_icmpne→along
iconst_0
goto→along
iload_0
iload_1
if_icmpge→along
iconst_m1
goto→along
iconst_1
ireturn
SPR
load
load
if→along
const
if→along
load
load
if→along
const
if→along
const
return
Table 3.3.: A method signature’s AR and NR.
AR NR
Declaring Type MyHashSet [HashSet, Object, Set ]
Method Name get
Parameter Key [Object ]
Return Type int int
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Table 3.3 shows the AR and NR method signature of Object get(Key) which is
declared by the app class MyHashMap. This app class is a clone of Android’s HashMap
class. For this example, we assume that the app class Key inherits only from Object
and that MyHashMap inherits from AbstractCollection, Map, and Object. While the
signature of AR contains the app-specific type-information, its NR is identical to the get
method from Android’s HashMap. This allows the representation to detect MyHashMap
as a Fake type.
In the Structure-Preserving Representation (SPR), we sort the parameter type
lists from NR in lexicographical order to address Method Parameters Manipulation. Ad-
ditionally, we avoid Fake Types by removing all type information and the indexes from
load and store instructions. For example, the instructions astore and dstore_2 for
storing an object or a double, are both represented by store. In order to unify size-
dependent instructions, such as ldc and ldc_w and we also drop all string constants,
e.g., log messages, to address Constant Computations that exchange these. Furthermore,
we improve our handling of Structural Changes to a Method’s Implementation by rep-
resenting all compare and jump instructions by if. However, the jump direction, i.e.,
“along” or “back” is kept.
To provide an exhaustive mapping from bytecode instructions to their SPR, we added
the mapping in the appendix of this dissertation (cf. Section 12.8).
In the Fuzzy SPR, we address stronger Code Optimizations, Constant Computations
and Code Slicing by using fuzzy hashes of the token sequence from our SPR with the tool
SSDEEP [Kor06]. This tool enables us to uncover similarities in the presence of various
obfuscations. SSDEEP chunks the input sequence depending on the total sequence
length, abstracts each chunk to a single character, and concatenates all characters to a
hash. It then repeats this process with a doubled block size. Consequently, the resulting
signature consists of the two hashes and the used block size. Using this technique,
SSDEEP increases the abstraction level of the hash by the sequence length of the input.
Table 3.2 shows an example method compare(int, int) displayed in the first four
representations. We excluded the fifth representation since it represents a fuzzy hash of
the previous representation SPR. First, the AR removes the offsets and replaces the jump
addresses of the offsets 2, 6, 11, and 15. Last, the SPR removes all type annotations of
the instructions and transforms the jump instructions to if-keys.
Table 3.4 shows all obfuscation techniques handled by the five representations and
our approach LibDetect. Bytecode addresses no obfuscation technique, but our approach
uses it to identify unchanged library code. The AR handles small structural changes and
modifier changes. Each following representation handles more obfuscation techniques.
However, Code Restructuring can only be handled with the combination with LibDetect.
None of the representations or LibDetect can handle hidden functionality since, for this,
an approach needs to execute an app, and LibDetect only performs a static analysis.
To improve the precision of our matching procedure, we extract the fully-qualified
name of a method, its instruction count, its enclosing class, and its defining package as
metadata.
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Table 3.4.: Comparison of obfuscation to handling entities.
Obfuscation BC AR NR SPR Fuzzy SPR LibDetect
Name Mangling 7 7
Modifier Changes 7
Structural Changes to a 7
Method’s Implementation
Code Slicing 7 7 7 7
Code Restructuring 7 7 7 7 7
Method Parameters Manipulation 7 7 7
Constant Computation 7 7 7
Fake Types 7 7
Code Optimization 7 7 7
Hide Functionality 7 7 7 7 7 7
3.2.2. Lookup
In order to find library methods to which an APK’s method might correspond, we need
a database of known library methods that enables an efficient lookup. For the lookup,
we hash all five abstract representations of known library methods using the SHA-1
function [ErJ01] (the two fuzzy hashes of the SPR are processed individually) and build
an index for the hashes of each representation. For the lookup, we use these indexes to
point to the methods’ metadata.
Algorithm 1: Best-matching methods
Data: Method m
Result: Matching methods
1 matches ←lookup(m.FQN , m.BC);
2 if matches ̸= ∅ then return matches;
3 matches ←lookup(m.FQN , m.AR);
4 if matches ̸= ∅ then return matches;
5 for repr in m.{AR, NR, SPR, FuzzySPR1, FuzzySPR2} do
6 matches ←lookup(repr);
7 if matches ̸= ∅ then return matches;
8 return ∅;
Given an APK method, we use Algorithm 1 to lookup potentially-matching library
methods in our reference database. The algorithm looks for matches using our abstract
representations in increasing order of abstraction. The first two lookups search the
database for methods with a matching fully-qualified name (FQN) and the same BC
or AR as the APK method. These two representations allow us to precisely identify
library methods that are not or only slightly obfuscated. All subsequent lookups ignore
the declaring classes’ FQNs, to address Name Mangling. To ensure that we have not
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missed a method, we perform another lookup with the AR and proceed with the other
representations until we find at least one match or otherwise declare the method as
non-library code. This way, we find potential matches even in the presence of strong
obfuscation with the highest match confidence. The matches of weak obfuscated methods
avoid unnecessary large sets of method matches on more abstract representations.
3.2.3. Method/Class Matcher
In the last step, we aggregate the APK methods for which we found potentially-matching
library methods to library classes.
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Figure 3.2.: Aggregating potentially-matching methods to library classes.
Figure 3.2 shows the app’s structure, i.e., the packages (ellipse), classes (rectangles),
and methods (diamonds) it contains. The code of each included library corresponds to
a fragment of this structure (b, c, C, D, F, and k, m, o, p). Due to Code Restructuring,
this fragment of a library may have a different structure than its respective original.
Also, due to Code Slicing, elements of the original library might be missing (n’ diamond
shape).
For the aggregation of the code in Figure 3.2, LibDetect filters all app packages that
match with code from the same library package and sorts them by the number of match
methods from this library package. We refer to this number as the app-to-library-method
count.
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Afterward, LibDetect continues for each library package in descending order of the
app-to-library-method count. For example, from app package c in Figure 3.2, two app
methods o,p match methods from the library package c' and one app method match
methods from the library package b'. Therefore, since more methods match from pack-
age c than from package b, LibDetect first processes c and then b.
Next, LibDetect computes for each library package a mapping from app classes to
library classes. For this mapping, it considers only potentially-matching library methods
from that library package. It maps each app class with the library class to which the
highest number of methods match. If multiple classes match equally many methods, the
procedure picks the library class with the closest size in terms of bytecode instructions.
Each library class is mapped only once. For example, the app class F in Figure 3.2 is
mapped to the library class F', because two of its methods potentially match methods
from F'.
Finally, LibDetect filters out class mappings that have less than half as many bytecode
instructions as the mapped library class and reports the remaining mappings as library
classes. The filtering of the described app classes avoids false positives caused due to a
few methods that occur very frequently, especially in our abstract representations. For
instance, if LibDetect matches only the initializers of a class without matching more than
half of the code, then this class is removed from the mapping.
3.3. Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate LibDetect’s effectiveness in detecting library classes by an-
swering the following research questions:
RQ1 How robust are our code representations against state-of-the-art obfuscation?
RQ2 How effective is LibDetect compared to other library detection approaches?
For the experiments we used a server with two AMD(R) EPYC(R) 7542 @ 2.90 GHz
(32 cores / 64 threads each) CPUs and 512 GB RAM. The analyses were executed using
OpenJDK 1.8_212 64-bit VM with 20 GB of heap memory and MySQL 5.7 for the
library database.
3.3.1. Robustness of Code Representation
We assess the robustness of our code representations against obfuscation by applying
LibDetect to obfuscated apps for which we know the used set of libraries.
Setup We downloaded from Maven Central [Mav17] all available 193 APKs for which
the build files (POM file) document the used libraries. Afterward, we obfuscated these
APKs using DexGuard, an extension of ProGuard [Pro17] that is integrated into the
Android development environment and recommended by the Android developer board
[pro20a]. Compared to ProGuard, DexGuard adds more advanced obfuscation tech-
niques, in particular, string obfuscation and fake types. We use DexGuard with four
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preset configurations: Renaming, Optimization, String Obfuscation, and all of them
Combined. DexGuard’s default configuration enforces Renaming, therefore it is always
enabled.
During the obfuscation process, DexGuard generates a detailed mapping file that
specifies the origin of every obfuscated method. Using this information, along with the
description of libraries stored in the APK’s POM file, we can assess whether LibDetect
classifies a method correctly as belonging to a library.
Evaluation We filtered all methods (≈ 26%) with less than ten instructions (e.g., simple
getters and setters or default constructors), because, after name mangling, such methods
are indistinguishable. Subsequently, we checked for each method, whether it is a library
method and at which abstraction level LibDetect classified it as a library method (cf.
Algorithm 1).
Results Figure 3.3 shows how often LibDetect’s method matching correctly classified
a method as belonging to a library. For each configuration of DexGuard, the figure
visualizes the percentage of methods found to the total number of methods per project
using standard box-plots.
Observation 1 Our results indicate that our representations are very robust against
state-of-the-art obfuscation techniques (RQ1). In the case of Name Mangling, we
correctly classified more than 95% of all methods. Moreover, if all obfuscation
techniques are combined, we identified still more than 70% of all methods correctly.
Figure 3.4 shows the importance of each representation. It depicts at which abstrac-
tion level/representation an obfuscated library method was detected. As expected, BC
and AR could not find any library methods. Both rely on names, which are changed
by the applied obfuscations in all configurations. However, these representations are
still valuable in detecting unobfuscated methods that we have tested with the same set
without applying obfuscation.
Interestingly, even if all obfuscation techniques are combined, the nameless represen-
tation (NR) already enables us to correctly classify a method in the vast majority of
cases (> 95%); this makes NR the most relevant representation. Nevertheless, SPR and
fuzzy SPR are still needed to identify obfuscated library methods, and they are needed in
more and more cases, increasing by 0.5% per obfuscation technique. Overall, the results
indicate that our design decision to consider the representations in increasing order of
their level of abstraction is helpful.
3.3.2. Library Detection
In this section, we present the results of the comparison between LibDetect and other
library detection approaches.
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Figure 3.4.: Relevance of representations
Setup We collected 8,000 Android related libraries: ≈7,000 from Maven Central and
≈1,000 additional JARs collected manually by searching for package names from the
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common-library list of Li Li et al. [LKLT+16] and the package names of LibRadar’s
database [MWGC16] (cf. short description of LibRadar in 3.1). The Maven Central
JARs were collected by analyzing the latest versions of the build files with dependencies
to Android APIs (keyword “android” in the group ids of the dependency). Using all
8,000 libraries, we build the reference database, as described in Section 3.2.
For the evaluation of LibDetect on apps in the wild, we randomly selected 1,000
apps (99% confidence level; 5% confidence interval) from the app stores Anzhi [Anz17],
Google Play [pla17a], App China [App17b], HiApk [HiA17], and Freewarelovers [Fre17].
Afterward, we measured the precision and recall of LibDetect, the common library white
list (Common Libraries) by Li Li et al. [LKLT+16], and LibRadar [MWGC16]. We chose
the five app stores to avoid biases, such as only small apps or only language-dependent
apps. To determine the ground truth, we first identified the libraries used by the apps
through manual code inspection, which enabled us to assess both the precision and recall
of all approaches.
Results Figure 3.5 shows the average precision and recall of each approach. The Com-
mon Libraries set has an average precision of 99.6 % and a recall close to 9.3 %. LibRadar
has an average precision of 99.7 % and recall of 11.5 %. LibDetect has an average pre-
cision of 80.2%, and an average recall of 87.2%.
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Figure 3.5.: Average precision, recall and F2-measure of the different library detection
approaches
57
3. Library Detection
Discussion Given that library code causes false positives in code-based security analy-
sis, identifying as many library classes as possible (i.e., a high recall) is essential. In order
to reflect this statement, we calculated for Figure 3.5 the harmonic-balanced F2-measure,
which weights recall higher than precision.
Observation 2 LibDetect is more effective than the state-of-the-art approaches
(RQ2). In our experiments, it identified the majority of library code (F2-measure
of 85.7%) and outperformed the white list with Common Libraries and the tool
LibRadar.
LibRadar’s low recall 11.5% is due to its package-level abstraction. As discussed above,
the approach misses library classes that obfuscators move across package boundaries.
A careful analysis of the false positives/negatives of LibDetect revealed that the false
positives are primarily due to Activity and Listener-classes that often occur in UI-
intensive apps and which can be found in app-code as well as in library code. These
classes often have very similar functionality and differ only in their names. Hence, they
are indistinguishable to LibDetect because the (original) names are no longer available.
The filtering of potentially obfuscated data-container classes of libraries caused LibDe-
tect’s false negatives; in general, a container class primarily declares several fields along
with respective getters and setters and, as discussed earlier, such short methods are
filtered out.
3.3.3. Summary
LibDetect identifies library versions based on identified library classes, but does not map
library classes. However, security analyses can use LibDetect to filter out library classes
to focus solely on the app code.
The robustness experiment shows that LibDetect is suitable against many obfuscation
techniques, especially Code Restructurings and String Obfuscation render many library
detection approaches unusable. While LibDetect does not share many drawbacks of
other approaches, it is not suitable for the detection of small library classes because
these classes are too similar to other classes that belong to the app code. Therefore, we
omit small classes from our analysis.
The authors of Orlis compared it against LibDetect and showed that Orlis has higher
precision and recall for library detection of classes. However, we designed LibDetect,
not for library mapping of classes but library class detection. As the authors of Orlis
confirm, the precision and recall of LibDetect for mapping libraries based on sub-packages
are significantly higher than those for classes. Besides the higher mapping ability of
Orlis, it is vulnerable to Code Restructuring, Method Parameter Manipulation, String
Obfuscation, and Code Slicing.
3.4. Threats to Validity
In the following, we discuss the threats to the validity that are related to our library
detection experiments.
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We construct LibDetect’s reference database from all libraries in LibRadar’s database,
the latest Android related libraries from Maven Central, all libraries from a public white-
lists [LKLT+16] and a popular-libraries list [mus17]. Nevertheless, the database may not
contain all libraries used by apps in our evaluation datasets. In this case, LibDetect may
fail to identify some of the library classes, and cause false positives or false negatives,
but – given the size and quality of the data set – the overall error should be negligible.
Assembling an extensive, up-to-date reference database for LibDetect might be un-
practical. We argue that since we include only public libraries listed in public databases
and lists, assembling the database can be fully automated, which would allow frequent
updates without any manual effort.
The evaluated apps from Maven Central may not be representative of apps in gen-
eral. We chose these apps because they document their library dependencies, which
allowed us to construct a ground truth for evaluating the library detection tools (see
Section 3.3.2). The experiment shows how well LibDetect can discover (library) code
embedded in a completely-obfuscated app. The impact of specific apps on the results of
these experiments should be rather small.
In order to evaluate the impact of obfuscation on library detection, we used the obfus-
cator DexGuard, which applies renaming, optimization, shrinking, and string obfusca-
tion. To the best of our knowledge, no existing library detection handles more advanced
techniques. Other obfuscators might apply different or stronger techniques, such as vir-
tualization, class encryption, class loading, control-flow flattening, and packaging. To
the best of our knowledge, no existing library detection approach handles the latter
techniques.
3.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a library detection approach that uses five representations
to identify obfuscated libraries as precise as possible with high recall. For the detection,
our approach LibDetect uses the matched library methods to aggregate them to entire
library classes and evade multiple obfuscation techniques.
In our evaluation, we showed the robustness of our representations and the effective-
ness of LibDetect. Our experimental setup demonstrated that LibDetect outperforms
state-of-the-art library detection approaches by identifying more than six times more
library classes. Furthermore, our work inspired the development of another approach
Orlis [WWZR18] that improved the mapping of library classes.
59

4. App-Code Separation
Many approaches analyzed Android apps to identify whether developers obfuscated
their code [WHA+18, Don18], the app contains malware [FGL+13, FLB+15, AMSS15,
ARSC16, STDA+17], or the apps are repackaged [YFM+17, IWAM17, STDA+17, and17,
LLB+17]. These approaches separate library code from the main app code to reduce the
influence of library code on their analyses.
Currently, some approaches use library detection to separate app code. While library
detectors such as LibDetect require a database of all library methods from all versions
of each library to identify the library correctly, maintaining such a database to separate
app code requires additional effort. For instance, some libraries are only released in an
obfuscated form (cf. Section 7.3), which makes the identification of all associated meth-
ods challenging. Furthermore, the comparison of app methods against library methods
generates additional overhead during the analysis. This overhead increases with each
added library because the comparison algorithm needs to check the method signature
for each new library. The additional overhead slows down analyses that use library
detection as a prefilter.
In order to reduce the additional overhead caused by library detection, we propose
AppSeparator that splits application code from the included library code without using
a database with method representations that need to be maintained for each version of a
library class. We based the implementation of AppSeparator on the separate compilation
assumption [AL12], which states that even though the app code has dependencies on
library code, this is not true vice versa. This assumption stems from the fact that libraries
are independent modules that developers integrate into their apps. As a consequence,
libraries have no explicit dependencies on a specific app.
Other approaches [LVHBCP14, LWW+17, STA+16] tried to build an app separation
based on this assumption, but have not considered name obfuscation or multiple pack-
ages for app code. For instance, one approach uses only all classes contained in the
main package defined in the Android manifest [LVHBCP14]. However, a developer can
insert additional packages that contain parts of the app code. Additionally, no previous
approach can identify obfuscated classes that were moved into other packages because
these approaches focus solely on packages that are changed using Name Mangling.
To prepare the separation of app code, AppSeparator extracts all entry points of an app
and all classes that transitively access these entry points. All these classes are flagged
as potential app code. However, since some entry points may belong to library code,
AppSeparator uses a white list [LKLT+16] to filter out these entry points. We use a white
list because we assume that entry points are hard to obfuscate [WLG+17], as mentioned
in Section 2.2. After filtering the library entry points, AppSeparator uses a classifier
to determine whether a class actually belongs to the app code since optimizations and
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restructuring of code can result in the insertion of references to app code into a library
class. The classifier uses as features for each class the unique class counts of how many
classes are used by the class to be analyzed and how many classes use this class, also
called fan-in and fan-out. Using these counts, AppSeparator trains the classifier to
distinguish between app and library classes. During AppSeparator’s construction, we
used the knowledge from Section 2.2 to avoid any information that can be obfuscated
by these techniques.
To evaluate AppSeparator, we used the data set collected in Section 3.3.2. We used 80%
of the data for training and testing and 20% to measure the performance of AppSeparator
against two of the state-of-the-art library detection approaches. To identify the most
suitable classifier for our data, we trained multiple classifiers on our training data set
and measured the correctly classified instances and the misclassification rate using 10-
fold cross-validation. Given the best classifier for our data, we compared LibDetect
and LibRadar with AppSeparator using the 20% of the collected data. AppSeparator
identified more app classes than the other two approaches. Furthermore, we found that
the additional overhead for extracting the fan-in and fan-out is needed to identify app
classes more accurately.
In the following sections, we present the related work for our approach in Section 4.1,
our approach AppSeparator in Section 4.2, the evaluation in Section 4.3, threats to the
validity of our experiments in Section 4.4, and conclude our contributions in Section 4.5.
4.1. State-of-the-Art App-Code Separators
In this section, we describe the related work for separating app classes from library
classes. The related approaches are similar to the ones from the library detection chap-
ter because all tools that identify library packages or classes could also be used to
separate these packages or classes from one another. Since we have already shown the
different weaknesses of the approaches in the previous chapter, we only summarize these
weaknesses in Table 4.1.
The approaches [CLZ14, ZZJN12] that separate app code using white lists are vulner-
able to Name Mangling, Code Restructuring, and Code Slicing because any change to
the names or the structure of the library code cannot be compensated with a static list.
Most other approaches are vulnerable to Code Restructuring because their fingerprints
change when an obfuscator restructures large parts of the code. While Ordol [TLS17] is
immune to such obfuscation techniques, it is sensitive to Method Parameter Manipula-
tion because Ordol could produce the same fingerprints for methods that have different
parameters.
Additionall, approaches such as LibScout [BBD16], LibID [ZBK19], Orlis [WWZR18],
or the one from Feitcher et al. [FR19] are evaded by Method Parameter Manipulation
because their fingerprint changes.
Another threat for three approaches [WWZR18, TLS17, FR19] is String Obfuscation.
While these approaches do not use strings in their fingerprints, the fingerprints con-
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Table 4.1.: Categories of app code separation approaches
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White Lists [CLZ14, ZZJN12] Package Names 7 7 7
LibD [LWW+17] Package Inclusion/Inheritance 7
LibRadar [MWGC16] API Calls 7 7 7
LibScout [BBD16] Merkle-tree-Hashes 7 7
LibPecker [ZDZ+18] Code Entity Info. 7 7 7
Orlis [WWZR18] Transitive Method Calls 7 7 7 7
Feichtner et al. [FR19] AST Vectors 7 7 7 7
LibID [ZBK19] Basic Blocks 7 7 7 7
LibFinder [CWC+16] Centroids 7
LibSift [STA+16] Package Dependencies 7
Ordol [TLS17] Method N-Grams 7 7
Han Hongmu et al. [HLT18] Control-Flow Graph 7
tain representations of all methods and method calls, which can be changed by this
obfuscation technique.
AppSeparator does not suffer from the same drawbacks as the other approaches be-
cause it does not require a database of all method representations. These representations
are essential to identify libraries but are not needed to separate app classes from others.
Recap The discussion above indicates the need for a better app code separation that is
resilient against the above-described obfuscation techniques without using an extensive
database that stores all library representations. Without such a database, the mainte-
nance of its entries can be avoided, which removes the overhead to keep the represen-
tations of such approaches up-to-date. The maintenance of such a database is tedious
because no central register administrates these libraries, and new apps may use libraries
that are not known to the general public.
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4.2. AppSeparator
In this section, we describe our approach AppSeparator that separates app code from
library code. For the design of our approach, we used the separate compilation assump-
tion [AL12], which states that app classes depend on library classes but not vice versa,
and library classes also depend on other library classes. Following this assumption’s in-
tuition, we extract all classes in the main package, all entry-point classes, and all classes
that transitively access the entry point classes.
To identify all transitive accesses, AppSeparator starts with all classes defined in the
main package and all entry points and adds in each iteration additional potential app
classes by checking whether they access the current set. AppSeparator completes its
iteration if it does not find additional accesses to the set of potential app classes.
To avoid entry points that could belong to libraries, AppSeparator uses a white list of
library package names to filter them out. We assume that a white list is sufficient for
filtering because, as mentioned in Section 2.2, entry points are hard to obfuscate.
Because obfuscation can influence the dependencies of classes and blur the lines be-
tween app classes and library classes, we extract two sets of dependency information
for each class and train a classifier based on this information. This classifier decides for
each class, whether it belongs to the app or library code. The first set of dependencies
contains the classes used by a class under analysis (fan-out), and the second one consists
of classes that use the class under analysis (fan-in).
Figure 4.1 shows the process of AppSeparator to split the app code from the library
code. It extracts the fan-in and fan-out set of each class, computes the entry point
information, and classifies each class to belong to the app or library code.
Next, we explain each step in detail.
APK
Entry Points
Class / Library
Mapping
Classifica�onExtrac�on
FanIn, FanOut Legend
Processing Step
Output Ar�fact
Figure 4.1.: Process of AppSeparator to classify classes into app or library code
4.2.1. Extraction
For the extraction of entry points, AppSeparator collects all subtypes of Activity,
Service, ContentProvider, and BroadcastReceiver because these classes are the only
ones that define entry points. In addition to the entry points, it extracts the app’s
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namespace to identify the main app package. Using the entries and the namespace, we
identify the initial set of classes that belong to the app code.
The entry points and the namespace are defined in the Android manifest. Conse-
quently, we assume that obfuscators do not apply name mangling because they cannot
keep track of all references of entry points [WLG+17]. Given this assumption, AppSep-
arator filters library entry points by using the first two segments of package names and
comparing them with segments from a list of library package names (e.g., for the package
name com.google.android.test, the first two segments would be com.google).
After the filtering, AppSeparator derives for each class its fan-in and fan-out set. To
collect the fan-out set, AppSeparator extracts all field types, parameter types, return
types of all methods, types of inheritance relations, and types used in the method bod-
ies. Afterward, it excludes all base types or types that belong to the Android class
library because, for the fan-out set, we consider only the relations between types that
are bundled in the app’s compiled code. Using the types of the fan-out set, AppSepara-
tor deduces the fan-in set by collecting all reverse relations of the types. Given the app
classes in packages of entry points and the fan-in/fan-out relations, we use Algorithm 2
to calculate the remaining potential app classes.
Algorithm 2: Determine potential app classes
Data: Initial App Classes app_classes, FanIn fanIn
Result: Set of potential app classes
1 queue ←app_classes;
2 result ←app_classes;
3 while queue ̸= ∅ do
4 current ←dequeue(queue);
5 if current ∈ fanIn then
6 for fi in fanIn[ current ] do
7 if fi ̸= current and fi ̸∈ result then
8 result = result ∪ {fi};
9 queue.enqueue(fi)
10 end
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 return result;
Algorithm 2 uses a work-list to iterate over all classes that use app classes and add
them to the result set. In the beginning, the algorithm loads the initial potential app
classes into a queue (line 1) and iterates over all class usages of the queued elements (line
6). If a class is already in the result set or equals the current class under analysis (line
7), the algorithm will continue with the next class from the current class’s fan-in set.
Otherwise, the algorithm inserts the class usage into the result set and the processing
queue (lines 8 & 9) to analyze the usages of this class usage in another iteration. Once
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the algorithm cannot add further classes to the queue, and all queued elements are
processed, the algorithm returns all identified potential app classes. In the remainder
of this chapter, we will refer to the extraction process as IntuitionSeparator because
the resulting set of this algorithm can already be used to separate the app code of
non-obfuscated apps.
4.2.2. Classification
Since the results of the IntuitionSeparator can be influenced by inserting false references
or moving established references, we train a classifier that takes such actions into account.
For the classification, we use the dependencies of all potential app classes as features to
make our classifier immune to Name Mangling. Next, we describe the training and the
used features, followed by the classification using the trained model.
Training We show in Table 4.2 all features that were gained from the information of
the extraction process to train our classifiers.
Table 4.2.: Features for the REP Tree classifier
Feature Description
Fan-in count Number of unique class usages
Fan-out count Number of classes that are used by the class
App fan-in count Number of class usages that are potential app classes
App fan-out count Number of potential app classes that are used by the class
Library fan-in count Number of class usages that are potential library classes
Library fan-out count Number of potential library classes that are used by the class
Is entry point 1 if the class is an entry point, 0 otherwise
Is app class 1 if the class is a potential non-library class, 0 otherwise
We chose these features based on the following intuitions and assumptions:
Fan-in/Fan-out We use the count of fan-in and fan-out to provide a classifier with
an estimation for the coupling of the analyzed class. This measure’s intuition is
that entry points of app code have a low fan-in count because other classes rarely
access them. Consequently, classes that have high fan-out and a high fan-in count
indicate no entry points of app code.
App fan-in/fan-out: The fan-in and fan-out of app classes indicate how many other
app classes use the class under analysis or are used by it. While the usage of app
classes stems from our overall intuition that app classes use library code but not
vice versa, a high number of usages of the class under analysis by app classes can
indicate a central app class such as a data container.
Library fan-in/fan-out: For these features, we assume that all classes that are not in
the set of potential app classes belong to library code. The fan-in of these library
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classes indicates that the class under analysis is also a library class. If the class
under analysis uses many library classes, it can indicate a high coupling to these
classes, which implies that the class under analysis is also a library class.
Is entry point: If the class under analysis is flagged as an entry point, and the class is not
in a library package, this feature indicates an app class. We base this assumption
on the statement in Section 2.2 that components and their corresponding references
that reside in the Android manifest are hard to obfuscate.
Is app class: If the extraction process flagged the class under analysis as a potential
app class, it indicates that the class belongs to the app code. A classifier gets a
hint with this flag to compare the first assignment with other available features.
After extracting the above-described features, we train multiple classifiers to evaluate
the most suitable classifier for our use case. The evaluation of the most suitable classifier
is discussed in Section 4.3.2.
Classification After processing each class, the trained classifier returns a probability of
whether a class belongs to the app code or library code. To get a binary decision, we
use a threshold at the probability of 50%. We consider all values below 50% as library
classes and all above or equal as app classes. If the classifier assigns a class to the app
code, this class and all classes accessing this class will be flagged as app code for the
next iteration to update the set of potential app classes for the next class under analysis.
To ensure that different processing orders of classes do not influence the results of the
classifier, we process the classes by the order of the app fan-out count. Given a classifier,
we first perform the extraction and then the classification over all classes. In the end,
AppSeparator returns a report that shows our assignment of classes to either library code
or app code.
In the next section, we evaluate which classifier is the most suitable for AppSeparator
and compare AppSeparator’s precision and recall with other approaches.
4.3. Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the ability of AppSeparator to separate app code from the
library code. In order to evaluate our approach, we investigated the following research
questions:
RQ1: What is the best classifier for AppSeparator to split app code from library code?
RQ2: How accurate is AppSeparator compared to other library separators?
RQ3: What impact has the classifier of AppSeparator on its overall effectiveness?
RQ4: How effective is AppSeparator on obfuscated apps?
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The following describes the data set used to train, test, and validate our approach.
Then, we determine which classifier is the most suitable for our use case. Afterward, we
compare AppSeparator with LibDetect, LibRadar, and IntuitionSeparator that uses the
extraction of our approach without the classifier. In the end, we analyze AppSeparator’s
effectiveness on different sets of obfuscated apps.
For our experiments, we used the following setup. The underlying server had two
AMD(R) EPYC(R) 7542 @ 2.90 GHz (32 cores / 64 threads each) CPUs and 512 GB
RAM. The analyses were executed using OpenJDK 1.8_212 64-bit VM with 20 GB of
heap memory.
4.3.1. Dataset
For our experiments, we built a ground truth to compare the results of our AppSeparator.
In order to identify libraries in apps, we manually analyzed the code of the apps. As
initial analysis, we used the common library list of Li Li et al. [LKLT+16] and the
package names of LibRadar’s database [MWGC16] (cf. a short description of LibRadar
in Section 3.1) as white list to identify names of library code in an app. Afterward, we
analyzed all classes that are either obfuscated or not contained in the package names of
the white list. Finally, each class that did not belong to the library code was assigned
to the app code.
For the first three experiments, we selected 1,000 apps from five app stores (cf. Sec-
tion 3.3.2) and randomly split the dataset into 800 apps for the training and test set and
200 apps for the validation set. We used the validation set to compare AppSeparator with
other tools. Some of these apps contain obfuscated code, and some are not obfuscated.
For this reason, we assessed, in the fourth experiment, AppSeparator’s ability to separate
code in a controlled environment of obfuscated apps. Consequently, we collected all 453
non-obfuscated apps from the F-Droid store that contains open-source apps, which are
not influenced by advanced obfuscation techniques. After downloading these apps, we
obfuscated them using ProGuard’s standard configuration and a configuration to which
we refer in further experiments as the advanced obfuscation configuration.
While the standard obfuscation configuration replaces meaningful names with mean-
ingless random sequences of characters, the advanced configuration uses all additional
options for the name obfuscation. This configuration enables the repackage option that
removes all package names by moving all classes into the root package of the app and
uses a natural-language dictionary for ProGuard’s name replacement procedure instead
of using random character sequences.
4.3.2. Classifier Selection for AppSeparator
We analyzed Naive Bayes, Multilayer Perceptron, Logistic Regression, Random Tree,
Random Forest, and REP Tree from Weka’s collection [WF02] to assess the most suitable
classifier for our data. While we trained most classifiers using their default values, we
evaluated the Multilayer Perceptron using four different epoch values because of their
impact on the classifier’s performance.
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For each classifier, we used Weka’s 10-fold cross-validation [HTF09] to train and test
them on the 800 apps. Afterward, we compare the correctly-classified instances and root
mean squared error of the classifiers given the cross-validation statistics. The root mean
squared error is a measure for the false classifications of a model. During the 10-fold
cross-validation, the trained classifiers processed a total of 1,171,616 classes.
Table 4.3.: Selection of classifiers for AppSeparator
Classifier Correctly Classified Root Mean Squared Error
Naive Bayes 80.57 % 37.83 %
Multilayer Perceptron (one epoch) 85.25 % 32.08 %
Multilayer Perceptron (five epochs) 85.82 % 31.65 %
Multilayer Perceptron (10 epochs) 85.89 % 31.55 %
Multilayer Perceptron (20 epochs) 85.92 % 31.47 %
Logistic Regression 84.65 % 34.46 %
Random Tree 87.19 % 30.37 %
Random Forest 87.22 % 30.13 %
REP Tree 90.21% 17.00%
Table 4.3 shows the correctly classified and false-classified measures of all classifiers.
While the Multilayer Perceptron seems to improve after each epoch, the classification
performance with more epochs only slightly increases. Both the Random Tree and
Random Forest achieve more than 87% correctly-classified instances.
Observation 3 We identified that the REP Tree yields the best scores with our
training data. It correctly classified 90.21% instances and the false classification
rate (root mean squared error) is only 17%. The results in Table 4.3 show that REP
Tree is the most suitable classifier to process our data (RQ1), and therefore, we
select it for AppSeparator.
We assume that because the other decision trees are based on randomly selected fea-
tures, they selected a hierarchy of features that resulted in poorer results. Furthermore,
the other classifiers may produce unsatisfactory results because they cannot handle con-
tinuous values (Multilayer Perceptron) or assume conditions that do not hold (e.g., Naive
Bayes assumes that all features are independent of each other).
4.3.3. Comparison against other Library Detectors
Given the validation set, we measured precision, recall, and F1−measure of AppSepara-
tor, LibRadar, LibDetect, and IntuitionSeparator that uses only the extraction step of
our approach without the classifier. By using IntuitionSeparator in our evaluation, we
analyze the impact of the classifier on the performance of AppSeparator. We executed
all approaches on the validation set consisting of 200-apps with 62,675 app classes and
246,758 library classes. Figure 4.2 shows the results of the four tools.
As we can see in Figure 4.2, LibRadar has the highest precision but at the cost of a
poor recall of only 12.46%. While LibDetect has higher recall than LibRadar, it has a
20.31% lower precision.
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Figure 4.2.: Average precision, recall and F1−score of all approaches
Observation 4 Comparing AppSeparator with IntuitionSeparator shows that the
classifier improves the detection performance significantly (RQ3). AppSeparator’s
precision is about 38% times higher, and the recall is about 15% higher than the ones
of the IntuitionSeparator.
Observation 5 AppSeparator is more accurate than all other analyzed tools; it has
a recall of 99.62% and achieves a F1-measure that is at least 11.55% higher than
the ones of the best-analyzed separator (RQ2). The precision of AppSeparator is
the second highest, only surpassed by the precision of LibRadar that has the worst
recall.
4.3.4. Performance on Obfuscated Apps
For this experiment, we used all 453 apps from the F-Droid store that were not obfuscated
and obfuscated them using ProGuard’s standard and advanced obfuscation configura-
tion. The F-Droid store is an open-source platform, so the analyzed code contains no
complex obfuscation.
Because we obfuscated the apps, we acquired for each app the mapping files produced
by ProGuard. These files contain which names the obfuscator mapped to which other
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names. From these mapping files, we can deduce all library classes by using a com-
mon white-list [LKLT+16] of library package names and comparing the package names
with the original ones. Using these mapping files, we determine for each app whether
AppSeparator separated the app classes from the library classes correctly.
Standard Advanced
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Figure 4.3.: Average precision, recall and F1−score of AppSeparator on both obfuscation
configurations
Figure 4.3 shows the results of AppSeparator executed on the app set that we obfus-
cated using the two configurations. In the experiment with the standard configuration,
AppSeparator has higher recall than in the one with the advanced configuration (90.18%
vs. 87.71%). However, in the latter experiment, AppSeparator achieves a slightly higher
precision than in the former (94.01% vs. 94.62%).
Observation 6 The high recall and precision indicate that AppSeparator identifies
library classes even when obfuscators change their name or restructure their code
into other packages. Therefore, we can conclude that AppSeparator is very effective
for app-code separation even for obfuscated apps (RQ4).
The advanced configuration replaced all names belonging to library code and removed
all reference points to separate the libraries. However, AppSeparator was still able to
separate 87.71% of the classes correctly.
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Observation 7 Consequently, we claim that even though AppSeparator could not
use its white list to filter out known library code, it separated most of the classes in
an app.
4.3.5. Summary
In the first experiment, we chose multiple classifiers to determine the most suitable
among them to separate app classes from library classes. We chose these classifiers
because they are commonly used in literature for similar problem domains and can
process our input features.
In the second experiment, we compared AppSeparator with IntuitionSeparator, Li-
bRadar, and LibDetect. We selected these separators because they are the only publicly
available state-of-the-art approaches released with their complete database. AppSepara-
tor outperformed the other approaches in all our experimental settings.
The third experiment shows AppSeparator’s performance on obfuscated apps by pro-
cessing apps obfuscated with ProGuard’s standard name obfuscation and an advanced
configuration for name obfuscation. While we used ProGuard to obfuscate the selected
apps, other obfuscation tools use either the same name-obfuscation scheme or ProGuard’s
name obfuscation as a post-processing step. AppSeparator correctly classified at least
87.71% of all analyzed library classes.
With these results, we conclude that AppSeparator is a powerful approach to separate
app code from library code. It is even suitable if an obfuscator repackages all classes
into a single package and manipulates all names of the app under analysis. We discuss
threats to the validity of our evaluation in the next section.
4.4. Threats to Validity
We constructed AppSeparator’s reference white list using the two segments of the package
names from all libraries in LibRadar’s database and a public white list [LKLT+16].
Nevertheless, both sources may not contain all library package names used by apps in
our evaluation data sets. In this case, AppSeparator may have failed to separate some
library code correctly, and a complete white list may lead to other results than the
reported ones. However, as shown in the last experiment, AppSeparator has a significant
impact on the overall result without relying on the white list, making the error rate of
an incomplete white list negligible.
Assembling a ground-truth data set containing apps with all possible obfuscation sce-
narios and in all possible sizes is infeasible. However, our data set was obfuscated with
the most used tool [WHA+18] for app obfuscation and in the most advanced configura-
tion. Furthermore, most apps have a similar ratio between app code and library code
[WGMC15], which makes the separation of app code for other apps similar to those in
the learned data set.
The 200 evaluated apps from Section 4.3 may not be sufficient to compare the perfor-
mance of AppSeparator with other tools. Since the other tools have a similar performance
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on larger data sets, we assume that AppSeparator will also have a similar performance
on the other data sets.
To evaluate the impact of obfuscation on app-code separation, we used the obfus-
cator ProGuard, which applies renaming, optimization, and shrinking. To the best of
our knowledge, other obfuscators such as DashO [Das19], DexGuard [Dex19c], or Dex-
Protector [dex19a] either use the same renaming technique as ProGuard or use it as a
post-processing step. Both the post-processing and the similar technique lead to the
same obfuscated names. Nevertheless, other obfuscators might apply stronger tech-
niques, such as virtualization, class encryption, class loading, and packaging. To the
best of our knowledge, no other existing approach can handle these techniques.
4.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented AppSeparator that uses the single compilation assumption
[AL12] to separate app code from library code. Following the intuition of this assump-
tion, AppSeparator extracts all entry points of an app and all classes that transitively
access the entries to identify app code. Since specific obfuscation techniques can blur the
lines between library code and app code, AppSeparator additionally uses a classifier to
assess whether a class belongs to the main app code. For the classification, AppSeparator
uses the counts of different fan-in and fan-out sets of a class as features.
In order to evaluate AppSeparator, we compared its precision, recall and F1-measure
with LibRadar and LibDetect. AppSeparator outperformed these tools in separating
app code by a higher F1−measure of at least 11.55%. Furthermore, we showed that
AppSeparator’s classifier is crucial for its performance and that even advanced name
obfuscation does not heavily weaken the effectiveness of it.
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Users install popular apps from the Google Play store on millions of devices [Ann20].
This wide-spread Android app usage attracts malicious actors to create altered, repack-
aged versions of those apps and steal the original owner’s revenue or trick users into
infecting their mobile devices with malware. Detecting such repackaged apps is, there-
fore, necessary for a secure and viable app market.
Several techniques for repackaging detection have already been proposed and can be
broadly categorized by their used representations:
Code-Statistics-based approaches [ZZG+13, LVHP16, ZGW+16, GHLZ16, SLQ+14,
LLB+16] extract statistics about metadata, packages, and classes to identify sim-
ilarities in repackaged apps.
View Graph-based techniques [ZHZ+14, CCS+15, SLL15, CWL+15, YFM+17, LLYZ16,
STAW15] construct a graph by using views as nodes and the transitions from one
view to another as edges.
Resource Hash-based approaches [ZGC+14, IWAM17, IWAM16, STDA+17, GLZ16]
hash internal files of an app without considering the file content or type.
Data-, and Control-Flow Graph-based techniques [CGC12, CGC13, CLZ14, GSC+13,
and17, ARSC16, LLB+17, HHW+12] derive the control-flow, or data-flow graph of
the analyzed app and measure the similarity by comparing isomorphic sub-graphs
of the derived properties. Given that graph matching is a hard problem, these
approaches potentially suffer from scalability issues [CGC12].
Repackaging Anomaly-based approaches [FGL+13, FLB+15, GKS+15] identify repack-
aged apps by anomalies that are caused through the recompilation of an app.
High-Level Features-based approaches [CADZ15, PNNRZ12] try to decompile the code
or extract other features that are mostly only available in non-obfuscated apps
to identify repackaging. However, most repackagers obfuscate their apps so that
decompilation is almost infeasible.
Android API-based approaches [SZX+14, ZSL13, KGGS16, WGMC15] extract features
from API calls to construct a fingerprint that they use to identify repackaged apps.
Execution Trace-based approaches [WZSL15, LLCT13, AMSS15, MZW+16] execute
apps in an emulated environment and extract essential traces of the execution.
However, an obfuscator can inject guards into the code to evade such approaches.
Fuzzy-Hash-based approaches [ZZJN12, QPX+16] dissect the core functionality of an
app, create signatures based on an apps’ code, and compare it with potential
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repackaged apps using a fuzzy hash that is immune to small code changes. Our
proposed approach also belongs to this category.
Challenges A challenge for all existing repackaging-detection techniques is code trans-
formations. Developers regularly use Name Mangling and Code Optimization to increase
the performance of their apps. Additionally, they obfuscate their apps to protect their
intellectual property. However, attackers also apply obfuscation to hide malicious code
and evade signature-based detectors, such as anti-virus software.
Current repackaging-detection techniques can only handle rudimentary forms of ob-
fuscation, such as one-by-one identifier renaming, replacing types, and reordering fields
and methods [MWGC16, BBD16]. More sophisticated obfuscation techniques, such as
moving classes between packages or changing Android API-calls, are not supported.
Our evaluation of Google Play store apps revealed that 60% [rev17] are at least partially
obfuscated, and 20% of them repackage their classes into the root package. The preva-
lent reuse of libraries in apps further inhibits the effectiveness of repackaging detection.
Wang et al. [WGMC15] reported that more than 60% of the sub-packages in Android
apps belong to library code. Hence, separating the library code from the app code is nec-
essary. Otherwise, apps that use (nearly) the same libraries automatically share a large
portion of the overall codebase. Thus, detectors always identify them as repackaged –
even if the apps’ code is entirely different. Hence, libraries used in an app need to be
identified and removed before measuring the similarity to other apps. A basic approach
to filter out non-obfuscated library code is to use package white-lists [CLZ14, ZZJN12].
However, these approaches do not handle obfuscated package names or the relocation of
app classes into library packages.
Another challenge for repackaging-detection tools are apps generated by App Makers,
e.g., apps-builder [app17a]. Using such makers, the vast majority of the codebase – the
generator’s libraries – will be the same, and the rest will still be very similar. Current
approaches will generally flag such apps as repackaged. Such apps are generated by
App Makers (E.g., apps-builder [app17a] ), which enable users to generate apps without
coding knowledge. Previous repackaging-detection tools entirely overlooked this kind of
apps and flagged them as repackaged.
In general, the detection of the used libraries is not easy because the compiler fuses the
app’s codebase with the libraries’ codebases, i.e., detectors cannot find the libraries in
some archive file or a particular folder, and they cannot identify the libraries using some
meta-information. Additionally, it is a recommended and applied practice to obfuscate
the entire or at least some parts of the codebase, which renders approaches based on
package names infeasible.
Proposed Approach To address the identified challenges, we propose CodeMatch that
detects repackaged apps using our library-detection technique LibDetect (cf. Chapter 3)
and our app code separator AppSeparator (cf. Chapter 4).
CodeMatch uses fuzzy hashing [Kor06] of an app’s code to withstand various sophis-
ticated obfuscation techniques and optimizations, including; class relocating, slicing,
76
duplication of Android APIs in the app, code changes, and code optimizations that
affect the detection. Additionally, it orders the app’s packages based on their classes’
size, which addresses the challenges faced by DroidMOSS [ZZJN12] due to reorderings
of classes and packages.
CodeMatch performs the following steps to identify repackaged apps:
• First, it filters apps that are generated by tools (App Makers). These gener-
ated apps account for 2.4% of all analyzed apps, and they generally share the
vast majority of their codebase. We can filter them out using a white list of the
main-package prefixes. Since the Android signing process requires these prefixes,
obfuscators cannot manipulate them.
• Second, CodeMatch filters the library code of apps using LibDetect and AppSepa-
rator.
• Third, it filters apps with less than ≈ 300 lines of code; our approach cannot
reliably classify such apps through the size limitation of fuzzy hashing.
• Fourth, CodeMatch generates for each app the most abstract/obfuscation-resilient
representation from Section 3.2.1 and fuzzy hashes it.
• Fifth, it compares the fuzzy hashes with the ones of other apps, and if the similarity
exceeds a predefined threshold, the apps are marked as repackaged.
We prepared the evaluation of CodeMatch by fuzzy hashing the descriptions of down-
loaded apps and randomly selecting 1,000 app pairs, whose fuzzy-hashed descriptions
are at least 90% similar; we considered very similar descriptions as the first indicator for
repackaging. Afterward, we installed and executed each app pair to reconfirm their sim-
ilarity manually. We used these results as the ground truth, to evaluate the findings of
CodeMatch, ViewDroid [ZHZ+14], DroidMOSS [ZZJN12], FSquaDra [ZGC+14], and an
repackaging detection that uses the centroid concept from physics [CLZ14]. We selected
these tools because they are publicly available, or we could re-implement them based on
their documentation.
Additionally, we evaluated the effects of CodeMatch with different library separators.
To evaluate the effect of CodeMatch in isolation, we additionally run it with a library
white-list, with LibRadar, and AppSeparator (cf. Chapter 4). We show that CodeMatch
enables us to identify, in all library-detection configurations, up to 50% more obfuscated
and repackaged apps than the other approaches. In summary, we make the following
contributions:
• CodeMatch, a technique that detects app repackaging, which uses LibDetect and
AppSeparator to filter out libraries before measuring the similarity of the apps.
• A quantitative comparative evaluation of available repackage detection approaches
(CodeMatch, ViewDroid, DroidMOSS, FSquaDra and a centroid-based approach)
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• A list of package names that generally identify applications built using App Makers,
e.g., http://www.apps-builder.com, and therefore share the entire codebase, but
are generally not repackaged [rev17]
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 presents the
attacker model. Section 5.2 describes the state-of-the art. Section 5.3 presents the
proposed approach. Section 5.4 discusses the results of our evaluation. Section 5.5
examines threats to the validity of our experiments. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes the
contributions of this chapter.
5.1. Attacker Model
We identified three kinds of attackers who create repackaged apps, which we categorize
based on their knowledge and manual effort to trick repackaging detectors.
Basic Knowledge: Attackers from the first category only apply basic changes/obfus-
cations to an app, which do not require a deep understanding and configuration of
obfuscators. Their primary goal is to avoid the detection of their repackaged app
by hash-based approaches.
More Knowledgeable: The second category makes full use of existing advanced ob-
fuscators to hide their apps effectively, even if analysts use state-of-the-art repack-
aging detection approaches. They use advanced obfuscators that are automatically
able to add arbitrary code and circumvent more advanced repackaging detectors.
These attackers are dangerous because they can automatically repackage apps.
Hence, they can flood an entire app store with repackaged apps.
Expert: The third category of attackers are experts who can apply custom obfusca-
tion techniques. Their obfuscation repertoire for repackaged apps includes, but is
not limited to, manual code changes, using self-written obfuscators, or applying
compression or encryption to a part of the app. While the repackaged apps of
these attackers are hard to identify, their focus lies on a small number of specific
apps because of the vast amount of manual effort.
Current repackaging detection tools can identify repackaged apps created by attackers
from the first category. Our proposed approach – CodeMatch – is additionally able to
identify repackaged apps of attackers from category two.
5.2. State of the Art
This section presents the state-of-the-art approaches for repackaging detection of An-
droid applications. During the analysis of related work, we identified 40 different ap-
proaches [LBK19] that either handle repackaged apps directly or in order to identify
malicious content. Table 5.1 shows the identified approach sorted by their library fil-
tering, their internal representation, and potential weaknesses against the obfuscation
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techniques described in Section 2.2. For brevity, we shorten Name Mangling to NM, and
Code Restructuring to CR.
Since the detailed description of all 40 approaches would go beyond the scope of useful-
ness, we describe approaches grouped according to their representations and limitations
in terms of obfuscation techniques. In Table 5.1, we divided the groups using horizontal
lines, and we will describe each group in the following from top to bottom of the table.
Metadata-, Package-, and Class Statistics Approaches [ZZG+13, LVHP16, ZGW+16,
GHLZ16, SLQ+14, LLB+16] from this group extract package, class, or metadata statis-
tics to create a fingerprint for an app and compare it with ones extracted from potential
repackaged apps.
Unfortunately, in this category, no approach filters library classes that can cause high
similarity scores among apps that use the same or a similar set of libraries. Additionally,
repackagers can use Code Restructuring to manipulate the metadata-, package-, or class
information to evade the detection of repackaged apps.
Fuzzy Hashes DroidMOSS [ZZJN12] and T-CTPH [QPX+16] use a white-list to filter
out libraries and create from an app’s opcodes a fingerprint by fuzzy hashing the entire
opcode sequence in the given order. Afterward, both approaches compare the created
fingerprints against potentially repackaged apps.
Although the approaches use fuzzy hashing to identify repackaging in obfuscated apps,
they are vulnerable to Code Restructurings because the fingerprints depend on the code
order of an app. Additionally, both approaches suffer from Name Mangling because the
processing order of each fuzzy hash depends on names, and the order can change by
manipulating the names of packages, classes, methods, and fields.
View Graphs Approaches [ZHZ+14, CCS+15, SLL15, CWL+15, YFM+17, LLYZ16,
STAW15] from this group extract view graphs based on activities as nodes and their
actions as edges, e.g., button pushes or intent executions. These approaches compare
the view graphs of an app with potential repackaged ones. For instance, ViewDroid
[ZHZ+14] extracts a viewgraph and compares the viewgraphs of an app with potential
repackaged ones by measuring their sub-graph isomorphisms.
Not only ViewDroid perform sub-graph similarity measurements for the comparison,
but all these tools. However, the comparison with such a technique is very time-
consuming. Additionally, all approaches are vulnerable to the insertion of libraries with
their views because they do not filter libraries. Furthermore, most approaches can only
compare apps with more than three views. In a random sample of 1,000 apps, 44.3%
had less than 3 views.
Resource Hashes These approaches [ZGC+14, IWAM17, IWAM16, STDA+17, GLZ16]
either extract hash values for all files referenced in the MANIFEST.MF or compute their
hash values from various code elements and resource files. Afterward, the approaches
compare these hash values with the ones extracted from potentially repackaged apps.
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Table 5.1.: Categories of Repackaging Detection Approaches
Library Obfuscation
Approach Detection Representation Weakness
PiggyApp [ZZG+13] 7 Package Fingerprint CR
CLANdroid [LVHP16] 7 Cluster of Meta Data CR
Jingqiu Zheng et al. [ZGW+16] 7 Class Relations CR
RepDetector [GHLZ16] 7 Class Statistics NM & CR
Resdroid [SLQ+14] 7 Main Package Structures CR
Li Li et al. [LLB+16] 7 Package Statistics NM & CR
RomaDroid [KLCP19] 7 Manifest Structure CR
DroidMOSS [ZZJN12] White-List Fuzzy Hashes NM & CR
T-CTPH [QPX+16] White-List Fuzzy Hashes NM & CR
ViewDroid [ZHZ+14] 7 View Graph
Cuixia et al. [CCS+15] 7 View Graph
DroidEagle [SLL15] 7 View Graph
MassVet [CWL+15] 7 View Graph CR
RepDroid [YFM+17] 7 View Graph NM & CR
SUIDroid [LLYZ16] 7 Hashes of View Graph
Charlie Soh et al. [STAW15] 7 Activity Flows CR
FSquaDra [ZGC+14] 7 Resource Hashes NM & CR
APPraiser [IWAM17, IWAM16] 7 Resource Hashes NM & CR
DroidSieve [STDA+17] 7 Resource Hashes CR
Olga Gadyatskaya et al. [GLZ16] 7 Resource Hashes CR
DNADroid [CGC12] Data Dependency (DD) NM & CR
AnDarwin [CGC13] Cluster of DD CR
Adrob [GSC+13] 7 Cluster of DD NM & CR
AndroGuard [and17] 7 Control-Flow Graph CR
DroidClone [ARSC16] 7 Control Flow Graph CR
Li Li et al. [LLB+17] 7 Control-Flow Graph CR
Juxtapp [HHW+12] 7 Basic Block N-Grams NM &CR
Kai Chen et al. [CLZ14] White-List Centroids NM & CR
AndroSimilar [FGL+13, FLB+15] 7 Improbable Features NM & CR
AndroidSOO [GKS+15] 7 Recompilation Anomalies CR
Jian Chen [CADZ15] 7 Code Tokens CR
Rahul Potharaju et al. [PNNRZ12] 7 AST Symbols CR
DroidSim [SZX+14] 7 API Graph CR
DroidAnalytics [ZSL13] 7 API Hashes CR
Daeyoung Kim et al. [KGGS16] 7 API N-Grams CR
Wukong [WGMC15] Cluster of APIs CR
Xueping Wu et al. [WZSL15] 7 HTTP Traffic CR
SCSdroid [LLCT13] 7 System Call Sequence CR
PICARD [AMSS15] 7 System Call Graph
LoPD [MZW+16] 7 Symbolic Execution Traces CR
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For instance, FSquaDra [ZGC+14] extracts the hash values for all files referenced in the
MANIFEST.MF and compares them with the ones of a potentially repackaged app.
While these approaches are usable for near-to identical, repackaged apps, they are not
suitable for obfuscated resource files. For instance, since none of the approaches has a
library detection, the insertion of library code would change the entire hash value of the
code elements. Even adding some (useless) resources (e.g., sound files or images) would
change the computed hashes and reduce the similarity with original apps.
Data- and Control-Flow Dependencies Approaches [CGC12, CGC13, CLZ14, and17,
GSC+13, ARSC16, LLB+17, HHW+12] that use data- or control-flow dependencies,
extracts these dependencies from each method, and create a signature to match them
against methods of potentially repackaged apps. For instance, the approach of Kai Chen
et al. [CLZ14] uses control-flow graphs to calculate the centroids of each method and
use these centroids to identify repackaged apps. Physicists use centroids to describe the
perfect point to balance any given shape.
While all of the approaches are vulnerable against Code Restructuring, the similarity
measurements of six approaches also might be highly biased towards libraries because
they use either only a white-list or no library filtering.
Repackaging Anomalies Some approaches [FGL+13, FLB+15, GKS+15] attempt to
identify features that hint at the recompilation or repackaging of an app.
Since some obfuscators recompile an app’s code, the mentioned approaches might
confuse obfuscated apps with repackaged ones. The recompilation of a repackaged app
could also have the opposite effect on the detection. For instance, a repackaged app
after obfuscation with Name Mangling or Code Restructuring could no longer possess
the anomalies necessary for detection. Additionally, the build process of an app might
recompile used libraries and influence the extracted features.
High-Level Features The approaches by Jian Chen [CADZ15] and Rahul Potharaju et
al. [PNNRZ12] extract high-level features such as while-loops from the abstract syntax
tree (AST) of the decompiled app. Afterward, they use these features to compare the
original apps against potential repackaged ones. If the apps have a high similarity, the
approaches flag the latter app as repackaged.
However, the obfuscation of Android apps makes the complete decompilation or ex-
traction of AST from an app’s code nearly impossible. Therefore, this approach would
miss a large amount of repackaged apps. Additionally, both approaches suffer under
false positives due to missing library detection.
API-Based Detection Several approaches [SZX+14, ZSL13, KGGS16, WGMC15] ex-
tract features based on API calls by building graphs, hashes, n-grams, or clusters from
them. Afterward, the approaches use these features to detect repackaged apps.
While all approaches would suffer from Code Restructuring, not all have a high false-
positive/negative rate in the detection results cause by integrated libraries. Wukong
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filters libraries before constructing an API vector by using LibRadar. However, since
LibRadar filters libraries based on the app’s package structures, it might miss libraries
that obfuscator split by Code Restructuring. Therefore, if the filtering misses one of the
libraries, Wukong has a high dissimilarity in its results so that repackaged apps remain
undetected.
Execution Traces Approaches [WZSL15, LLCT13, AMSS15, MZW+16] from this group
execute apps in an emulated environment and extract execution traces to build graphs,
HTTP-traffic signatures, or other fingerprints. Afterward, the approaches compare these
fingerprints against ones extracted from potential repackaged apps.
While these approaches can identify repackaged apps with the same execution traces,
repackaged apps that contain guards against dynamic analyses or have more complex
execution traces evade the capabilities of these approaches. Additionally, library code bi-
ases their similarity measurements because the missing filtering leads to a high similarity-
value between execution traces of non-repackaged apps.
Discussion To recap, each repackaging detection approach has its specific drawbacks;
all share problems due to limitations of the library filtering in use. To address these
problems, we designed CodeMatch, which we evaluate against DroidMOSS, ViewDroid,
FSquaDra, and the centroid-base approach in Section 5.4. For FSquaDra and ViewDroid,
the software was either available online or was made available to use upon request. The
code for DroidMOSS and for the centroid-based approach was not available; but we
were able to re-implement them based on the information available in their publications
[ZZJN12, CLZ14]. We could not acquire the remaining approaches from their authors,
and the re-implementation of all approaches based on their publications is infeasible.
5.3. CodeMatch
Figrue 5.1 depicts the workflow of CodeMatch that is separated in filtering, the building
of the representation, and comparing it with representations from the database.
Legend
Processing Step
Output Ar�fact
Figure 5.1.: Toolchain to Identify Repackaged Apps
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Filtering In the beginning, CodeMatch uses a library-filtering tool that reports detected
library classes. These classes are then removed from the APK’s codebase. If the library
filtering reports multiple library classes in the same app package, CodeMatch removes
the whole package instead of the individual classes to avoid library classes that cannot
be detected with the library filtering.
In addition to the library code removal, CodeMatch filters two kinds of apps. First,
those apps that consist mainly of library code, plus at most ≈ 300 lines of glue code
[rev17]. We consider these apps as non-repackaged because they use only the same
libraries as other apps, and the glue code represents only a pattern for the same usage
of these libraries. We refer to such apps as library apps. Second, we filter apps that are
generated using “App-makers”. App-makers generate apps by processing user-created
UI-designs. Apps generated by the same App-maker generally share a similar code base
without necessarily being repackaged. We filter these apps using a white list of 40
commonly used prefixes of known App-maker frameworks. This list is the result of a
web search for Android App-maker frameworks. The list is sufficient to filter generated
apps since the Android signing process requires these prefixes, and therefore obfuscators
cannot manipulate them.
Representation In contrast to library code that obfuscators may slice when an app
only uses a part of the library’s functionality, the app code is likely completely included
in a repackaged app because slicing would break its functionality. Since we already
removed library code from our target APK, we assume that the remaining code almost
entirely corresponds to the potentially repackaged app’s code. As a result, we can use the
identified app code to compare it with the code of other apps. To this end, CodeMatch
represents each app class using its Android-API type list (as defined for our NR in
Section 3.2.1), the type list of all its fields, and the SPR for all its methods. We chose
SPR instead of Fuzzy SPR because CodeMatch calculates the fuzzy hash for all class
representations to compare the entire app code with one fuzzy hash.
We address Code Reordering by sorting the fields according to the type lists and the
methods according to their instruction count. Furthermore, to address Name Mangling
of package and class names, i.e., to have a name-independent order of classes, we also sort
the entire classes by their size, i.e., the sum of sizes of each field, the number of methods,
and the instruction count. We address the remaining smaller differences that might have
been introduced by obfuscation by fuzzy hashing [Kor06] the entire representation.
Comparison Before we compare potentially repackaged apps, we establish a threshold
for the fuzzy-hash similarity, above which we report analyzed apps as repackaged. We
determine this threshold by executing CodeMatch on 1,000 apps and searching for the
best F1-measure (harmonic mean between precision and recall). We get the best F1-
measure with a threshold of 30%.
In order to find a potential repackaged app efficiently, CodeMatch builds a database of
known apps that it processed as described in the previous steps. Additionally, it indexed
the public keys of the respective developers to avoid reporting apps from the same de-
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veloper as repackaged apps. Furthermore, it compares apps from different developers by
the fuzzy-hashed representation of the apps’ code using F2S2 [WSY13], which efficiently
finds similarity matches based on the edit distance between fuzzy hashes. If the simi-
larity score between the target app and an app in the database exceeds our threshold,
CodeMatch reports it as a potential repackaged app.
5.4. Evaluation
The evaluation answers the following research questions:
RQ1: How effective is CodeMatch compared to other repackage detection approaches?
RQ2: How many apps does CodeMatch detect in the wild?
For the experiments, we used a server with two AMD(R) EPYC(R) 7542 @ 2.90 GHz
(32 cores / 64 threads each) CPUs and 512 GB RAM. We executed the analyses using
OpenJDK1.8 212 64-bit VM with 20 GB of heap memory, MySQL 5.7 for the library
database, and F2S2 for the app database.
5.4.1. Comparison Against Other Tools
For the evaluation of CodeMatch, we collected all app descriptions and the respective
developer’s public keys (to differentiate between them) from an archive of the Google
Play store [pla17b] and fuzzy-hashed the descriptions of each app with SSDEEP [Kor06].
Afterward, we compared all fuzzy-hashed descriptions pairwise and randomly selected
1,000 app pairs with different public keys and at least 90%-similar descriptions.
To identify which of these pairs are actual repackaged apps, we installed and executed
the app pairs on the emulator LeapDroid [lea17]. Subsequently, we manually tagged
them (as truly repackaged or not) by checking their similarity in the following process:
1. First, we checked whether the loading screen and main view have the same struc-
ture and the same icons.
2. In case of doubts, we checked the actions that a user can perform from the main
view.
3. If we were still not sure about the tag, we generated fake accounts, installed needed
additional software, and performed all possible actions.
4. If the above steps were insufficient, we also performed a visual inspection of the
decompiled code. If the code of both apps was similar, we classified the apps as
repackaged; otherwise, they were, in business terms, a “me-too” product.
Following this process, we manually identified 377 app pairs as actual repackaged (true
positives) and used all 1,000 app pairs to evaluate the precision and recall of CodeMatch,
84
5.4. Evaluation
FSquaDra [ZGC+14], ViewDroid [ZHZ+14], DroidMOSS [ZZJN12], and a centroid-based
approach [CLZ14] to which we refer as Centroid.
To assess the effect of the different library detection approaches on the overall repack-
aging detection, we removed all library apps using LibDetect, as described in Section 5.3.
These apps are generally falsely identified as repackaged apps by the other approaches
as they have no specialized support for this kind of apps, and we want to avoid such
biases. We exclude library apps that had mostly less than 300 lines of code, excluding
library code, because it is practically impossible to determine whether such apps are
illegitimate repackaged apps. For example, most wallpaper apps only differ in the image
but are generated apps, not repackaged ones.
After that, we executed all repackaging detectors that use some library detection
with all of the following library-detection approaches: AppSeparator (AS), LibDetect
(LD), and the Common Libraries white list (WL). We counted it as a false negative if a
repackaging detector was unable to classify a repackaged app.
Results Figure 5.2 presents the precision and recall of the different combinations of
repackaging and library detection tools. The results are grouped by the repackaging
detection approaches and sorted by their F1-measure.
All approaches that use white lists perform worst compared to the same repackaging
detectors with other library detectors. Using AppSeparator improves the F1-measure for
each approach, but it filters out too many classes of small apps so that it cannot achieve
the best results. However, in manual analysis, we discovered that AppSeparator is very
accurate for large apps.
The results of Figure 5.2 show that the combination of LibDetect with any repackaging
detection approach produces a precision of 86%, which is better than all combinations
of the respective repackaging detection approach and any other library detection.
Observation 8 Based on the F1-measure, CodeMatch + LibDetect is the most
effective combination and outperforms all other analyzed tools (RQ1). However,
we can conclude that CodeMatch with any library-detection approach performed at
least as good as the combinations of the respective library detection with any other
repackaging detection approach.
Overall, LibDetect leads to significantly better repackaging-detection results and sig-
nificantly improves the results of Centroid when compared with the initial results. Nev-
ertheless, CodeMatch + LibDetect gives the best precision and recall.
5.4.2. App Data-Provision & Insights
We used CodeMatch to assess the problem of repackaged apps in the wild. For that, we
downloaded 46,537 apps from five different Android app stores and analyzed the number
of repackaged apps across individual stores. Table 5.2 shows the distribution of the apps
across the stores. We obtained the APKs from AppChina [App17b], HiApk [HiA17],
and Freewarelovers [Fre17] using DroidSearch [RAK+15].
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Figure 5.2.: Average Precision, Recall and F1-Measure of the Different Repackaging De-
tection Approaches
Table 5.2 reveals that up to 5.7% of the apps are created using App-makers (see
Section 5.3) and—depending on the store—between 2.1% and 68.8% of the apps are
library apps with less than 300 lines of app (glue) code. We filtered these apps before
computing the number of repackaged apps.
Observation 9 Overall, CodeMatch identified 7,291 (15.7%) of the 46,537 apps
are repackaged (RQ2). The problem seems to be most relevant for the Google Play
store; it contained in 2017 nearly 20% repackaged apps.
5.5. Threats to Validity
In the following, we discuss threats to validity related to our repackaging detection
experiments.
The database of LibDetect may not contain all libraries used by apps in our evaluation
datasets. In this case, LibDetect may fail to identify some library code, and CodeMatch
may include this library code in the repackaging detection. These missing libraries could
lead to other results than the reported ones, but – given the size and quality of the data
set – the overall error should be negligible.
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Table 5.2.: Analyzed Android Apps from Five App Stores
App Store Apps Lib Apps App Maker Repackaged
Anzhi [Anz17] 18,889 1,707 9.0% 72 0.4% 2,757 14.6%
Google Play [pla17b] 17,751 371 2.1% 1,018 5.7% 3,510 19.8%
App China [App17b] 4,577 1,260 27.5% 21 0.5% 396 8.7%
HiApk [HiA17] 4,472 1,106 24.7% 6 0.1% 608 13.6%
Freewarelovers [Fre17] 848 583 68.8% 0 0% 20 2.4%
Total 46,537 5,027 10.8% 1,117 2.4% 7,291 15.7%
Our ground-truth dataset for repackaging detection may not be representative of apps
in general. To mitigate this threat, we chose our sample from the apps of Google Play
store, Anzhi, AppChina, HiApk, and Freewarelovers. First, we filtered the set of all
app pairs with similar descriptions, as described in Section 5.4.1. Then we selected a
random sample of 1,000 app pairs, representing a confidence level of 99% and a confidence
interval of 5%. This sampling strategy may introduce biases because repackaged apps
with dissimilar descriptions are left out. However, the intent behind repackaging is to
get users to install the repackaged app instead of the original app, making it likely that
the repackager uses a similar description. Furthermore, one author classified the app
candidates as repackaged or not-repackaged through a manual review (cf. Section 5.4.1).
It is possible that our primary criterion, the similarity of the apps’ user interfaces, may
lead to some wrong classifications. Due to the high effort of reviewing 1,000 app pairs,
it was infeasible to confirm the review results by additional reviewers.
There might be other repackaging detectors that perform better than the ones against
which we compared our approach. We included the results of an extensive literature
review to identify the tools and, to the best of our knowledge, compared against the
state-of-the-art tools.
5.6. Conclusion
We presented a repackaging detection approach that relies (1) on new advanced library
detection approaches and (2) the fuzzy hashing of the app code to handle advanced
code obfuscations. Additionally, we rely on our different code representations. Each
representation abstracts over additional parts of the code to counter more advanced
obfuscation techniques.
The evaluation demonstrated the effectiveness of CodeMatch by applying it to real-
world apps taken from Android app stores. We were able to determine that 15% of the
apps are in repackaged form across different app stores.
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Summary
In Chapter 3, we presented LibDetect our approach for detecting libraries in obfus-
cated apps. It uses five representations for its detection algorithm; each abstracts more
information from a method code to identify more obfuscated methods without losing
precision. After the matching of methods, LibDetect aggregates the methods to entire
library classes.
For the evaluation of LibDetect, we compared its precision, recall, and F2-measure
with an approach that uses a white list of Common Libraries [LKLT+16] and a more
advanced library-detection approach, called LibRadar [MWGC16]. To compare these
approaches, we downloaded 1,000 apps from different app stores and manually identified
all library classes. The comparison showed that LibDetect identifies more than six times
more library classes than the other approaches.
Since many approaches need to separate app code from library code without the
detection of libraries, we introduced in Chapter 4 AppSeparator that separates app code
without the need for a database of all library-method representations. The design of
AppSeparator is based on the single compilation assumption, which states that libraries
were already compiled before their integration into apps; therefore, libraries have no
dependency on any specific app. Using the intuition of this assumption, AppSeparator
performs the following steps to separate app code.
First, it extracts all classes containing entry points and all classes from the main
package of an app. With these classes, AppSeparator transitively identifies all additional
classes that access the ones identified earlier.
Second, since obfuscation can blur the lines between app code and library code,
AppSeparator calculates for each class the FanIn and FanOut metrics.
Last, AppSeparator uses a classifier that is trained using the fan-in and fan-out sets
of the classes to decide whether a class belongs to the app code.
For the evaluation of AppSeparator, we used the 1,000 apps from the evaluation of
LibDetect and split them in 80% training and test set and 20% validation set. We
used the former set to train our classifier and the latter to compare AppSeparator with
LibDetect and LibRadar. The results suggested that AppSeparator is at least 11.55%
more accurate in separating app code than the other approaches. In an additional
experiment, we discovered that the usage of the classifier is, to a significant degree,
responsible for the better results of AppSeparator.
Chapter 5 introduces our repackaging detector CodeMatch and compares the ability
of AppSeparator and LibDetect to filter out library code. CodeMatch first filters out
small apps and apps generated by App Makers [app17a] and compares the remaining
apps with a database of original apps. If one app has a high similarity to one in the
database and is not produced by the same developer, it is repackaged.
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Before CodeMatch compares an app with the database, it also filters out the library
code using either AppSeparator and LibDetect. Because library code influences the sim-
ilarity measurement of apps, it is essential to remove as much code as possible. After
the filtering, CodeMatch uses the most abstract representation from LibDetect to evade
obfuscation techniques used by the repackagers.
For the evaluation of CodeMatch, we analyzed manually 1,000 app pairs based on
their appearance and their code. Afterward, we compared CodeMatch with FSquaDra
[ZGC+14], ViewDroid [ZHZ+14], DroidMOSS [ZZJN12], and Centroid [CLZ14]. The
results showed that CodeMatch using the library detection LibDetect outperformed all
other approaches at least by 3.58%.
Finally, we discovered, in an additional experiment, that at least 15% of the apps in
different markets are repackaged.
90
Part II.
Obfuscated Names
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Obfuscated Name Detection and Recovery
Developers apply name obfuscation to apps to protect their intellectual property. How-
ever, it is also used by attackers to conceal repackaged apps and malicious payloads
in these apps. Previous work proposed several approaches [BRTV16, RVK15, VCD17,
Jaf17, AZLY19, CFPK20] to support analysts in understanding code entities with ob-
fuscated names, such as class, field, method, and variable names. These approaches au-
tomatically learn names from large code samples and suggest learned names to replace
obfuscated ones. For the replacement of names, they analyze a code entity’s surrounding
context to suggest a name that was learned together with a similar context. This con-
text is captured using dependency networks, Abstract Syntax Trees, or by treating the
code as text blocks. The approaches extract the context and train a model to associate
structures with the code entities’ names. Because these approaches infer names from
code structures, we refer to them in the following as name inference approaches.
While these approaches foster analysts’ understanding, they have two main drawbacks:
First, most name inference approaches do not analyze if the code samples used for their
learning process contain obfuscated names. The names they suggest depend heavily on
the code samples they use during their learning process. If the code entities in these
samples have obfuscated names, they would suggest these obfuscated names during their
inference process. Since most approaches learn from code in open-source apps, it could
be assumed that these approaches are not affected by obfuscated names. However, even
code from open-source apps may integrate libraries containing obfuscated names. Some
libraries are only released in obfuscated form; therefore, the names of these library code
entities are not suitable for name inference approaches because the names are not avail-
able in the non-obfuscated form. Additionally, during the inference process of an app,
the approaches do not identify which code entities of that app have obfuscated names,
leading to the replacement of non-obfuscated names. As a result, some approaches that
should support analysts to deobfuscate names suggest obfuscated names for replacing
non-obfuscated ones.
Second, the approaches do not distinguish between library code and app code and may
suggest the names of library code entities to app code entities. This situation can occur
if a code entity’s context in the main code of the app is similar to the context of a code
entity from a library. Names of app code fundamentally differ from library code entities
because the names of app code entities are tailored for a specific use case. In contrast,
the names of library code are more generic. Since every app consists of at least 60%
library code [WGMC15], the names of library code entities occur more frequently than
the names of app code entities. Because name inference approaches learn only names
that occur in the majority of the code samples, they learn mostly names of library code
entities and may suggest these names for app code entities. For instance, some developers
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may not obfuscate their app codebase, but their apps contain obfuscated libraries. A
name inference approach would identify suitable names for the library code entities but
also suggest library code entities’ names to app code entities.
To support analysts, we present two approaches. The first approach pinpoints ob-
fuscated names in the entire codebase of an app, and the second one focuses on the
recovering of names for library code entities. For the recovering of obfuscated names
for library code entities, we introduce in Chapter 6 LibMapper that can map original
names of library code entities to their obfuscated counterparts. For the remapping, it
uses AppSeparator (Chapter 4) to separate library code from app code, which leads to
a more reliable suggestion of names only for the library code of an app. Afterward,
LibMapper uses LibDetect (Chapter 3) to get possible name suggestions for the mapping
of classes. With LibMapper, malware analysts can uncover which library code entities are
used by payloads and investigate whether a payload exploits unknown vulnerabilities of
these code entities. In the following chapters, we refer to the process of mapping original
names of library code entities to their obfuscated counterparts as library mapping.
Chapter 7 introduces ObfusSpot which identifies obfuscated names in three steps.
In the first step, it identifies obfuscated names whose naming schemes differ from non-
obfuscated names. In the second step, it analyzes name frequencies to identify obfuscated
names that occur very frequently. In the last step, ObfusSpot uses LibMapper to identify
patterns in obfuscated names of library code entities and use these patterns to uncover
obfuscated names in the rest of the code. In contrast to previous approaches [Mir18,
WR17, PYC+19, KNGS18, Don18, WHA+18], ObfusSpot can pinpoint obfuscated names
of code entities instead of just pointing out that an app contains obfuscated names.
In the end, we summarize all contributions of this part.
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As library mapping, we describe the process to map the original names of library code
entities, such as class, field, and method names to their obfuscated counterparts. The
names of these code entities are essential to understand their functionality during the
analysis of an app. However, these names are manipulated by developers to protect their
intellectual property and by malware authors to hide their payload.
In order to support security analysts and avoid the mapping of code entities by
hand, previous works [YDGPS16, Jav20b, Jav17, RVK15, BRTV16, VCD17, ABBS14,
ABBS15] introduced several approaches to learn names of code entities and map them
to their obfuscated counterparts that have a similar surrounding context as the code
entities from the learned names. This context is captured using dependency networks,
Abstract Syntax Trees, or by treating the code as text blocks. The approaches extract
the context and train a model to associate structures with the code entities’ names.
Despite the usefulness of these approaches, they have various drawbacks. For instance,
some approaches operate solely on source code, which is rarely available for apps. Addi-
tionally, these approaches do not distinguish between library and app code and assign
library code names to app code entities and vice versa. Since most of the code in an app
belongs to libraries [WGMC15], the approaches learn more names of library code entities,
and it is more common that these names are assigned to app-code entities [GS10].
In this chapter, we introduce LibMapper that operates on Java bytecode, which can
easily be extracted from Android apps. It uses LibDetect and AppSeparator as prelimi-
nary analyses and assigns to each library code entity the name of its original counterpart.
While LibMapper uses AppSeparator to identify which classes belong to library code, it
needs LibDetect to get suggestions of possible name candidates for matching library
classes. As explained in Section 3, LibDetect identifies potential candidates for library
methods and uses the best mapping of these methods to identify their potential declaring
classes and the library version. While we already used the potential declaring classes to
filter out library code in Section 5, we can use all potential library methods to get a set
of potential declaring classes candidates that can be used for library mapping. Given a
library class in an app under analysis, LibDetect identifies all methods and derives from
them a set of potential library class names. This set of class names is used by LibMap-
per to determine the name of each field and method member. For instance, if LibDetect
returns for a class in an app, ten potential class names, then LibMapper’s database con-
tains all names of the associated fields and methods of each class name. These field and
method names are used to map as many obfuscated code entities as possible. Afterward,
given the context of the code entities, LibMapper determines from all potential name
mappings, the one that maps most of the names to assign this mapping to the library
class and its members.
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With this technique, LibMapper does not suffer from the drawbacks of previous ap-
proaches, and by using LibDetect, it can resist advanced name obfuscation without over-
writing non-obfuscated names. Standard configurations of obfuscators replace meaning-
ful names with a short sequence of random characters. However, more advanced name
obfuscations may repackage classes into a single package or use a natural language dic-
tionary for their replacement procedure to make the identification of obfuscated names
more challenging [con19a].
To avoid the replacement of non-obfuscated names, LibMapper checks whether the
class under analysis has the same name as one of the candidate names produced by
LibDetect and integrates them with a higher probability into its mapping procedure.
While the method representations of LibDetect are designed to determine the exact
version of a library, they may not be suitable to provide a method name that remains
equal across multiple versions of libraries. For this reason, we analyze the stability of the
method representations across class boundaries by measuring how often the same method
representation is used in different classes without belonging to the same library. We refer
to this measure in further descriptions as the collision rate and use for LibMapper a set
of method representations with another collision rate than for LibDetect.
For the evaluation, we compare LibMapper with the state-of-the-art deobfuscator De-
Guard [BRTV16] that assigns each code entity, including app and library code, a new
name. To show both approaches’ effectiveness, we measure their performance on apps
manipulated with ProGuard’s standard configuration for name obfuscation and the most
advanced one [Pro17].
In the following sections, we present our related work in Section 6.1, a case study
whether current representations are suitable to map names (collision rate) in Section 6.2,
followed by our approach LibMapper in Section 6.3. Afterward, we evaluate LibMapper
in Section 6.4, discuss threats to the validity of our results in Section 6.5, and conclude
our work in Section 6.6.
6.1. State-of-the-Art of Library Mapping Approaches
In this section, we describe the state-of-the-art approaches for library mapping. All ap-
proaches are either rule-based or use artificial intelligence to infer names from previously
learned contexts.
Rule-Based Approaches Early attempts inferred names based on associations of struc-
tures and were primarily rule-based. Approaches such as DREAM++ [YDGPS16],
JavaDecompiler [Jav20b], and JavaDeObfuscator [Jav17] used known structures like
loop variables, constants, classes, fields, or methods to assign frequently used names
such as i for obfuscated loop variables or type-based names such as str for field names
with the type java.lang.String. However, an analyst could not use these approaches
to map libraries because most libraries had specific names for their code entities, and
rule-based approaches use only very generic names.
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JSNice [RVK15] uses conditional random fields [LMP01] (CRF) to infer identifiers
based on JavaScript’s pre-defined language constructs. First, it extracts all associations
between local variables and learns which names are used along with these variables. The
inference phase also extracts the same associations and matches these associations with
previously learned ones to assign the learned variable names to the obfuscated ones. In-
stead of focusing on one variable at a time, the approach uses an approximate Maximum
a Posteriori algorithm [KF09] (MAP) to adjust all names to a global maximum.
JSNice operates only on local variables and is not suited for class, method, or field
names. In addition to the limited usability, the approach assigns names of local variables
based on language constructs without considering non-obfuscated names. That way, the
inference overwrites previously known and descriptive names. While JSNice could be
used to infer names in JavaScript functions, it is not suited to identify libraries and map
their names in Android apps.
DeGuard [BRTV16] operates on the same platform as JSNice and uses CRF for library
mapping. In contrast to JSNice, DeGuard does not establish associations between local
variables. It establishes them between package names, class names, method names, field
names, and constants by using the API of the Android class library instead of language
constructs as a basis for the associations. As a result, DeGuard can infer names for the
above-mentioned code entities by using the approximate MAP estimation of associations
from previously learned code entities.
Since DeGuard does not identify obfuscated names, it suffers from the same drawback
as JSNice that overwrites previously known and descriptive names. In addition to this,
the algorithm identifies libraries by using only a white-list of library package names and
hence is vulnerable to Name Mangling.
JSNaughty [VCD17] builds a statistical machine translation [Koe09] (SMT) model of
non-obfuscated JavaScript code and infers identifier names of obfuscated code by using
the identifier’s surrounding language constructs. JSNaughty blends the capabilities of
Autonym [VCD17], a tool designed by the same authors with JSNice [RVK15]. Autonym
learns a language and translation model for SMT.
JSNaughty builds names from language constructs to all local variables without consid-
ering non-obfuscated names so that its inference procedure overwrites previously known
and descriptive names. Furthermore, it overwrites app code-entities with names from
the library code. Finally, JSNaughty does not identify libraries and suffers from the
same drawbacks as JSNice.
NATURALIZE [ABBS14] identifies the styling-conventions used by Java developers
and suggests the learned conventions if another developer adds new code structures to
keep a uniform style in code reviews.
NATURALIZE is not suited for obfuscated apps, because obfuscators manipulate
all tokens that are used by it. Additionally, NATURALIZE is neither able to handle
bytecode nor to identify libraries for library mapping.
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Allamanis et al. propose an approach [ABBS15] that builds upon NATURALIZE by
dividing identifiers into subtokens, and inferring for each subtoken a more suitable name.
For this purpose, the approach compares the surrounding context with a previously
learned context model. The approach builds the context model by extracting the subto-
kens of surrounding Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) nodes and other identifier-related fea-
tures in the Java source code.
Nevertheless, this approach’s features depend on the AST and source code that are no
longer available after the compilation and obfuscation of an app. Additionally, this ap-
proach overwrites previously known and descriptive identifiers by names from its learned
model. Finally, the approach does not identify libraries and is therefore not suitable for
library mapping.
Code2Vec [AZLY19] extracts paths from an AST of a method. Using the extracted
paths, it learns the most relevant features of a path for a given method name. Finally,
it uses the learned features to infer method names in similar environments.
Since Code2Vec operates only on source code and needs a complete AST, it is not suit-
able to map obfuscated code. This conclusion derives from the fact that Code2Vec uses
the names of other code entities to infer method names. Thus, if obfuscators manipulate
the AST and all names in a method, Code2Vec cannot infer correct names [CFPK20].
Additionally, it overwrites names that have not been changed by the obfuscator.
Discussion Summarizing the discussion above, we need a better library mapping that
can correctly identify library instances without overwriting non-obfuscated names. Cur-
rently, only DeGuard can identify library instances of Android bytecode. Many ap-
proaches operate only on source code, and others use variable names without considering
field, method, and class names. Although DeGuard can identify library instances, its
library detection is based on a white-list and, therefore, is vulnerable to changes in the
package hierarchy. These limitations lead to a poor recall, as our empirical comparison
of DeGuard against our new approach will reveal in Section 6.4.
6.2. Case Study of Collision Rate from Method
Representations
In this section, we discuss the suitability of method representations for library map-
ping. For this purpose, we analyze the representations used by several library detection
techniques that use these representations to determine library classes or a library ver-
sion. Library detection approaches match libraries either by using method representa-
tions [WWZR18, BBD16, ZDZ+18, FR19] and combining these representation to entire
classes (like our work in Section 3.2) or by directly using a representation for classes or
packages [LWW+17, ZBK19, MWGC16].
While Code Slicing, Code Restructuring, and Code Optimization may evade represen-
tation for classes and packages, method representations are used as a fallback to match
library parts if the other representations failed to match a class or package.
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Previous works measure the robustness of their method representations [WWZR18]
or the uniqueness of the entire profile [BBD16, ZDZ+18] without considering that one
method representation can occur in different locations and lead to wrong assignments of
names to code entities. We measure how often these representations collide with ones
from different locations and further refer to this measurement as the collision rate. To
analyze the collision rate of different representations, we re-implemented the method
representations of LibScout [BBD16] and Orlis [WWZR18] and compared them with our
five representations from Chapter 3.
The collision rate was calculated by measuring one minus the occurrence ratio of a
representation to the number of its method declaration in different classes. The following
formula shows the collision rate:
collision rate = 1− 1
# of classes declaring such representations
For instance, if a tool uses the same representation for three methods that are declared
in three different classes, the collision rate is 1− 13 = 66.66%.
To enable an accurate calculation, we need to ensure that each method representation
in a data set is unambiguously connected to its class. This connection cannot be ensured
by straightforwardly using code from different apps because these often use the same
library code but are changed by obfuscation. As a result, we acquired the data set
described in the next section, which was not transformed by any obfuscation technique.
6.2.1. Data Set
To acquire a data set of apps that do not contain obfuscation, we collected all 1,879
apps from the F-Droid store [F-D19] and analyzed their code. The Android developer
website [pro20a] recommends to integrate ProGuard [Pro17] in the developers’ build
process so that the published apps contain obfuscated names. However, since developers
often use the standard configuration of ProGuard, which transforms meaningful names
into a short sequence of random characters, we can easily identify them by exploiting
the shortness of the names.
For the filtering, we compared the average class-, method-, and field-name length per
package with the average length of code entities in non-obfuscated packages. If an app
had a package that contains many short names, we excluded this app. After this step,
only 453 apps remained, and we checked them for the usage of obfuscation manually.
In total, we acquired 302 unique, non-obfuscated libraries that we used to compare the
collision rate for the seven representations.
6.2.2. Results
Given the 302 libraries, we extracted our five representations from Section 3.2.1, Orlis’
representation with transitive method calls, and LibScout’s fuzzy method signatures.
Afterward, we stored in a database the representation of each method connected with
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the class that declares the corresponding method. Using this database, we calculated
the collision rate for each representation.
Figure 6.1 shows the collision rate of all seven method representations categorized by
the number of instructions. The x-axis shows the number of instructions in the logarith-
mic scale to the base two. We included the method representations whose instruction
number ranges between two x-values to the larger value. The figure lists our five rep-
resentations from Section 3.2.1 (BC, AR, NR, SPR, Fuzzy SPR), the representation of
Orlis (CallR), and LibScout’s fuzzy method signature (Fuzzy Signature). Additionally,
we added the percentage of methods that have a particular method length (Distribution).
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Figure 6.1.: Collision rate categorized by number of instructions
Given all collision rates, we have made the following observations:
In Figure 6.1 all collision rates decrease with the increase of the instruction count and in-
crease with a higher method distribution. Interestingly, five of the representations
have the same collision rate, with either zero or just one instruction; this results
from the fact that these methods have too few instructions to differentiate them
from plain fuzzy signatures as used by LibScout [BBD16] and LibPecker [ZDZ+18].
Only BC and AR have a lower collision rate because they use the original method
signature in their representations.
These fuzzy signatures have the highest collision rate across all categories of the instruc-
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tion counts. Its peak is at 3 to 4 instructions (22 instructions), and such methods
are often either getters or other methods that directly delegate all parameters to
another method.
The collision rates of CallR, the SPR, and, without considering partial matches, of
Fuzzy SPR are very close to each other. While the Fuzzy SPR and the SPR overlap
entirely, the CallR has a slightly higher collision rate because it does not use all
instructions in its representation but only those that call methods transitively.
The NR has a lower collision rate than the previously described representations because
it only removes all names without changing any instruction. As shown in Figure 3.4
of Chapter 3, the removal of names is already sufficient to match more than 95%
of the obfuscated methods.
Most surprising are collision rates of BC from methods smaller than eight instruc-
tions. BC includes all unchanged instructions and the unchanged method sig-
nature. These high collision rates are caused by default constructors, getters,
interface, and other methods that are not distinguishable among different classes.
Obfuscators such as ProGuard do not change the signature of default constructors.
However, as shown by our experiment, these methods alone are not suitable for
identifying obfuscated classes.
Figure 6.1 also shows that the collision rate of the AR overlaps with BC. This overlap
is not surprising since only the modifiers and program counters are removed from
the bytecode to create the AR. While the AR has a low collision rate, it can only
be used to match non-obfuscated methods that differ due to access restrictions of
methods used in different library versions.
Using the percentage of the method distribution, we identified that with a higher dis-
tribution, the collision rate drops rapidly below 10% starting at 26. However,
this effect may also arise from the complexity of the method representations that
incorporate more information with a higher number of instructions.
From Figure 6.1, we can deduce that matching all representations in ascending order
according to the collision rates yields the best results. However, due to the various over-
laps between different representations, we use only AR instead of BC for non-obfuscated
methods, and CallR instead of SPR because it is more robust against obfuscation.
With the gained knowledge, we design our library mapping approach LibMapper in
the next section. Which organizes the representations in the following order: AR, NR,
CallR, Fuzzy SPR, and Fuzzy Signature.
6.3. LibMapper
In this section, we present our approach LibMapper that identifies not only library classes
or packages but also maps each original class, method, and field name to the obfuscated
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counterpart. LibMapper follows the steps shown in Figure 6.2 and uses for LibDetect the
method representations described in the previous section to identify a set of potential
class name candidates.
First, LibMapper uses AppSeparator (cf. Chapter 4.2) to separate the library code from
app code. Second, it matches a set of potential classes to the library code using either a
representation for classes or methods. Third, our approach calculates the likelihood of
the class, field, and method data fitting the potential class-matches. Fourth, LibMapper
combines all probabilities to resolve the mapping for each code entity. It also considers
preferred classes that result from previously matched ones. Finally, LibMapper returns
a mapping file that contains all code-entity mappings that an analyst can use to rename
all names in an app using ProGruard [Pro17].
In the following, we describe the usage of our representations and the interaction
between different processing steps.
APK
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Library Code
Match Classes
by Methods
Merge Classes
Matched
Classes
Match Field Data
Match Method Data
Mapping FileMatch Class Data
Match
Classes
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Resolve Mapping
Preferred Classes
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Figure 6.2.: Process to resolve class, method, and field library mappings
6.3.1. AppSeparator
We use AppSeparator to identify which classes belong to library code in preparation for
the next processing step. AppSeparator has shown to be adequate to separate app code
from library code in Section 4.3.
6.3.2. Match (Structurally) Unchanged Classes
Given the potential library classes identified by AppSeparator, we match library classes
that have not been structurally changed to identify them more efficiently. For this
matching, we use two representations that we previously stored for each library class.
The first representation consists of the following class, field, and method information,
which we concatenate to a fingerprint of the class.
Classes: For classes, we remove all modifiers and concatenate the name of the class,
followed by the superclass’s name, and the names of interfaces sorted by their
names to the result string.
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Fields: For fields, we remove all modifiers of the fields, sort them by their names and
append each field with its type name and field name to the class string.
Methods: For methods, we extract the AR for each method, sort the methods by the
representation, and append them to the class string.
To enable a fast comparison, we hash the resulting string with SHA1 and refer to the
hash sum in the following as Class AR. As we have shown in Section 6.2, the AR has the
same collision rate as the bytecode; however, since the Class AR is more robust against
changes to modifiers, we use this representation to match structurally-unchanged classes.
Since the Class AR is vulnerable to Name Mangling and Fake Types, we manipulate the
classes, fields, and methods and concatenate their strings for the second representation
in the following way:
Classes: For classes, we use the first type names from the inheritance hierarchy, which
belong to the Android API as a class string similar to parameters and return types
in Section 3.2.1 (NR). For instance, if class X extends class Y and class Y extends
class Z that belongs to the Android class library, then we use the class name of
class Z in our class string.
Fields: For fields, we remove all modifiers and field names. Afterward, we transitively
iterate over the type hierarchy of a field type and replace the field type name with
the first type name that belongs to the Android API. Finally, we sort the fields by
these names and append each field with its type representation to the class string.
Methods: For methods, we extract the NR for each method, sort the methods by the
representation, and append them to the class string.
As done with Class AR, we hash the resulting string with SHA1 and use it in the
following as Class NR. We first match a class with the Class AR. If we cannot match a
class with this representation, we match it with the Class NR. Afterward, we match all
remaining, unmatched classes from the library code using the method representations
as in the following description.
6.3.3. Match Classes by Methods
We use five method representations in increasing abstraction order to identify a set of
potential class matches for classes that were not matched using the class representations.
However, we use a slightly different set of representations than LibDetect because it has
a different focus than LibMapper. While LibDetect tries to match a method signature as
precise as possible to identify the library’s version, LibMapper tries to match as many
names as possible to map each class, field, and method name of a library.
Based on the collision rates of BC and AR, we do not use BC as our representations
because AR has the same collision rate but is more robust to modifier changes. The same
applies to Fuzzy SPR over SPR so that we use the former but not the latter. With these
reductions, only the representations AR, NR, and Fuzzy SPR would remain to match
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methods. However, if we cannot match specific methods with these representations, we
also use CallR, and Fuzzy Signature from Section 6.2.
Given this set of representations, we match a set of potential library classes to a
library class from an app using the same method-to-class matching, as described in
Section 3.2. To this end, we match each of the five method representations extracted
from the library code with the same representations stored in the database in the order
from most to least precise representation. Using the stored fully-qualified name of the
classes and each matched method representation, we aggregate the set of potentially
used library classes.
In order to reduce the number of potentially matched library classes, we use heuristics
gained from the insights of Section 6.2: We first match all methods with more than 16
(24) instructions to avoid mismatches due to huge collision rates. Afterward, we match
the remaining methods based on the identified class names of the previously matched
methods or use all methods if there are no methods with more than 16 instructions.
6.3.4. Merge Classes
From matching of unchanged classes and classes by method representations, we get a
set of potentially fully-qualified names of classes for each library class in an app. While
the sets of unchanged classes contain only one or a few matched classes, the ones from
method-representation matching may contain several hundred potential library classes.
To identify a precise mapping for each class, field, and method name, we combine all
possible information of the entities under analysis.
6.3.5. Match Method Data
To map all methods to a potentially matched class, LibMapper uses multiple features to
calculate for each matched method (m) a score of m ∈ [0, 1]. The features were selected to
facilitate the identification of the method name by encompassing its core functionalities
and its surrounding code entities without relating on their names. After calculating the
scores, LibMapper summarizes them and divides the result by the number of features.
Finally, LibMapper maps each class’s method by using the library information with the
highest resulting value, which is stored in our database. In the following, we describe
the different features that LibMapper uses to determine a mapping for a library method.
Method Name: While an obfuscator could manipulate a method name, LibMapper
uses it to avoid mismatches caused by non-obfuscated names. However, LibMapper
does not calculate a score for partially matched method names, it uses 1.0 for a
complete match and 0.0 otherwise.
Subclass Methods: If an obfuscator did not change a method name, LibMapper also
checks all methods that override this method in subclasses to reduce time wasted
for additional checks and matches the name with 1.0 for a complete match and
0.0 otherwise.
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Sibling Class Methods: As for subclass methods, if an obfuscator did not change a
method name, then LibMapper checks also the name of a method whose declaring
class inherits from the same superclass. If the method name matches completely
LibMapper uses the score 1.0 and 0.0 otherwise.
Number of Instructions: The number of instructions may change by utilizing code
manipulation, method inlining, or extraction. However, since most of the method
instructions stay unchanged, LibMapper uses this number to discriminate between
different sizes of methods. To use the method size as score, LibMapper uses the
number of instructions from the method under analysis (instMua) and compare it
with the number of instructions of the potentially matched method (instPmm) by
using the formula min(instMua,instPmm)max(instMua,instPmm,1) where instMua, instPmm ∈ N.
Method Signature: Since obfuscators change the names of methods and types that
do not belong to the Android class library, we could not use the unchanged method
signature to map method names. Nevertheless, if a method signature uses primitive
types or types from the Android class library, we could compare the method under
analysis and the potentially matched method. Since the partial match of method
signatures would lead to an enormous increase of false positives, LibMapper com-
pares the method signatures by the exact number of parameters and matches of
the following kinds of parameters. If a parameter type belongs to the set of primi-
tive types or a class from the Android class library, LibMapper checks whether the
type resides at the same index position of the parameter list and is the same type.
Otherwise, it checks whether the index positions of both types are equal. However,
if both parameters are of type array, LibMapper compares the element types of the
parameters by using the comparison for non-array types. The same applies to the
return type of the method signature. LibMapper uses 1.0 for a complete match of
a method signature and 0.0 otherwise.
Fully-Qualified Name of the Class: Obfuscators often minify the fully-qualified
name of a class. However, they cannot change each class name since other sources
reference these names. To avoid matching methods from other classes if the class
name is unchanged, LibMapper compares the fully-qualified class name of the
method under analysis with the potentially matched method. It uses 1.0 for a
complete match and 0.0 otherwise.
Fuzzy SPR: Since we have no comparison value whether structures in the method un-
der analysis match the ones from the potentially matched method, LibMapper uses
the Fuzzy SPR to compare the structures. Recall that we constructed the Fuzzy
SPR using SSDEEP, whose comparison function calculates a score between 0 and
100 for each fuzzy hash. Consequently, we use the tool’s integrated functionality
to get a comparison value between 0.0 and 1.0 using SSDEEP output100 .
Fuzzy Signature: If obfuscators change the methods’ structures so that the method
bodies have no similarities, we can still determine the similarity of a method by
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comparing their Fuzzy Signatures. In contrast to the method signature matching
above, Fuzzy Signatures also deal with the inheritance and re-ordering of parameter
types. Because of this fact, LibMapper uses the Fuzzy Signatures to determine
complete matches (1.0) or none 0.0 otherwise.
Similarity of Calling Methods: Since obfuscators may change the entire code of a
method, we use the calls of the method to deduce its name. LibMapper compares
the methods that call the method under analysis with the method calls from a
potentially matched method. However, we do not directly compare the method
calls but their signatures. To compare two method signatures of the method under
analysis (mua) and the potentially matched method (pmm), LibMapper uses their
method names, return types, and all parameter types. It calculates for each pair
of method signatures the similarity formula:
similarityij =
similar(mi,mj)
max(#parametersOf(mi),#parametersOf(mj)) + 2
where mi ∈ All Method Calls of mua and mj ∈ All Method Calls of pmm.
The addition with two in the denominator is used for the matches of the method
name and the return type. Given the comparison of individual method signatures,
we combine them by using the formula:
Similarity of Calling Methods =
∑
imaxj(similarityij)
max(#pmm, 1)
where i ∈ {0..#pmm} and j ∈ {0..#mua}.
We calculate this score using only the number of pmm in the denominator because
library methods that were integrated into apps might have a different set of callers
than those extracted in a separate module.
Similarity of Method Calls: To match the method calls of the method under analysis
with the ones of a potentially matched method, we compare the method signatures
of the calls analogously to the previous feature, only using the method calls instead
of calling methods.
Similarity of Used NR Field-Signatures: While the above features only consider
method code and calls, this feature uses fields that are read and written by the
method under analysis. As obfuscators may change the name of fields, we use the
field types and transform them, analogously to method parameter types, by using
the Nameless Representation (NR). The NR replaces a type that does not belong
to the Android class library with a set of its transitively inherited Android class
library data types (cf. Section 3.2.1). We calculate the similarity of NR field-
signatures by using the following formula that is similar to the one from Similarity
of Calling Methods. It uses only the NR field-signatures (nrf) of the method under
analysis (nrfMua) and the potentially matched method (nrfPmm):
field similarityij = similar(nrfi, nrfj)
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where nrfi ∈ All Fields of nrfMua and nrfj ∈ All Fields of nrfPmm.
Similarity of Used NR Field Signatures =
∑
imaxj(field similarityij)
max(nrfPmm, 1)
where i ∈ {0..#nrfPmm} and j ∈ {0..#nrfMua}.
Similarity of Methods Connected By Fields: Although matching NR field-
signatures introduces a feature for fields into the comparison of methods, it may
provide too little information because the field types may not differ between dif-
ferent methods. For instance, a data container class could contain many fields
with the type int, which are accessed by many getter and setter methods so that
these fields cannot be differentiated using these methods. To tackle this issue,
we use instead of field signatures, all method signatures (ms) that access the fields
which are also accessed by the method under analysis (msMua) and the potentially
matched method (msPmm). For the comparison, we use the following formulas:
similarity of field− connected methodsij =
similar(msi,msj)
max(#parametersOf(msi),#parametersOf(msj)) + 2
where msi ∈ All Methods Connected By Fields from msMua and msj ∈ All Meth-
ods Connected By Fields from msPmm.
Similarity of Methods Connected by F ields =∑
imaxj(similarity of field− connected methodsij)
max(msPmm, 1)
where i ∈ {0..#msPmm} and j ∈ {0..#msMua}.
6.3.6. Match Field Data
After matching the method data, we extract the following features to match fields for a
potentially matched class. Since the representation of fields provides limited information
to identify their names, we use to encompass the fields not only their representation as
features but mainly information from methods that access the fields. As with the method
data, we assign a field mapping for each potentially matched class using the maximum
of the combined scores from the following items.
Field Signature: Since obfuscators may not be able to change all field names, LibMap-
per compares fields by using their signatures and uses 1.0 for a complete match
of a field signature and 0.0 otherwise.
Fuzzy Field Signature: For all fields whose names were changed by obfuscators,
LibMapper compares the field types using the Nameless Representation and uses
1.0 for a complete match of a field NR and 0.0 otherwise.
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Similarity of Method Accesses: Since the Fuzzy Field Signature may not suffice to
match fields with common types, LibMapper uses the methods that read or write
each field to identify it. LibMapper matches each method that accesses the field
under analysis (mFua) with all methods that access the potentially matched field
(mPmf) and divides it be the number of accessing methods for the fields (namFua,
namPmf) using the formulas:
Method Access Similarityij = 1−
|mfuai −mPmfj |
max(1,mFuai,mPmfj)
Similarity of Method Accesses =
∑
imaxj(Method Access Similarityij)
max(namPmf, 1)
where i ∈ {0..namPmf} and j ∈ {0..namFua}.
Similarity of Fields Read Before Another Field: Using the methods’ field-
accesses may be sufficient for most fields. However, if multiple fields are accessed
by the same methods, they cannot be differentiated using the previous data. For
this purpose, LibMapper checks each method that reads the field under analysis,
whether another field was read before it using the program counter. LibMapper
compares each previously read field using its Fuzzy Field Signature (fsi, fsj) for
the number of all reading methods of the field under analysis (nrmFua) and the
potentially matched field (nrmPmf). We match the fields either by using 1.0 for
a full match or 0.0 otherwise. For the comparison, we use the following formulae:
Fuzzy F ield Signature Similarityij = equal(fsi, fsj)
Similarity of F ields Read Before Another F ield =∑
i sumj(Fuzzy F ield Signature Similarityij)
max(nrmMua, nrmPmf, 1)
where i ∈ {0..nrmPmf} and j ∈ {0..nrmFua}.
Similarity of Fields Written Before Another Field: We compare the similarity
of fields written before another field analogously to the Similarity of Fields Read
Before Another Field.
Similarity of Loop Reads: To distinguish fields with a collection type from those
without one, we check whether a method reads a field in a loop. However, loops
are not easily identified in Java bytecode because some obfuscators change control-
flow graphs to hide loop structures. For this reason, LibMapper first calculates the
strongly connected components of the control-flow graph and then checks whether
the a field is read in a strongly connected component. To aggregate this value across
all reading methods and all strongly connected components, LibMapper uses the
following formula to match the loop reads of the field under analysis (lrFua) and
the potentially matched field (lrPmf).
Similarity of Loop Readsij = 1−
|lrFua− lrPmf |
max(1, lrFua, lrPmf)
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Similarity of Loop Writes: We handle the field-writes in a loop analogously to the
Similarity of Loop Reads.
Similarity of Assigned Entities: We use the previous field data to distinguish fields
that methods access using different variations. However, we cannot distinguish
obfuscated fields with the same field type in data container classes accessed via
small obfuscated methods such as getters and setters. It is hard to resolve such
cases because the obfuscated methods might have not enough content information
to resolve the fields and vice versa.
Nevertheless, if the obfuscated methods write different values to these fields, the
values can be used to distinguish the fields. For this reason, LibMapper compares
for each method that writes a field, which entities are written into the field. These
entities can be values of common types such as java.lang.String or int, but
also results of method calls or field accesses. LibMapper uses the fuzzy signatures
of methods and fields to encode these connections. To compare as few values as
possible, we compare for each method only the first assigned value (avi, avj) for
the number of methods for the field under analysis (favFua) and the potentially
matched field (favPmf) using the following formulas:
V alue Similarityij = equal(avi, avj)
Similarity of Assigned Entities =
∑
imaxj(V alue Similarityij)
max(favPmf, 1)
where i ∈ {0..favFua} and j ∈ {0..favPmf}.
6.3.7. Match Class Data
In addition to the information from methods and fields, we need a score for potentially
matched classes. Since the suggestions of LibDetect and our class representations only
encompass the core functionalities of a class and not its surrounding code entities, we use
as features the former and the latter to identify a name for the class. In the following,
we describe the used class features to determine the mapping for a library class.
Fully-Qualified Name: Obfuscators cannot change all class names because different
sources may reference them, and obfuscators have no access to these references.
LibMapper uses 1.0 for a complete match of a class name and 0.0 otherwise.
Similarity of Subclasses: While an obfuscator may have changed the name of a
class, it is still possible that subclasses of that class keep their original names
because sources reference these names, which are not controlled by the obfuscator.
LibMapper compares each subclass name (sci) of the class under analysis (cua) with
the subclass names (scj) of a potentially matched class (pmc). For the combination
of multiple subclass-names, LibMapper uses the following formulas:
Subclass Similarityij = equal(sci, scj)
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Similarityof Subclasses =
∑
imaxj(Subclass Similarityij)
max(#pmc, 1)
where i ∈ {0..#pmc} and j ∈ {0..#cua}.
Similarity of Super Interface Classes: LibMapper calculates the similarity of super
interface classes analogously to Similarity of Subclasses.
Class Signature: While matching the direct superclasses and interfaces might match
some of the classes, most classes have obfuscated superclasses and interfaces. To
handle this fact, LibMapper uses the Nameless Representation of the class under
analysis and compare it with the NR of a potentially matched class. This com-
parison allows us to match classes that transitively inherit from the Android class
library. As score, LibMapper uses 1.0 for a complete match and 0.0 otherwise.
Similarity of fan-In: As with subclasses, superclasses, and interfaces, LibMapper
compares the classes that access the class under analysis with the classes that
access the potentially matched class (acPmc). In order to calculate a score for the
match, it uses the following formula:
Similarity of Fan In =
#accessingclasses
#acPmc
Similarity of fan-Out: LibMapper calculates the number of matched classes accessed
by the class under analysis analogously to the Similarity of Fan In.
Number of Instructions: While an obfuscator might change the names of the sur-
rounding classes, the number of instructions usually stays similar. LibMapper
compares this number between the class under analysis (niCua) and a potentially
matched class (niPmc) using the following formula:
Instruction Count Similarity = 1− |niCua− niPmC|
max(1, niCua, niPmc)
Number of Methods: We compare the number of methods analogously to the number
of instructions using a similar formula for the class under analysis (nmCua) and a
potentially matched class (nmPmc):
Method Count Similarity = 1− |nmCua− nmPmC|
max(1, nmCua, nmPmc)
Class Kind: Android and Java bytecode use some classes for unique purposes. For
instance, some classes are used as enumerators of specific values, are abstract
classes, are anonymous classes, are interfaces, inherit from Exception or Error, or
are resource classes. To match these different kinds of classes, LibMapper compares
the kind of the class under analysis with each potentially matched class. Since these
class kinds are mutually exclusive, we match them using 1.0 for a full match and
0.0 otherwise.
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6.3.8. Preferred Classes
After LibMapper resolved a class mapping, it uses its database to add all class names
that access the mapped class to a collection of preferred classes. These classes are used
to match others in the following iterations. A class in the preferred-class collection has
a slightly higher chance to be picked in future mappings because LibMapper calculates
an additional score for classes that match a class in the collection. LibMapper represents
the class names of the collection in our resolving process, as a score: 1.0 for a full match
and 0.0 for no match.
6.3.9. Resolve Mapping
Given the mapped method-, field-, and class data for all potentially matched classes, the
algorithm finally maps one of the potentially matched classes to the class under analysis.
For this, it averages all scores of the mappings and chooses the maximum-fitting class-
mapping. After this step, each analyzed class was mapped to a single library class with
the previously assigned method and field mappings. In the end, the algorithm outputs
the mapping of all classes into a file.
After describing our mapping procedure, we evaluate the effectiveness of LibMapper
against different obfuscation configurations and the state-of-the-art deobfuscator De-
Guard in the next section.
6.4. Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our LibMapper against the state-of-the-art approach De-
Guard. Furthermore, we analyze LibMapper’s false positives and false negatives. We
chose DeGuard because it is the most advanced tool for resolving obfuscated names in
Android apps. For the evaluation, we analyzed LibMapper’s effectiveness and compared
it with DeGuard by investigating the following research questions:
RQ1: How effective is LibMapper compared against DeGuard to map names of obfus-
cated libraries in the standard obfuscator configuration?
RQ2: How effective is LibMapper compared against DeGuard to map names of obfus-
cated libraries in an advanced obfuscator configuration?
RQ3: What kind of entities are mapped incorrectly by the LibMapper?
For the experiments, we used a server with two AMD(R) EPYC(R) 7542 @ 2.90 GHz
(32 cores / 64 threads each) CPUs and 512 GB RAM. The analyses were executed using
OpenJDK 1.8_212 64-bit VM with 20 GB of heap memory and MySQL 5.7 for the
library database.
To answer these questions, we used all 453 apps from the case study in Section 6.2,
which do not contain obfuscated names. While we stored the libraries from 302 apps
in LibMapper’s database, we used the remaining 151 apps for the comparison with De-
Guard. For the comparison, we obfuscated the 151 apps using ProGuard and used
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the mapping files which ProGuard created to assess the effectiveness of LibMapper and
DeGuard. To this end, we compared each tool’s precision, recall, and harmonic mean
of both values (F1-measure). For calculating the precision, recall, and F1-measure, we
checked each entry in the mapping file that was created by ProGuard with a correspond-
ing entry in the deobfuscation mapping files from LibMapper or DeGuard. If an entry
belongs to a library and the deobfuscated name completely conforms with the original
name, we count it as a true positive. However, if the entry in the original mapping
does not belong to a library and the deobfuscation mapping assigns this entry a library
name, we count it as a false positive. Analogously, we identify false negatives and true
negatives by checking whether the assigned name and the original name belong to the
app code or the library code.
Using this procedure, we can only identify complete matches. However, to identify
partial matches, we split the entry names using Samurai [EHPVS09] and use the fraction
of matched words as a matching score.
Given the description of precision, recall, and F1-measure, we evaluate LibMapper and
DeGuard using two configurations of ProGuard [Pro17]. In the following, we describe
the standard configuration and the most advanced configuration for name obfuscation.
Many developers use the former to build their app, but the latter could provide more
protection for the developer’s intellectual property.
6.4.1. Standard Name Obfuscation Configuration
We use the standard configuration of ProGuard [Pro17] to obfuscate the names of the
151 apps and compare the abilities of LibMapper and DeGuard to resolve the obfuscated
names. We use ProGuard because it is integrated into the build system of Android apps
and, therefore, often used in practice. With ProGuard’s standard configuration, the
tool obfuscates names by replacing meaningful names with meaningless short character
sequences. For instance, the method name getLength may be obfuscated to the name
a or any other combination of characters.
Given the obfuscated apps, we execute LibMapper and DeGuard on them to measure
the precision, recall, and the F1-score, which we show in Figure 6.3.
Observation 10 While DeGuard has a 0.79% higher precision (99.92% vs. 99.14%),
LibMapper has a 5.1% higher recall (88.12% vs. 83.84%). The high recall results
in a higher F1-score of LibMapper (93.31% vs. 91.18%). Therefore, in the stan-
dard configuration of ProGuard, LibMapper resolves more obfuscated names than
DeGuard (RQ1).
6.4.2. Advanced Name Obfuscation Configuration
For the second experiment, we enabled the repackaging option of ProGuard and obfus-
cated the names by words from a natural language dictionary [Sta20]. The repackaging
causes the relocation of all classes into the root package of an app. While this option
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Figure 6.3.: Average precision, recall and F1-measure of LibMapper and DeGuard
does not directly affect the class names, it prohibits deobfuscators from keeping the same
simple names in the same package without renaming the simple names.
The usage of a natural language dictionary circumvents deobfuscators that only resolve
names with meaningless character sequences. For instance, the method name getLength
is changed to John which is not just a sequence of random characters like abc.
Using these two options, we obfuscated the names of the 151 apps and resolved the
library names using LibMapper and DeGuard. Figure 6.4 shows the comparison be-
tween LibMapper’s and DeGuard’s average precision, recall, and F1-score for the apps
obfuscated using the above-described advanced configuration.
Observation 11 While in this experiment, DeGuard has a higher precision than
LibMapper (64.39% vs. 83.47%), LibMapper achieves more than eight times the
recall of DeGuard (6.64% vs. 54.41%). These differences result in a significant
distance between the harmonic means of both approaches (58.98 vs. 12.3%). While
the difference in precision and recall is higher than in the first experiment, both tools
map less code entities correctly. However, LibMapper resolves obfuscated names
better than DeGuard in the advanced name-obfuscation configuration of ProGuard
(RQ2).
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Figure 6.4.: Average precision, recall and F1-measure of LibMapper and DeGuard for the
advanced configuration
6.4.3. False Negatives of LibMapper
To evaluate the causes of LibMapper’s false mappings, we analyzed false negatives using
the obfuscation from ProGuard’s configurations and the deobfuscation mappings from
LibMapper. We consider as false-negatives library entries that either did not match at
all or only partially. Using the identified false negatives, we examined fully-qualified
names of fields, methods, and classes.
Figure 6.5 shows the missing names for each obfuscator configuration. Using the
standard configuration causes a total of 11.88% false negatives, consisting of 8.89% false
field names, 2.6% false method names, and only 0.39% false class names. We randomly
chose 100 fields and examined their context. Most of the fields with false name mappings
are rarely used and do not have any distinctive features.
Using the advanced configuration causes more than 28 times more incorrectly assigned
class names because of classes being repackaged into the root package of an app. With
the repackaging, less information is available to map fields and methods, which results
in an amplification of the effect mentioned earlier for fields. Since fewer classes can be
mapped, 23.98% of the field names are falsely assigned. With fewer mapped classes and
fields, 10.28% of the method names are also falsely assigned.
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Observation 12 Due to these results, we identify for RQ3 two main causes of false
negatives: The first cause is fields that are only used by less descriptive methods,
such as get* or set* methods and that have a widespread field type. The second
cause is the repackaging of classes, which results in the fact that small classes cannot
be mapped unambiguously.
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Figure 6.5.: Identified false negatives per configuration categorized by field, method, and
class names.
6.4.4. Discussion
In the experiment with ProGuard’s standard configuration, DeGuard’s recall is already
5% lower than LibMapper’s but DeGuard’s recall drops to 6.64% when using the ad-
vanced configuration. To identify the cause of DeGuard’s low recall, we manually com-
pared its output files with the mapping files from ProGuard. The comparison showed
that DeGuard changed only 6.64% of the names that ProGuard obfuscated using the
given dictionary. This fact suggests that it is not a false assignment that causes the low
recall but a false identification of non-obfuscated code entities.
In the experiment with the advanced configuration, LibMapper has a lower precision
than DeGuard, which is caused by repacking all classes into the same package. This
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repackaging blurs the boundaries between library and app code and causes app classes
to be considered as library classes. Because DeGuard identifies only a small fraction of
the obfuscated names, it changes only those names and therefore has higher precision.
However, since many obfuscated names were not identified by DeGuard, it has a low
recall. In contrast, if LibMapper considers an app class as a library class, it also considers
all its members belonging to a library class, which leads to the lower precision. The low
precision can be improved by improving AppSeparator’s splitting procedure.
The missing library mappings in LibMapper’s output files are also caused by the
repackaging so that library classes are considered as app classes and, therefore, produce
many false negatives. However, in the experiment with the advanced configuration,
LibMapper’s recall is significantly higher than DeGuard’s. Therefore, it is much better
suited to map names to obfuscated library code entities.
6.5. Threats to Validity
In the following, we discuss threats to the validity of our library mapping experiments.
Since LibMapper maps only code that was identified as library code by AppSeparator,
missing entries in AppSeparator’s reference white list may lead to missing library map-
ping. However, due to the high precision of AppSeparator even without the white list,
the overall error should be negligible.
Assembling an extensive, up-to-date ground truth database to learn the mapping of
library code is infeasible because some libraries contain obfuscated names. However,
using further analyses that identify obfuscated names, we could extend our database
with non-obfuscated library code entities.
The 151 evaluated apps from Section 6.4 may not be sufficient to compare LibMapper
with DeGuard. Since we chose these apps from the same source as the database of
DeGuard, we are confident that the results are comparable.
To evaluate the impact of obfuscation on library mapping, we used the obfuscator
ProGuard, which applies renaming, optimization, and shrinking. To the best of our
knowledge, other obfuscators either use the same renaming technique as ProGuard or
use ProGuard as a post-processing step. However, other obfuscators might apply stronger
techniques, such as virtualization, class encryption, class loading, and packaging. To the
best of our knowledge, no existing library mapping approach handles these techniques.
6.6. Conclusion
We presented our approach LibMapper that uses app-code separation and library de-
tection to collect possible candidates for library classes. Afterward, it extracts multiple
features to unambiguously map each library class, field, and method with a name from
non-obfuscated library code entities.
The evaluation shows that LibMapper maps library code better than the state-of-the-
art deobfuscator DeGuard. Obfuscating names with ProGuard’s most advanced naming
configuration causes that LibMapper’s recall is more than seven times higher than the
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one of DeGuard. During an analysis of DeGuard’s mappings, we identified that most of
the names are not falsely assigned but not handled at all. We suspect that an incorrect
detection of obfuscated names causes this fact.
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Previous research [YFM+17, IWAM17, STDA+17, and17, LLB+17] analyzed repack-
aging and malicious components by extracting features from app code that indicate
repackaged or malicious behavior. To identify suitable features for their approaches, re-
searchers investigated samples of known repackaged apps and malware payloads. For the
investigation, an app needs to be reverse-engineered to reveal the app’s code. In order
to understand the content of the code, it needs to be comprehensible and have an easily
readable layout. In previous work [PHD11, GS10, HØ09], researchers studied the code
layout and found that manual analysis is more difficult without understandable names
of code entities such as classes, fields, and methods. However, malware writers and
repackagers use name obfuscation to hide the behavior of their apps. For that purpose,
some approaches [BRTV16, RVK15, VCD17, Jaf17, AZLY19, CFPK20] support analysts
by suggesting names for code entities with obfuscated names based on the assumption
that in a similar context, many names are the same [GS10]. Since these approaches infer
names from a code entity’s context, we refer to them as name inference approaches.
These name inference approaches have two main drawbacks. First, they do not identify
which code entities have obfuscated names leading to the overwriting of non-obfuscated
names. Second, the approaches do not separate between library code and app code,
leading to the suggestion of names from library code to app code entities. While the
previous chapter described how to handle the second drawback, we propose, in this
chapter, an approach to identify obfuscated names of code entities in Android apps.
Previous works [WHA+18, Mir18, WR17, Don18] proposed several tools to identify
apps that contain obfuscated names. However, they only measure whether an app con-
tains obfuscated names but cannot pinpoint them in the code. This fact results from the
features used by these approaches to identify obfuscated names. They either combine all
names of an obfuscated app or a specific area without focusing on single names. Further-
more, all approaches target only specific name-obfuscation techniques (e.g., ProGuard’s
standard configuration [Pro17]) so that they may miss obfuscated names produced by
more advanced techniques.
We introduce ObfusSpot that pinpoints obfuscated names in a given codebase to sup-
port name inference approaches. ObfusSpot identifies obfuscated names in three steps.
In the first step, it uses a classifier to identify names that were manipulated using
the standard configuration of obfuscators such as ProGuard [Pro17], Allatori [All19],
DashO [Das19], ZKM [Zel19], and Stringer [str19]. This step identifies all obfuscated
names with a different pattern of character sequences than non-obfuscated names.
In the second step, ObfusSpot identifies obfuscated names by measuring the frequency
of code entity names because non-obfuscated names are less frequent than obfuscated
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ones. For this analysis, it uses a trained classifier to decide which frequencies are an
indication for obfuscated names.
While the second step identifies obfuscated names that occur more frequently than
other names, it is laborious to identify less common obfuscated names. For this purpose,
ObfusSpot uses LibMapper to check whether the names of libraries are obfuscated. If
an obfuscator manipulated the names of library code entities, ObfusSpot extracts the
used name-obfuscation pattern and tries to identify other names with the same naming
pattern in the remaining code. For instance, if a technique frequently uses the word
”demo” in their obfuscated names, we identify this word in names of library code entities
and can flag all names of app code entities that also contain this word. Using the last
two steps, ObfusSpot can identify obfuscated names that are rarely used or are combined
from more frequent ones. To the best of our knowledge, ObfusSpot is the first detector
that can handle obfuscated names that consist of concatenated words from dictionaries.
For the evaluation of ObfusSpot, we downloaded mapping files from 948 app reposito-
ries, which are used by developers to map obfuscated names back to the original names
if they receive a crash report by an app user. With the knowledge from these mapping
files, we built a ground truth of obfuscated and non-obfuscated names and used it to
train our classifiers and measure ObfusSpot’s effectiveness. The results show that each
of ObfusSpot’s steps effectively identifies names obfuscate using different techniques.
Furthermore, because the developers of obfuscators are experts for their tools and most
likely obfuscated them with more advanced techniques, we measure whether ObfusSpot
recognizes manipulated names contained in these codebases. ObfusSpot identifies with
a F1-measure of 94.46% all obfuscated names in the codebases of obfuscation tools.
Finally, we analyzed 100,000 apps to measure the percentage of apps that were obfus-
cated by their developers, libraries that are only available in obfuscated form, and apps
that are obfuscated using a dictionary instead of random sequences of characters. The
results show that only 29.33% of the analyzed apps were obfuscated by their developers,
and only 3.59% of the libraries are released in obfuscated form. Interestingly, the names
of 18.53% of the obfuscated code entities could only be found using ObfusSpot’s last two
steps. These names were obfuscated using natural language dictionaries.
In the next section, we discuss the related work (Section 7.1) followed by the descrip-
tion of our approach ObfusSpot in Section 7.2. We evaluated the approach in Section 7.3,
discuss in Section 7.4 threats to the validity of our experiments, and draw a conclusion
of our work in Section 7.5.
7.1. State-of-the-Art Detectors of Obfuscated Names
In this section, we describe related approaches to identify apps that contain obfuscated
names. All approaches use either a classifier or heuristics to identify names manipulated
by a specific obfuscator.
Dong et al. [Don18] identify apps with obfuscated names by counting the occurrence
of 3-grams in each name of a code entity and using these counts to train a Support
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Vector Machine (SVM) classifier [Wan05]. This SVM distinguishes between apps with
obfuscated names and non-obfuscated names. While this approach identifies whether
an app contains obfuscated names, it cannot pinpoint an individual obfuscated name
because it operates on all names of an obfuscated app.
AndrODet [Mir18] identifies apps with obfuscated names using seven classifiers. These
classifiers are trained with multiple aggregated features, and their classifications are
combined using limited random search [Pri77]. Each newly analyzed app is used by
AndrODet to improve its models. However, AndrODet only identifies if entire apps are
obfuscated and cannot pinpoint the exact name of a code entity because it aggregates
its features using all names in an app.
Wang et al. [WR17] identify apps with obfuscated names by determining the used
obfuscator and even the used configuration. For this purpose, their approach extracts
all names and strings, filters them, counts their occurrence, and uses the occurrences
to train an SVM for each configuration of known obfuscators. The resulting SVMs can
identify which name obfuscation was used to manipulate an app. Unlike ObfusSpot, the
described tool only identifies if an app contains obfuscated names but cannot pinpoint
which of the names are obfuscated.
Park et al. [PYC+19] identify apps with obfuscated names by decompiling all Java
classes from an app, treating the classes as text documents, and classifying the docu-
ments using various machine learning techniques. The approach can identify different
obfuscation techniques applied to all classes of an app, such as renaming, string obfusca-
tion, control-flow obfuscation, and the usage of reflection. However, it cannot pinpoint
the exact location of an obfuscated name because it uses all classes to identify the various
obfuscation techniques.
Kaur et al. [KNGS18] identify obfuscated names by transforming the bytes of an app’s
codebase into an image and using image classification to determine the used obfuscation
technique. As the approaches of Park et al. [PYC+19] and Wang et al. [WR17], this
approach can identify the different obfuscation techniques used to manipulate an app.
However, this approach is also not able to pinpoint the exact location of an obfuscated
name.
OBFUSCAN [WHA+18] identifies obfuscated names of packages, classes, fields, and
methods by using heuristics extracted from analyzing the implementation of the most
used obfuscator ProGuard [Pro17]. Additionally, it checks whether an obfuscator re-
moved the debug information, the source code’s reference, and specific annotations. The
authors of OBFUSCAN used it for a large scale study of 1,762,868 apps to measure the
impact of all these obfuscation techniques and how often the main code of an app is obfus-
cated using these techniques. However, OBFUSCAN focuses only on names obfuscated
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by ProGuard but cannot identify obfuscated names manipulated by other obfuscators.
Additionally, it does not pinpoint the exact location of an obfuscated name.
Discussion Some approaches identify different obfuscation techniques or even the used
obfuscator configuration using either machine learning or heuristics. However, none of
the approaches analyzed name obfuscation using a natural language dictionary. While
the standard configurations of obfuscators manipulate names using random sequences of
characters, names obfuscated using a natural language dictionary are hard to distinguish
from non-obfuscated names. Only ObfusSpot can identify such names by using the
frequency of names and detecting patterns of obfuscated names.
Additionally, most approaches identify names obfuscated using standard configura-
tions by training their classifiers with obfuscated and non-obfuscated names. In con-
trast, ObfusSpot uses only non-obfuscated names to detect anomalous characteristics
of obfuscated names. Finally, unlike ObfusSpot, all other approaches can only detect
whether the names in an app are obfuscated but cannot pinpoint the exact locations of
such names.
7.2. ObfusSpot
In this section, we describe our approach ObfusSpot that identifies obfuscated names
in three steps. The first step combines a clustering and a classification algorithm to
identify anomalies in the naming scheme of obfuscated names. This step is similar to
the approach of Gadal et al. [GM17] that focuses on intrusion detection. The second step
uses a classifier to identify names of obfuscated code entities by using the frequency of the
names as a feature because non-obfuscated names are less frequent than obfuscated ones.
As last step, ObfusSpot uses LibMapper (cf. Section 6.3) to extract naming patterns of
obfuscated library code entities. Using these patterns, ObfusSpot identifies obfuscated
names of app code entities that are obfuscated similarly.
In the following, we describe ObfusSpot’s processing steps depicted in Figure 7.1. First,
ObfusSpot analyzes the code using anomaly classification and frequency classification.
If the second step identifies other obfuscated names than the first step, ObfusSpot use
LibMapper to identify obfuscated names in libraries. Afterward, the Name Matcher
identifies all names of app code entities that use the same naming scheme as the identified
obfuscated names and outputs the results to the user.
While ObfusSpot always performs the anomaly and frequency classification, it executes
the library mapping only if the frequency classification identified more obfuscated names
than the anomaly classification. ObfusSpot uses this condition to ensure that it executes
the time-consuming library mapping only if the app contains more obfuscated names
than can be found with the first step.
The following describes the processing steps and the interaction between the different
processing steps in more detail.
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Figure 7.1.: Process to identify obfuscated names
7.2.1. Anomaly Classification
For the detection of anomalies in names of obfuscated code entities, ObfusSpot extracts
several features shown in Table 7.1. First, it clusters all names and then identifies all
names that do not fit into these clusters. The intuition behind the features is that non-
obfuscated names contain words, are not encrypted or compressed, and have a well de-
fined distribution of vocals, consonants and other characters. In contrast, names changed
by an obfuscator can be encrypted or compressed (e.g., getLength → a2f34d), can be
transformed into a random sequences of characters (e.g., getLength → IiIiiiIiI), or
just minified to a single character (e.g., getLength → a).
In the following, we describe the different features from Table 7.1 by their category.
Statistical Tests: Previous statistical analyses of encryption mechanisms [Kah96,
cry19, LH07] show that obfuscated names often have a random (close to equal)
distribution of characters. Consequently, ObfusSpot identifies a random distribu-
tion and uses it as a discriminating feature to distinguish between obfuscated and
other names with special characters. Thereby, ObfusSpot uses three different mea-
sures to check whether the distribution of the characters is random because we
encountered that each one is suited for different scenarios. For instance, previous
works [LH07] used the Normalized entropy to identify encrypted malware. Ob-
fusSpot uses it to identify encrypted names. While the Chi-squared test measures
the deviation of the characters from the equal distribution, the average distribu-
tion measures whether an obfuscator rotated the characters of a given name (e.g.
caesar cipher [Kah96]) or it belongs to a language.
Compression Rate: If ObfusSpot uses only the statistical tests, it may miss names
obfuscated using compression, e.g., compressing a name using gzip. To correctly
identify such names, ObfusSpot compresses all names and compares the compressed
name’s length against the original name length. Based on cryptoanalysis knowl-
edge [cry19], the comparison will show that both lengths do not differ if the original
name already consisted of compressed data.
Word Counts: As described above, names changed with the standard configuration
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of an obfuscator contain no or just a few words. ObfusSpot uses natural lan-
guage dictionaries to check whether a name contains words. However, some names
cannot be checked because they do not follow the camel-case naming convention
[ora19]. As a result, ObfusSpot splits names from non-Latin languages using ICU-
Tokenizer [ICU19] and Samurai [EHPVS09]. Samurai splits identifiers by a list of
frequently used words.
Name Characteristics: ObfusSpot uses one feature from AndroDet [Mir18] that iden-
tifies if an app uses name obfuscation. While AndroDet aggregates all name fea-
tures over the app, ObfusSpot uses it to classify individual names. Additionally,
to the feature from AndroDet, ObfusSpot combines eight additional ones that cal-
culate different character distributions, e.g., character counts, digits.
Table 7.1.: Feature list for the clustering of obfuscated names
Category Name Description
Statistical Tests Chi-squared Test Tests if all chars in the given name are equally,
distributed indicating a random distribution.
Average Distribution The average distribution which is close to the
Gaussian distribution for plain names,
Normalized Entropy The normalized entropy of names.
Compression Rate GZIP The rate of the GZIP compression,
Word Counts Dictionaries of The shortest word length,
54 Languages the largest word length,
[Mil95, dic20] the number of words,
the number of unique words from a
multiple language dictionary.
Name Characteristics AndroDet[Mir18] Sum of repetitive characters.
Character Counts Number of characters,
Number of vocals,
Number of consonants,
Number of digits,
Number of unique characters,
Number of non letters,
Maximum number of consecutive characters,
Maximum occurrences of the same character
Training Given the 17 features in Table 7.1, ObfusSpot uses a data set with non-
obfuscated names to create clusters from the features that represent the non-obfuscated
names. Afterward, it uses the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm (cf. Sec-
tion 2.3.1) from Weka [WF02] to build clusters of these names.
After the extraction of clusters, we use a data set of obfuscated and non-obfuscated
names for the training of our classifier. From this data set, we measure for each data
entry the Euclidean distance to each cluster center. For the measurement, we standardize
the extracted feature values using the following formula: xi−meanistdi where the mean and
standard deviation (std) is used from each cluster.
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Given the distances to all cluster centers, we use the minimum distance (mindistance)
to a cluster center and the cluster name (mincluster) to train a binary classifier that
identifies name anomalies. However, before we use these values, we exclude outliers and
extreme values using Weka’s interquartile ranges. The intuition behind these features
is that obfuscated names have a higher distance to specific cluster centers than non-
obfuscated names. Since we cannot anticipate the optimal distances and cluster values
for these features, we train multiple classifiers to evaluate the most suitable classifier
that identifies these values. The evaluation of the most suitable classifier is discussed in
Section 7.3.1.
Classification For the classification, we extract the mindistance and mincluster values
as in the previously-described process and use the trained binary classifier to identify
obfuscated names.
xmindistanc
e
min
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ter
Figure 7.2.: Cluster example
Let us assume that the cluster centers are represented in two-dimensional space like
the colored ovals in Figure 7.2, and the features of an obfuscated name are at the point
of the red X. We can see that X is closest to the blue oval, which is our mincluster, and
we take the Euclidean distance from this oval for our classifications as mindistance.
Since X is too far away from the mincluster, the name that represents the X is classified
as obfuscated.
7.2.2. Frequency Classification
In the second step, ObfusSpot extracts the occurrence of each code entity name in an
app. For this purpose, ObfusSpot counts for each name how often it occurs in a simple
name of a class, in a field name, and a method name (except names of initiators such as
constructors or static initializers).
After calculating the occurrences, ObfusSpot measures each name’s distribution using
the number of all names with the same frequency (nnf) and the frequency of the name
under analysis (nf). Given these values, it computes the name distribution with the
following formula: nfmax(1,nnf∗nf) This feature’s intuition comes from the insight that
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obfuscators overload many names. The overloading creates a higher distribution of the
same names in an app, and ObfusSpot exploits this insight to identify obfuscated names.
A name distribution closer to 1.0 indicates that this name occurs more frequently in
comparison to other names. In contrast, a value closer to 0.0 indicates that the name
under analysis occurs as frequently as other names. However, some non-obfuscated
names may have a similar distribution to obfuscated names and vice versa. Since we
cannot determine the optimal distribution point to decide whether a name is obfuscated,
we train a classifier that learns the closest representation to this point from a given data
set of obfuscated and non-obfuscated names. The trained classifier outputs a binary
decision for each name using only the name distribution and its frequency.
7.2.3. Library Mapping
In the last step, ObfusSpot uses library mapping to identify obfuscated names. However,
ObfusSpot executes this step only if it encounters other obfuscated names in the output
of the second step than in the one of the first step. Because the identification of other
names in the output of the second step might indicate that an obfuscator changed the
names of an app using a natural language dictionary.
For instance, if an obfuscator manipulates the code entities’ names in an app with
random character sequences, then the anomaly classification and frequency classification
would identify the same obfuscated names because these names are anomalous and very
frequent. However, if the obfuscator uses random character sequences and words from
a natural language dictionary, then the first step would identify other names than the
second step. The same applies if an obfuscator only uses the natural language dictionary
because the first step would identify no obfuscated names, while the second step might
identify many obfuscated names with a higher distribution.
Since some names obfuscated with the natural language dictionary have a low dis-
tribution, we use LibMapper from Section 6.3 for the library mapping. If LibMapper
assigns to a code entity another name than it had before, we consider the previous name
as obfuscated.
7.2.4. Name Matcher
After the three steps’ execution, ObfusSpot splits each obfuscated name using Samu-
rai [EHPVS09] to identify whether other names use the same words as the obfuscated
ones. If a previously not identified name consists entirely of words from obfuscated
names, it is also considered obfuscated. With this procedure, ObfusSpot identifies ob-
fuscated names that are concatenated from obfuscated words found in names of library
code entities of an app. In the end, ObfusSpot outputs a list of obfuscated class-, field-,
and method names.
Given the description of ObfusSpot, we evaluate, in the next section, its effectiveness
against obfuscated names in the wild.
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7.3. Evaluation
For the evaluation of ObfusSpot’s effectiveness, we conducted five experiments to answer
the following research questions:
RQ1: What are the best classifiers for ObfusSpot to identify obfuscated names?
RQ2: How accurate is ObfusSpot in finding obfuscated names?
RQ3: How effective is ObfusSpot’s identification for names obfuscated by experts?
RQ4: How many apps contain obfuscated main code?
RQ5: How common are libraries released only in obfuscated form?
We performed our experiments using a server with two AMD(R) EPYC(R) 7542 @
2.90 GHz (32 cores / 64 threads each) CPUs and 512 GB RAM. The experiments were
executed on the server using OpenJDK 1.8_212 64-bit VM with 20 GB of heap memory
for Weka 3.9.4.
For our evaluation, we downloaded and analyzed four different data sets. The first
data set consists of all 453 apps that we have described in Section 6.2.1. These apps are
the only ones from F-Droid [F-D19] that contained no obfuscated names. The second
data set consists of 948 mapping files extracted from GitHub [git20] using a BOA script
(cf. Appendix Listing 12.1). Developers use these files to map the obfuscated names
back to original names if they receive a crash report from their app users. The third
data set consists of seven obfuscator trial-versions. It was downloaded to show how
often these obfuscators contain obfuscated names. The last data set encloses 100,000
apps randomly selected from AndroidZoo [HAB+16].
7.3.1. Selection of Classifiers
To classify obfuscated names, we first use the 453 apps from the F-Droid store to extract
all non-obfuscated names for the clustering step of the anomaly classification (cf. Sec-
tion 7.2.1). In total, we extracted 11,338,654 names from classes, fields, and methods.
Using these names, we calculated our features and clustered them with the expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm from Weka [WF02]. The EM algorithm outputted five
clusters with the means and standard deviations for each feature.
Anomaly Classification For the classification, we used the 948 mapping files down-
loaded from app repositories of GitHub. With these mapping files, we can deduce which
names an obfuscator changed in an app. If the output name is not equal to the input
name, the output name is flagged as obfuscated. However, if the input name equals the
output name, we manually checked whether the names are really non-obfuscated because
an obfuscator could manipulate the output name in the same form as the input name.
In total, we extracted from the 948 mapping files 3,359,533 names, of which 1,710,654
were obfuscated. To get an equal split between obfuscated and non-obfuscated names,
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we chose all obfuscated names and used a random sample of the same number of non-
obfuscated names. Afterward, we used 80% of the resulting names for training and
testing and 20% for validation.
To identify the best classifier, we measured the Euclidean distance for each name in
the training and testing set and removed all outliers and extreme values. Afterward,
we compared Naive Bayes, Multilayer Perceptron, Logistic Regression, Random Tree,
Random Forest, and REP Tree from Weka’s [WF02] collection to find the best classifier
for our approach. While most classifiers were trained using their default values, the
Multilayer Perceptron was evaluated using three different epoch values because of their
impact on the classifier’s performance.
The eight classifiers were trained and tested using 10-fold cross-validation [HTF09]
on the names of the training set. Given the cross-validation statistics, we compare the
correctly-classified instances and the root mean squared error of the classifiers. This
value is a measure of false classifications of a model.
Table 7.2.: Classifier selection for the anomaly classification
Classifier Correctly Classified Root Mean Squared Error
Naive Bayes 97.43% 15.37%
Multilayer Perceptron (one epoch) 99.06% 9.17%
Multilayer Perceptron (five epochs) 99.06% 8.87%
Multilayer Perceptron (10 epochs) 99.06% 8.81%
Logistic Regression 99.06% 9.74%
Random Tree 99.19% 8.24%
Random Forest 99.19% 8.24%
REP Tree 99.19% 8.26%
Table 7.2 shows the correctly classified and falsely classified measures of each of the
eight classifiers. Naive Bayes, with 97.43%, has the worst percentage of correctly classi-
fied instances. However, the percentage of correctly classified instances of all Multilayer
Perceptron cells and the Logistic Regression is only 1.63% points higher than those of
Naive Bayes. Nevertheless, the Random Tree, Random Forest, and REP Tree have the
highest number of correctly classified instances (99.19%). While the Random Tree and
Random Forest have the lowest false classification rate, we can integrate the REP Tree
model directly into our approach, eliminating the time required to load the classifier.
Observation 13 Since all classifiers have only a slight difference in their perfor-
mance, we chose REP Tree as our preferred classifier, because of the eliminated
loading overhead mentioned in the Section 2.3.2.
Frequency Classification For the classifier selection for the frequency classification,
we used the 948 mapping files and divided them into 80% (758 files) training and test
set and 20% (190 files) validation set. For the classifier’s construction, we extracted
each name of the mapping files and calculated its usage frequency to derive the features
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described in Section 7.2.2. From the previous experiment, we already know all obfuscated
names in the mapping files and used the same settings for the evaluation of this one.
Table 7.3.: Classifier selection for the frequency classification
Classifier Correctly Classified Root Mean Squared Error
Naive Bayes 88.24% 33.59%
Multilayer Perceptron (one epoch) 88.24% 31.15%
Multilayer Perceptron (five epochs) 88.24% 31.13%
Multilayer Perceptron (10 epochs) 88.24% 31.13%
Logistic Regression 88.20% 31.40%
Random Tree 91.33% 24.98%
Random Forest 91.33% 24.98%
REP Tree 91.33% 25.66%
Table 7.3 shows the results for each classifier. While the Logistic Regression returns the
lowest percentage of correctly classified instances (88.2%), Naive Bayes and all Multilayer
Perceptron configuration yield only a slightly higher percentage (88.24%). All tree-based
classifiers have the highest percentage of correctly classified instances, but Random Tree
and Random Forest have a lower false classification rate (24.98% vs. 25.66%).
Observation 14 As for the previous experiment, all classifiers have only a slight
difference in their performance; therefore, we use for this step also the REP Tree as
our preferred classifier. Taking all experiments into account, REP Tree represents
the best classifier for both data sets (RQ1).
7.3.2. Effectiveness of ObfusSpot
Given both classifiers, we measure the effectiveness of both classifications using their
respective validation sets. Additionally, we analyze names from the codebases of obfus-
cators and names that were obfuscated using dictionaries to evaluate the effectiveness
of ObfusSpot’s steps individually.
For the evaluation of the classifiers, we use the remaining validation sets from the
previous experiment. While the first validation set contains 684,262 names equally split
into obfuscated and non-obfuscated names, the second one contains a total of 190 map-
ping files for all apps. In order to evaluate ObfusSpot, we extracted the features for each
name in the data sets and executed the respective classifiers on them.
Table 7.4 shows the results from the execution of both classifiers on their respective
validation sets. Since we extracted both validation sets from the same sources, the overall
measures should be comparable. In the first classification experiment, the classifier
identified about 8.68% more obfuscated names than in the second one (recall: 99.99%
vs. 92%), and the precision was also 8.25% higher than in the second experiment. These
results suggest that the detector of the anomaly classification would be sufficient to
identify obfuscated names. However, in contrast to the anomaly-detection features, we
can use the features from the second classifier if an obfuscator uses names from a natural
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Table 7.4.: Precision, recall, and F1-measures for anomaly classification and frequency
classification
Measures Anomaly Classification Frequency Classification
Precision 98.29% 90.80%
Recall 99.99% 92.00%
F1 99.13% 91.40%
language dictionary. Therefore, we need both classifiers to identify as many obfuscated
names as possible.
Evaluation of Name Obfuscation in the Codebase of Obfuscators To measure the
effectiveness of ObfusSpot on name obfuscation performed by experts, we analyzed the
names of entities in the codebases of obfuscators. While name obfuscation performed by
users may accidentally miss obfuscating all names, the developers of obfuscators known
their product and use more advanced name obfuscation techniques. For this analy-
sis, we acquired trial versions of Allatori [All19], DashO [Das19], DexGuard [Dex19c],
Jarg [JAR20], Stringer [str19], yGuard [yGu20], and ZKM [Zel19] and analyzed manu-
ally whether the names of the tools’ code entities are obfuscated. Instead of analyzing
every single name of simple names of classes, fields, and methods, we analyzed only the
unique names, which reduced the number of names by 82.18% for the manual analysis.
Table 7.5.: Identified obfuscated names in analyzed obfuscators
Obfuscator Precision Recall F1 # Of Obfuscated Names
Allatori [All19] 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 6,821 (98.00%)
DashO [Das19] 100.00% 89.51% 94.46% 17,428 (81.86%)
DexGuard [Dex19c] 95.99% 100.00% 97.95% 8,231 (75.16%)
Jarg [JAR20] 89.93% 100.00% 94.70% 741 (22.74%)
Stringer [str19] 99.90% 99.16% 99.53% 19,293 (78.42%)
yGuard [yGu20] 99.83% 97.45% 98.63% 1,793 (53.09%)
ZKM [Zel19] 99.99% 98.17% 99.07% 19,926 (92.53%)
Table 7.5 shows the precision, recall, and the total unique number of obfuscated names
in all obfuscators. While the analysis results of both classification for precision and recall
were identical for most analyzed obfuscators, the results for Allatori differed between
the steps. The anomaly classification identified only 49.95% of the obfuscated names,
and only the usage of both classifications identified all of them. However, since we have
not identified any libraries in Allatori, therefore, we could not test our library mapping.
Observation 15 In total ObfusSpot identified at least 89.51% of the obfuscated
names in all obfuscator codebases with a precision of at least 89.93% (RQ3).
The main reasons for the false positives and false negatives are short names. The
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anomaly classification cannot distinguish between names consisting of three characters,
such as add or run or words accidentally formed by obfuscators. For instance, code
that runs code as background tasks often use the word run to define the main execution
method. However, an obfuscator can also accidentally produce this word by iterating
over all possible combinations of three characters.
From the column of obfuscated names, we gained an insight that all obfuscators except
Jarg and yGuard changed most of their names (at least 75.16%). We assume that because
both obfuscators are less maintained, they have less obfuscated names than other tools.
Evaluation of Name Obfuscation with Dictionaries While with the previous ex-
periments, we could fully answer RQ1 and RQ3, the answering of RQ2 with these data
sets was not possible because none of them contained names obfuscated using natu-
ral language dictionaries. To analyze apps that use such names, we use all 453 apps
from the F-Droid data set, which do not contain obfuscated names. We used 302 apps
for LibMapper’s database and obfuscated the remaining 151 apps. For the obfuscation
and analysis, we used ProGuard [Pro17] with a name dictionary [Sta20] and executed
ObfusSpot on the obfuscated apps.
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Figure 7.3.: Evaluation of dictionary based obfuscation
Figure 7.3 shows the results for all steps of ObfusSpot. All three steps have a high
precision of at least 93.6%. However, the recall of the first step amounts to 0.41% because
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the step is not suited for names obfuscated using dictionaries and detected only short
names with three characters (e.g., Lee or Ann). Consequently, the F1-measure of the
anomaly classification is 0.81%.
On the one hand, the precision of the frequency classification is 0.37% higher than
the one of the library mapping (98.66% vs. 98.30%); on the other hand, its recall is
0.07% lower than the one of the library mapping (84.82% vs. 84.88%). As a result, the
F1-measure of the second step is slightly higher than the third step (91.22% vs. 91.09%).
However, without library mapping, obfuscated names with low usage frequencies cannot
be identified.
Observation 16 ObfusSpot identifies obfuscated names very accurately and each of
its steps is specialized for different name obfuscation areas (RQ2).
7.3.3. Name Obfuscation in the Wild
In these experiments, we analyze the number of apps obfuscated by developers and
the number of libraries available only in obfuscated form. In order to investigate these
numbers, we use 100,000 apps randomly selected from AndroidZoo [HAB+16].
Apps Name Obfuscated by their Developers To analyze whether developers ob-
fuscated their apps, we filter out all libraries using AppSeparator (cf. Section 4.2) and
check with ObfusSpot whether the remaining code contains obfuscated names.
Observation 17 Given the results of our tools, we identified 29.33% of apps whose
app codebases were obfuscated by developers (RQ4). The names in the main code
of 70,668 apps were not obfuscated.
Previous works identified between 24.92% [WHA+18] and 43% [Don18] obfuscated
apps in the Google Play store. However, as we showed in Section 3.1, the library-
detection approach LibD [LWW+17] is vulnerable to Code Restructurings that is already
performed by simple name obfuscation by moving classes into the root package. Con-
sequently, since the approach of Dong et al. [Don18] uses LibD, it estimates too high
percentages of obfuscated apps (43%).
Additionally, in contrast to our approach, the tool OBFUSCAN [WHA+18] only con-
siders ProGuard [Pro17] as obfuscator. As a result, its identification rate of obfuscated
apps is only 24.92%. The slight differences between the results of both tools are explain-
able since many obfuscators use the same name scheme for their obfuscation. Therefore,
both tools produce similar results. However, our approach identified more obfuscated
names because it also considers names manipulated by other obfuscators.
Libraries Available only in Obfuscated Form In addition to analyzing apps obfus-
cated by their developers, we determined which libraries are only available in obfuscated
form. This insight is of utmost importance for tools such as LibMapper that recovers
names of obfuscated code entities.
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In order to identify such libraries, we analyzed all packages of the 100,000 apps using
ObfusSpot and AppSeparator. If AppSeparator excluded a package from the app code,
we considered it as a library package. However, to ensure that developers frequently use
this package, we considered only libraries contained in at least four apps.
Observation 18 For the identification of obfuscated packages, we counted each
package as completely obfuscated if ObfusSpot flagged 80% of their names. Given
these thresholds, we identified 330 out of 9,203 unique libraries in our data set
(3.59%), which are available only in an obfuscated form (RQ5). Additionally,
we discovered that 18.53% of the obfuscated names could only be found using our
frequency classification combined with LibMapper.
Table 7.6.: Top 25 libraries available only in obfuscated form
Package Name Obfuscation Percentage Unique APKs
org.fmod.* 99.47% 14,292
com.unity3d.player.* 99.59% 14,228
com.milkmangames.extensions.* 82.43% 8,168
com.chartboost.sdk.* 95.16% 6,366
com.facebook.ads.* 98.19% 6,142
com.jirbo.adcolony.* 92.63% 2,931
com.ironsource.mobilcore.* 100% 2,743
com.applovin.impl.* 100% 2,698
com.immersion.hapticmediasdk.* 100% 2,635
com.flurry.sdk.* 100% 2,572
com.vungle.publisher.* 100% 1,581
com.lostpolygon.unity.* 100% 1,482
com.purplebrain.adbuddiz.* 99.01% 1,316
com.andromo.widget.* 100% 896
com.inmobi.* 100% 835
com.moat.analytics.* 94.23% 762
com.makeramen.roundedimageview.* 81.09% 714
com.appnext.ads.* 95.88% 631
com.neatplug.u3d.* 99.81% 516
com.appodeal.ads.* 100% 434
com.yandex.metrica.* 100% 426
com.paypal.android.* 100% 391
com.adcolony.sdk.* 100% 375
com.pollfish.* 97.33% 337
com.facebook.all.* 100% 334
Table 7.6 shows the top 25 libraries that are only available in obfuscated form sorted
by the unique number of apps that contain these libraries. The obfuscation percentage
indicates how often the package names were only available in obfuscated form. While
in the top 25, most of the packages were available only in obfuscated form, some apps
contained these packages with less than 80% of names obfuscated. To determine whether
these apps contained a non-obfuscated version of the library package, we manually an-
alyzed their code. We identified that in all cases, the analyzed packages contained only
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non-obfuscated code provided by the library developers as API for the integration in
apps. Obfuscators moved all code that contained the remaining functionality of the li-
brary into the root package of the apps. As a result, all of the top 25 packages are only
available in their obfuscated form.
From the names of the packages we can deduce that most of these packages contain
functionality for ad-networks [App19] such as com.facebook.ads and com.adcolony.sdk.
These networks provide only an API for the app developers and release the remaining
code in obfuscated form. As a result, developers cannot understand the libraries’ content
that they integrate into their apps.
7.4. Threats to Validity
Our studies have one threat in common with all previous works [WHA+18, Don18] that
is the focus on freely available apps without considering paid ones. While developers
of paid apps could have a higher stimulus to obfuscated their apps, in June 2020, only
3.6% of the apps belonged to this category [pai20]. Therefore, we focused only on the
larger percentage of the overall apps.
Another threat is the usage of AppSeparator to split library code from app code. Since
the splitting procedure has no perfect precision, it can lead to app code that is considered
as library code or vice versa. However, to the best of our knowledge, AppSeparator is
the most effective tool for this task.
The second step of ObfusSpot could be evaded if an obfuscator distributes all names
from a dictionary randomly. Nevertheless, if the distribution is truly random, some of
the names occur more than once, indicating a name frequency of obfuscated names.
The 100,000 apps could not be sufficient to generalize the statements made in the
evaluation. The Google Play store currently has 2,960,000 apps [num20]. Our data
set corresponds to a confidence level of 99% and a confidence interval of about 0.4%.
Therefore, the 100,000 apps are sufficient to generalize the statements.
7.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented ObfusSpot a name obfuscation detector that uses three
different steps to identify various name obfuscation schemes. The first step uses anomaly
detection to identify names that do not conform with names in non-obfuscated apps.
Most obfuscators use these name obfuscation schemes in their standard configuration
to minify names and, therefore, the size of an app. In the second step, ObfusSpot
identifies obfuscated names using the frequency of the name occurrence that also differ
from non-obfuscate apps, mainly if an obfuscator performs overloading. The third step
identifies libraries using our tool LibMapper (cf. Chapter 6) and generalizes the identified
obfuscated names to detect similar naming patterns in the app codebase.
With these three steps, we showed in our evaluation that ObfusSpot effectively iden-
tifies names obfuscated by multiple free and commercial obfuscators. For this analysis,
we downloaded the obfuscators Allatori [All19], DashO [Das19], DexGuard [Dex19c],
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Jarg [JAR20], Stringer [str19], yGuard [yGu20], and ZKM [Zel19] and identified at least
89% of the obfuscated names.
Additionally, we analyzed 100,000 apps to identify the number of apps obfuscated by
developers and all libraries whose code is only available in obfuscated form. With these
results, we close the loop to the name-inference approaches that need to identify new
ways to deal with obfuscated libraries.
In the last section, we showed that our 100,000 apps are sufficient to generalize our
statements and discussed some of the shortcomings of our approach.
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Summary
Analysts develop tools to detect repackaging and malware in Android apps. For the
development, they need to analyze different apps, which is hindered by obfuscated names.
To support analysts, we developed approaches to identify and recover such names.
In Chapter 6, we presented LibMapper to map the original names of libraries on their
obfuscated counterparts. For the mapping it uses AppSeparator (cf. Section 4.2) to
identify all library classes in an app and LibDetect (cf. Section 3.2) to identify possible
library class candidates for the each of the libraries. Afterward, LibMapper explores
each class-, field-, and method mapping for each of the suggested class candidates and
assigns the one with the highest fitting probability. For the evaluation of LibMapper, we
compared its precision, recall, and F1-measure with the ones of DeGuard [BRTV16] the
current state-of-the-art name-deobfuscation approach. For the comparison, we down-
loaded non-obfuscated apps from the F-Droid store [F-D19] and obfuscated them with
different name-obfuscation configurations of ProGuard [Pro17]. The results showed that
LibMapper recovers more obfuscated names than DeGuard.
Since many apps contain obfuscated names, it is tedious to find non-obfuscated li-
braries to supply LibMapper’s database with an up-to-date number of libraries. As a
consequence, we introduced in Chapter 7 ObfusSpot that identifies obfuscated names
in three phases. First, it performs an anomaly detection of names that do not con-
form to the learned patterns of non-obfuscated names. Second, it measures each name’s
occurrence frequency in an app to identify names that occur more often than a non-
obfuscated name. Finally, in the last phase, ObfusSpot uses LibMapper to identify the
naming patterns of obfuscated library names that are already in LibMapper’s database
to generalize these patterns to unknown library names. For the evaluation of ObfusSpot,
we downloaded mapping files from GitHub repositories to train and test its classifiers.
Furthermore, we tested the generalization of the third phase on the app codebase to iden-
tify more obfuscated names than the ones identified by LibMapper. All results suggest
that ObfusSpot is an accurate obfuscated-name detector and identifies more obfuscated
apps than comparable approaches. In the end, we analyzed the number of libraries that
are only available in obfuscated form by analyzing 100,000 randomly selected apps from
the AndroZoo [ABKLT16] data set. Our analysis discovered that mostly ad libraries are
only released in obfuscated form.
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Obfuscated Strings
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Obfuscated String Detection and
Recovering
String obfuscation is applied by many existing obfuscators [Dex19c, All19, Das19, str19,
Zel19]. The presence of obfuscated strings impedes the analysis of apps, e.g., to check
their compliance with privacy regulations or to inspect them for detecting malware
[RAMB16, MW17]. String obfuscation can hide paths, URLs, and intents that can be
used to track the activities of a user or open shells on the user’s device to activate
malicious payload remotely.
Opposing prior work [Don18, Mir18, WR17], which stated that strings are often not
obfuscated in the wild, in this dissertation, we provide strong empirical evidence (cf.
Sections 10.3.2 & 10.3.2) that both malicious and benign apps use it in a wide range.
The usage of string obfuscation in benign apps is to a significant extent due to inte-
grated ad libraries – hence, even the app developer may not be aware of its presence.
Under these conditions, approaches [ZZPZ19, ZLZ19, NYW+18, PWD+17, OMA+19,
FBR+16, WL16] that analyze plain strings to identify malware, data leakages, or privacy-
related information are ineffective, and techniques for automatically uncovering obfus-
cated strings are highly needed.
Given that the deobfuscation logic usually is part of the application [WHA+18], an
analyst can try to debug or run the app with a monkey script. However, such a ”brute-
force” testing has serious drawbacks. First, the usage of a monkey script does not
guarantee that all execution paths are covered. Second, obfuscated applications could
detect the debugging mode activated by monkey scripts and avoid executing the deob-
fuscation functionality [RAMB16], which is often protected by guards that try to defend
against artificial runtime environments [VC14].
Several approaches [Dex20, sim20, Jav20a, Dex19b, RAMB16, BP18, WL18, ZWWJ15]
have been proposed to address string obfuscation. But, they suffer from limited scalabil-
ity and generality. Many of the existing approaches [RAMB16, BP18, WL18] typically
alter if statements of the target program and run the code with all combinations of
values to circumvent defenses and force the execution of all branches. Given that many
obfuscators perform automatic string obfuscation on millions of apps, the above ap-
proaches are not suited for large-scale analyses. The approach by Zhou et al. [ZWWJ15]
slightly reduces the number of executions, but at the cost of generality, as its emulator
is fitted to string operations only. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, all works lack
a systematic analysis of existing automatic obfuscators and their scope.
To address the above issues, we propose StringHound, a novel string deobfuscation
technique for Java bytecode. StringHound generalizes to different string obfuscations,
and to ensure scalability, it executes only the code necessary for the deobfuscation. To
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ensure that our approach generalizes over different string obfuscation techniques, we
conducted a comprehensive study of such techniques and used the gained insights to
guide the design of StringHound. In the conducted study, we systematically analyzed
strings obfuscation techniques in ad libraries (cf. Chapter 8). These libraries often
employ string obfuscation [SGC+12, RNVR+18, DMY+16, SKS16, CFL+17] and are,
hence, a good source for systematically surveying string obfuscation techniques used in
the wild. We ensure that StringHound executes only the necessary deobfuscation code
by locating the usage of obfuscated strings within the application code.
For locating, we propose two classifiers, one that uses decision trees [Qui86] to iden-
tify potentially obfuscated strings, and another one that uses the Spearman correla-
tion [MS04] to identify code of deobfuscation methods. Given that the deobfuscation
logic usually is part of the application [WHA+18], we propose a specifically targeted
slicing technique that includes all program statements which affect the state of an ob-
fuscated string located within a given method. Additionally, StringHound extracts the
execution context of the deobfuscation logic and injects the slice into it. Through the
injection of the slice, countermeasures, potentially introduced by obfuscators, are ren-
dered ineffective. Finally, StringHound executes the resulting slice within the extracted
context to obtain deobfuscated strings.
In the following, we present our study in Chapter 8, the detection of obfuscated strings
in Chapter 9, and the slicing and the recovering of obfuscated strings in Chapter 10.
Finally, we summarise all contributions of this part.
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Many obfuscators [Dex19c, All19, Das19, str19, Zel19] provide techniques that conceal
the contents of strings. While many studies [Don18, Mir18, WR17, Jav20a, Dex20,
MKS19, PYC+19, KNGS18] investigated these techniques, it is unclear whether all vari-
ations were explored and whether unknown ones exist in the wild. Without the analysis
of string obfuscation in the wild, obfuscated strings containing malicious content may not
be detected. Hence, a detailed analysis of string obfuscation is necessary to understand
and automatically identify such techniques.
To close this knowledge gap, we systematically analyzed ad libraries since many stud-
ies [SGC+12, RNVR+18, DMY+16, SKS16, CFL+17] mentioned that these libraries use
string obfuscation in various forms and quantities. To identify obfuscated strings, we
extracted 640 ad libraries from 100,000 randomly selected apps and analyzed them man-
ually. Obfuscated strings can be represented as constants but also hidden in other data
structures. Consequently, to identify obfuscated strings in the manual analysis, we in-
spect constant strings and methods that process other data structures but return strings.
In this analysis, we have identified 21 unique string obfuscations, whose techniques can
be categorized into five different concepts for concealing the contents of strings. In the
next sections, we describe the used data set in Section 8.1 and our methodology to iden-
tify string obfuscation techniques in Section 8.2. Afterward, we give an overview over
the identified obfuscation techniques in Section 8.3, and categorize the different concepts
of string obfuscation in Section 8.4. Finally, we discuss threats to the validity of our
study in Section 8.5, and draw conclusions in Section 8.6.
8.1. Dataset
While some approaches analyzed ad libraries in prior work [LKLT+16, LLJG15, NCC14],
no data set of all current ad libraries is publicly available. To collect a sample of ad
libraries, we analyzed apps that integrate them. As a first step, we collected a list of
package names of frequently used ad libraries [LKLT+16] and a list of URLs of ad net-
works [App19]. We reversed the internet domain names (e.g., youmi.net⇒ net.youmi)
of the collected URLs to guess potential package names of ad libraries since it is a com-
mon practice to use the reversed URL domain names as package names [ora19]. Next, we
collected 100,000 apps by randomly sampling these from the current list of AndroZoo’s
database [HAB+16]. In these 100,000 apps, we searched for code with the respective
package names by comparing them with our collection of package names. To extract the
package names of the APKs, we processed each APK with Enjarify [enj17] and extracted
the file list from the resulting JAR file (since the JAR file consists of multiple compress
files like a ZIP file). Given the file list from a JAR file, we compared the beginning of
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Figure 8.1.: Manual process to identify obfuscated strings
each class file with our collected package list. In this analysis, we identified 640 unique
ad libraries distributed across 81,008 individual apps.
8.2. Methodology
For the manual analysis, we performed the processing steps depicted in Figure 8.1. First,
we extracted all unknown strings and all method calls that return a string. Second, we
checked the data flow to and from the position of a string or a method call. Finally,
if the code that is used in the data flow belongs to a string obfuscation technique, we
further analyzed its functionality. In the following, we describe the individual processing
steps in more detail.
String Extraction For the manual analysis of strings, we extracted all strings from an
ad library and manually checked all unknown strings. For instance, the string "<html>"
were considered as non-obfuscated because it belongs to the starting tag of a HTML
document. Additionally, if the string contains multiple words1 found in a dictionary,
it is classified as non-obfuscated. However, we mark strings such as "i3@5khdsfg" as
potentially obfuscated because the usage of this string is not known.
Method Extraction During our manual analysis, we did not focus solely on string con-
stants because, in the obfuscated form, they are often also stored in byte arrays [SKK+16].
Hence, we considered different data structures that can be used to hide string representa-
tions and further refer to such data structures as obfuscated strings. We analyzed such
data structures by using OPAL [EH14] for the identification of all method calls that
take non-string parameters as input and return a string. For instance, the constructor
of java.lang.String takes a character or byte array and returns a string. If the val-
ues that flow into such methods are either data structures constructed from constant
values or computed using constant values, we marked the data structures as potentially
obfuscated strings.
1Most obfuscators produce strings with unreadable symbols and, therefore, contain no words.
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Data-Flow Analysis After identifying unknown strings and method calls that return a
string, we investigated the data flow at the positions where these strings and calls were
used. If a string directly flows into a method that is not modifiable by the obfuscator
(e.g., System.out.println), it is considered as non-obfuscated. For all other marked
strings and method calls, we performed a manual data flow analysis to check whether
these represent real obfuscated strings. If a marked string or method call is not processed
by deobfuscation logic, we ignored such cases in further manual analyses.
If an obfuscated string was identified, we analyzed the surrounding code to determine
the used technique. This code is placed into apps to deobfuscate the string during the
app execution [WHA+18]. For the analysis, we used CFR [CFR19] to decompile the
code of a JAR file and load the resulting Java files into IntelliJ IDE [int20b] to navigate
through the classes and their dependencies.
Table 8.1.: String obfuscation techniques found in ad libraries
Example Package Cipher Encoding Countermeasures Count
a.a.a AES - Serialized Object 3 (1.27%)
br.com.tempest Bit - Key Changed by Switch Statements 3 (1.27%)
br.com.tempest Bit - Key is the Signature of Stack Calls 3 (1.27%)
br.com.tempest Bit - Stack Calls 3 (1.27%)
br.com.tempest Bit - Switch Statements 3 (1.27%)
com.intentsoftware - Base85 - 3 (1.27%)
com.youmi - BigInt33 - 4 (1.69%)
com.adcolony - URLEncoder - 5 (2.12%)
com.apptracker Bit - Two Keys 8 (3.39%)
com.chamspire - Base64 - 8 (3.39%)
com.google.android Bit - Stream Transfer 8 (3.39%)
com.mnt Bit Base64 Key is the Index of Byte Arrays 8 (3.39%)
com.tnkfactory Bit - Object Initializer 8 (3.39%)
com.adlib Bit - Two Methods 12 (5.08%)
cn.pro.sdk Bit - Byte Arrays 13 (5.51%)
com.ironsource - Split - 16 (6.78%)
com.google.android AES & Bit Base64 Static Initializer 22 (9.32%)
com.applovin Bit - Key Hidden in Byte Arrays 24 (10.17%)
com.mt.airad DESede Base64 - 24 (10.17%)
com.vpon.adon DESede - - 28 (11.86%)
com.waystorm.ads Bit Base64 Key Management Calls 30 (12.71%)
8.3. Overview of Identified Techniques
The analysis of ad libraries has shown that only about 37% (236 of 640) of these libraries
contain obfuscated strings. From these obfuscated strings, we identified 21 unique string
obfuscation techniques and present them in Table 8.1. While some identified techniques
are custom-made, some of them are used by the state-of-the-art obfuscation tool man-
ufacturers such as, DexGuard 5.5.41 [Dex19c], Allatori 6.8 [All19], DashO 9.2 [Das19],
Stringer 3.0.5 [str19], ZKM 12.0 [Zel19], and Shield4J [Shi20]. For each technique, we
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show whether it uses a cryptographic cipher, an encoding, countermeasures, or a com-
bination of the former to evade the detection by static/dynamic analyses. Additionally,
we list the count (Count) of each string obfuscation technique across all 236 ad libraries.
Cryptographic Ciphers are used by various obfuscation techniques, ranging from simple
self-made to standardized cryptographic algorithms that encrypt strings. Many of the
identified custom-made algorithms convert the ASCII characters of a string into bytes,
apply to these bytes logical bit operations (Bit) with a fixed value as the key of the
algorithm, and convert the resulting bytes back into a concatenated string. Most such bit
operations are either XOR operations or a combination of other bit operations, resulting
in an XOR operation. For revealing the original string, the integrated deobfuscation logic
often uses the same values with the same operations as for the encryption.
Most of the observed standardized cryptographic algorithms originate from the Java
Cryptography Architecture (JCA). During our study, we found the algorithms DESede
and AES [Cry20]. They either were called directly from the implementation of the JCA,
or the implementation of the algorithms was extracted and integrated into their app
code, as described for Fake Types in Section 2.2. For revealing the original string, the
integrated deobfuscation logic uses the decryption algorithm with the included key.
Encodings similar to cryptographic ciphers are used by obfuscators in different forms,
and they also vary between simple custom-made techniques and standardized algorithms
that encode strings. For example, an observed custom-made technique splits (Split) a
string into its characters and puts the characters together in an arbitrary order. The
technique attaches an additional flag to each character, which is used to restore the orig-
inal order. Another technique converts the characters of a string into bytes, transforms
the bytes from base 10 to base 33, and converts the newly recovered bytes back into
a string. For restoring the original string, the technique uses the Java class BigInteger
(BitInt33) to interpret numbers directly with the specified base.
The most commonly used standard encoding algorithm is Base64 [Bas19a]. The strings
that are obfuscated with this algorithm are easily recognizable because most of them end
with an equal sign. This sign is used to pad the string if it is too short for the encoding.
For example, the string ”Hello” is changed to ”SGVsbG8=”. The Android class library
contains an implementation of the Base64 algorithm, and the analyzed obfuscators often
call this implementation. A less frequently used algorithm is URL encoding, which
is implemented in the class URLEncoder [URL20] of the Android class library. As
with ciphers, obfuscators either call the encoding algorithms directly or extract the
implementations of the algorithms and integrate them into their code, as described
for Fake Types in Section 2.2. Finally, we identified the implementation of a Base85
algorithm [Bas19b], which can be deobfuscated, similarly to the Base64 algorithm.
Countermeasures are used by obfuscators to prevent the extraction of the original
string or to prevent the unauthorized execution of the deobfuscation logic. In the fol-
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lowing, we briefly describe all identified countermeasures and which deobfuscators they
might evade:
Serialized Object: During our analysis, we found one technique that loads at runtime
a serialized class object that contains the deobfuscation method. Subsequently,
the deobfuscation method has to be called through reflection to reveal the con-
tent of a string. This technique evades current deobfuscators (Dex-Oracle [Dex20],
JMD [Jav20a]) that rely exclusively on the identification and execution of deob-
fuscation methods.
Switch Statements: Two obfuscation techniques perform the deobfuscation of strings
before the class containing the obfuscated strings is used. These obfuscated strings
are stored in an array of strings. This array is accessed during the initialization
of the class by a method to deobfuscate the strings in a switch statement ac-
cording to a predefined order. While one technique always uses the same key to
deobfuscate all strings, the other one changes the key in each case of the switch
statement. Afterward, both techniques store the resulting strings back into the
string array, and each method that uses a deobfuscated string needs to access this
array. These techniques evade deobfuscators (Dex-Oracle, JMD) that search for
an explicit deobfuscation method.
Stack Calls: Two obfuscation techniques include the calling context (e.g., method
name and class name) of the deobfuscation method into their logic. While one
technique checks the calling context in a conditional statement, the second one uses
the calling-context information as part of the deobfuscation key. Both techniques
evade deobfuscators (Harvester [RAMB16], Dex-Oracle, JMD, approach by Zhou
et al. [ZWWJ15]) that execute the deobfuscation logic without a specific context.
However, only one of the obfuscation techniques enforces the extraction of the
context for slicing approaches because the context is a part of the deobfuscation.
Two Keys: One obfuscator uses two different keys for the string deobfuscation. This
usage of keys evades deobfuscators (JMD) that either try brute force guessing the
key or extract only one key to uncover obfuscated strings.
Stream Transfer: One obfuscation technique uses covert channels to transfer obfus-
cated strings to their deobfuscation logic. This technique transfers an obfuscated
string using output streams. Therefore, it evades deobfuscators that track only
constant strings without analyzing data flows to streams, such as the approach of
Zhou et al. [ZWWJ15].
Byte Arrays: Two of the analyzed obfuscation techniques use byte arrays as data
structures to hide obfuscated strings and, thus, evade tools [Don18, Mir18] that do
not analyze such structures. We found the technique by analyzing data structures
that are converted to strings.
Object Initializer: One obfuscation technique inserts, into the root package, a specific
class that declares only a constructor and one additional method. The constructor
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initializes a key, and the additional method uses this key to deobfuscate all strings
that were obfuscated using this object. This technique evades deobfuscators (Dex-
Oracle, JMD) that execute only static methods.
Two Methods: One obfuscation technique uses two different methods to deobfuscate
a string. While the first method takes the obfuscated string as a parameter and
returns an intermediate character array, the second one takes this intermediate
character array and returns the deobfuscated string. This usage evades deobfus-
cators (Dex-Oracle, JMD) that execute only one deobfuscation method to uncover
obfuscated strings.
Static Initializer: We discovered a byte array that is used in the method to initialize
classes (static initializer). This byte array contains a key that is used to deobfuscate
strings. This practice evades tools (JMD [Jav20a]) that extract only the logic of a
deobfuscation method without considering the static initializer.
Key Management Calls: One obfuscation technique initializes the key used for
deobfuscation directly before calling the deobfuscation logic. These keys are stored
in fields of the same class object that uses the deobfuscated string and calls the
deobfuscation method. This technique hinders deobfuscators (Dex-Oracle, JMD)
that do not handle such initialization.
As depicted in Table 8.1, different combinations of cryptographic ciphers, encodings,
and countermeasures are used as techniques for string obfuscation. We refer to these
combinations as obfuscation schemes. Some of these techniques are used in state-of-the-
art commercial obfuscation tools, and developers most commonly use them to obfuscate
strings in Android and Java apps.
8.4. Identified Concepts of String Obfuscation
Given the 21 identified string obfuscation schemes, we determined five concepts used to
obfuscate strings in the wild. In the following, we elaborate on each of these concepts
and discuss whether current deobfuscators could evade these concepts.
Hide Obfuscated Strings: While some works [Don18, Mir18, WR17] identify obfus-
cated strings, only a few works [Dex20, Jav20a] can identify data structures that
hide the presence of obfuscated strings. These works try to identify deobfuscation
methods that transform the byte or character arrays and return the original con-
tent as a string. Since these works focus solely on data structures that are used
by known obfuscators, they miss data structures that are used in the wild, such as
strings hidden in streams.
Hide Deobfuscation Logic: Hiding the deobfuscation logic, e.g., through serialized
objects, can circumvent the detection of obfuscated strings. However, since those
obfuscation schemes use string constants to represent the obfuscated strings, the
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hidden code can be identified and extracted. While the usage of the string repre-
sentation can be avoided by hiding the obfuscated string in other data structures,
the procedure that hides the deobfuscation logic itself can be an indicator of the
usage of obfuscated strings. For instance, since the usage of serialized objects is
not common in Android apps, the code to deserialize the deobfuscation logic can
be used to identify the obfuscation scheme.
Hide Data Flow to Deobfuscation Logic: Some obfuscation schemes hide the
data or code of the deobfuscation (e.g., key, obfuscated string, or parts of the
deobfuscation logic) in other fields or methods. For instance, one scheme hides
an obfuscated string by using output streams. Since the transfer of obfuscated
strings is performed in the same method as the rest of the deobfuscation logic, the
extraction of this logic is straightforward. However, the extraction of deobfuscation
data is only possible because it is kept in the same class as the usage of the
deobfuscated string. We assume that this shortcoming results from the usage of
fully-automated obfuscators [Dex19c, All19, Das19, str19, Zel19, Shi20].
An obfuscator has to integrate the deobfuscation logic of a string into the appli-
cation [WHA+18]. This logic could be extended with new parameters, fields, or
methods to increase its complexity. This extension would lift the deobfuscation
logic to an interprocedural problem because new methods need to be analyzed,
and parameters and fields are initialized in other methods.
The insertion of new parameters to a method requires that the obfuscator iden-
tifies all calls of this method and adapts all calling methods (e.g., stack layout) to
add the parameter and its corresponding argument. However, to find all method
calls, the analysis of an obfuscator has to deal with polymorphism, intents, and
reflection. Reflection is frequently used [RKE+19] in the wild and not completely
resolved by current analysis. As a result of the above requirements, an automatic
obfuscator cannot lift the logic to an interprocedural problem without unambigu-
ously identifying all method calls.
Inserting new fields is more convenient than inserting new parameters. However,
the obfuscator must initialize the new fields before the deobfuscation logic can
access it. Initializing the new fields directly before each call of the deobfuscation
method would lead to the same problem as with new parameters (i.e., identification
of all calls). Thus, studying the JVM specification, we identified only two other
options to execute the field initialization before the deobfuscation method. In the
first option, the JVM executes the static initializer before the code of any other
method. Thus, an obfuscator can initialize a field in the static initializer. The
second option is the execution of the constructor/object initializer before any other
instance method. Thus, if the entire logic is in instance methods, an obfuscator can
use a constructor for the field initialization. However, both possibilities reduced
the analysis space to the class code that contains the deobfuscation logic.
An obfuscator can insert new methods at three different positions to increase
the deobfuscation complexity. The first position hides an obfuscated string in the
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last called-method of newly inserted methods that transitively call each other in a
chain. However, if a deobfuscator identifies the first method call of the chain, then
it can be executed to get the obfuscated string. Second, the deobfuscation logic
can be hidden in a chain of calls, as performed by the Two Methods-technique.
However, if a deobfuscator identifies the sink of the deobfuscated strings, then it
can call the method that contains the sink to retrieve this string. Finally, the sink
of the deobfuscated string can be hidden in a chain of calls. However, not every
sink is suitable to be embedded in such a chain of calls because techniques like
Stack Calls use the information of the surrounding method.
The discussion above indicates that interprocedural obfuscation is hard for auto-
matic obfuscators. It can only be performed in a limited environment or requires
input from the obfuscation user. For instance, to lift the deobfuscation logic to an
interprocedural problem, a user could add a parameter to a method by identifying
all calling methods and adding an argument to the method calls.
Protect Deobfuscation from Execution: Some obfuscation schemes protect either
the whole or a part of the deobfuscation logic so that it can only be executed if
certain conditions are met. While the usage of if-branches is circumvented by
current works such as Harvester [RAMB16], the usage of the surrounding environ-
ment as deobfuscation keys, such as performed by Key is the Signature of Stack
Calls, are not handled. However, since the obfuscation scheme cannot control the
entire stack trace of the currently executed method, these countermeasures can
be circumvented by keeping all information unchanged that is accessible via stack
traces.
Hide Deobfuscation Keys: While some schemes use an openly accessible deobfusca-
tion key, others either hide the key in other data structures or compute it during
runtime. However, a deobfuscator can easily extract the location of the key be-
cause most schemes keep them close to the deobfuscation logic. Some schemes
separate the computation of the deobfuscation key from the main logic to increase
the complexity of the entire process. However, if an obfuscation scheme moves the
computation of a key to extend the logic to an interprocedural problem, it has to
tackle the limitations described in Hide Data Flow to Deobfuscation Logic. These
limitations may be responsible that the analyzed obfuscation schemes do not move
the deobfuscation key beyond the borders of the class that use the obfuscation
string. Given the scope of the entire deobfuscation logic, it can be extracted by
analyzing the class that uses the deobfuscated string.
Observation 19 None of the identified techniques requires a broader focus than the
class that uses the deobfuscated string. All analyzed obfuscation schemes initialize
the deobfuscation logic within the same class that contains the logic. Thus, no
heavyweight interprocedural analysis seems necessary for our data set.
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In this section, we discuss the two major threats to the validity of our findings and
our methodology. Ad libraries may not contain all string obfuscation techniques or
variations of them. To mitigate the threat that ad libraries do not contain all variations
of string obfuscation, we chose ad libraries from different domains, in different sizes, and
with different complexities. Furthermore, we used obfuscation schemes that are applied
by current obfuscators. Developers who want to hide their strings will most likely use
current obfuscators instead of a custom made scheme.
During the manual analysis of the extracted strings, we might have missed obfuscated
strings because our indicators may have been based on subjective factors. To ensure
that we did not miss obfuscated strings, we checked the data flow of each suspicious
string. Additionally, we reduced the threat by picking 200 randomly extracted strings
and classifying each of them with two authors of the StringHound publication [GMB+20].
The analysts classified the strings separately without the knowledge of the mutual results.
The comparison of the results showed a 100% match.
8.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we identified 236 unique ad libraries that we have extracted from 100,000
randomly selected apps from AndroZoo [HAB+16] to examine techniques that obfuscate
strings. According to previous works [SGC+12, RNVR+18, DMY+16, SKS16, CFL+17],
many of the ad libraries contain obfuscated strings, and therefore, we used ad libraries
for the identification of string obfuscation techniques. To identify obfuscated strings,
we scanned all constant strings for abnormal usage of non-alpha-numeric characters.
Additionally, we analyzed all code locations that get non-string arguments but return
strings to identify deobfuscation code.
Using this procedure, we discovered 21 unique string obfuscation techniques and de-
bugged their functionalities. In particular, we have focused on mechanisms used for the
protection of obfuscated string from unauthorized deobfuscation. The study showed that
all identified string obfuscation techniques place their deobfuscation logic in the same
class as the obfuscated string, making its logic easy to identify.
In the end, we discussed different mechanisms that protect obfuscated strings and the
shortcomings of their current implementations against automatic analyses. Furthermore,
we argued that fully-automated string obfuscation is hard without the interaction with
the obfuscation user.
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Previous studies [Don18, Mir18] showed that many apps contain obfuscated strings.
While these studies identify whether an app uses obfuscated strings, their approaches
cannot pinpoint each string or the code that is used to deobfuscate the string [WHA+18].
These approaches have two main limitations that hinder the pinpointing of obfuscated
strings. The first limitation is the high aggregation level of the features used to ana-
lyze apps. For instance, the approaches extract all strings of an app and calculate the
distribution of each character over all strings instead of calculating information for each
individual string. The second limitation is that most approaches solely focus on string
representations in apps without considering other data structures, such as byte arrays.
As we identified in Chapter 8, at least two obfuscation schemes use other data structures.
Currently, most approaches cannot tackle the first limitation. However, some ap-
proaches [Dex20, Jav20a] partially mitigate the second limitation by identifying deob-
fuscation methods that process other data structures. These approaches use the method
signatures used by known obfuscators. However, without considering the method body,
therefore, the approaches cannot handle inlined deobfuscation logic used by more ad-
vanced obfuscation schemes. To avoid both of the limitations, we introduce two classifiers
that complement each other. The first classifier (String Classifier) can pinpoint an indi-
vidual obfuscated string by calculating features for each string. The second one (Method
Classifier) identifies the usage of other data structures by scanning each method for
instructions, which are used in deobfuscation logic. The String Classifier uses deci-
sion trees to dissect the characteristics of obfuscated strings, and the Method Classifier
matches instructions of known deobfuscation logic using the Spearman correlation.
We evaluated both classifiers by downloading the newest apps from the F-Droid store,
obfuscating their strings, and executing both classifiers on the strings and deobfuscation
logic. The results show that both classifiers identify their targets with high accuracy.
The following sections introduce related work for both classifiers in Section 9.1, our
String Classifier approach in Section 9.2, and its evaluation in Section 9.3. Furthermore,
Section 9.4 presents the Method Classifier, followed by its evaluation in Section 9.5.
Finally, Section 9.6 discusses threats to the validity of our experiments, and Section 9.7
draws a conclusion for this chapter.
9.1. State-of-the-Art Detectors of String Obfuscation
In this section, we describe related approaches for identifying obfuscated strings and
deobfuscation methods [Don18, Mir18, WR17, Jav20a, Dex20].
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Dong et al. [Don18] identify apps with obfuscated strings by counting the occurrence
of 3-grams in each string and using these counts to train a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier [Wan05]. The SVM is then used to distinguish between apps with
obfuscated strings and apps without obfuscated strings. While this approach identifies
whether an app contains obfuscated strings, it cannot pinpoint an individual obfuscated
string because it operates on all strings of an obfuscated app.
Mohammadinodooshan et al. [MKS19] identify obfuscated strings by training an n-
gram model on non-obfuscated text from different languages and checking whether the
strings of an app can be associated with a specific language. If the string does not belong
to one of these languages, it is marked as obfuscated.
While this technique can pinpoint obfuscated strings, it does not consider obfuscated
strings hidden in other data structures. Additionally, some strings in apps that are
non-obfuscated can have a different appearance than texts in an article. Therefore, the
approach could confuse these strings with obfuscated ones. For instance, strings that
contain XML structures are rare in articles, and because of their extensive usage of
special characters, they can be confused with obfuscated strings.
AndrODet [Mir18] identifies apps with obfuscated strings using seven classifiers. These
classifiers are trained with multiple aggregated features, and their classifications are
combined using limited random search [Pri77]. Each newly analyzed app is used by
AndrODet to improve its models. However, AndrODet only identifies if entire apps are
obfuscated and cannot pinpoint the exact strings because it aggregates its features using
all strings in an app.
Wang et al. [WR17] identify apps with obfuscated strings by determining the used
obfuscator and even the used configuration. For this purpose, the approach extracts
all names and strings, filters them, counts their occurrence, and uses the occurrences
to train a SVM for each configuration of known obfuscators. The resulting SVMs can
identify if a configuration enables string obfuscation to manipulate an app. Unlike String
Classifier, the described tool only identifies if an entire app contains obfuscated strings
but cannot pinpoint which of the strings are obfuscated.
Park et al. [PYC+19] identify apps with obfuscated strings by decompiling all Java
classes from an app, treating the classes as text documents, and classifying the docu-
ments using various machine learning techniques. The approach can identify different
obfuscation techniques applied to all classes of an app, such as renaming, string obfusca-
tion, control-flow obfuscation, and the usage of reflection. However, it cannot pinpoint
the exact location of an obfuscated string because it uses all classes to identify the various
obfuscation techniques.
Kaur et al. [KNGS18] identify obfuscated strings by transforming the bytes of an app’s
codebase into an image and using image classification to determine the used obfuscation
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technique. As the approaches of Park et al. [PYC+19] and Wang et al. [WR17], this
approach can identify the different obfuscation techniques used to manipulate an app.
However, this approach cannot pinpoint the exact location of an obfuscated string.
JMD’s Deobfuscation Method Detector [Jav20a] identifies deobfuscation methods
of Zelix KlassMaster (ZKM) [Zel19], DashO [Das19], Allatori [All19], and two generic
methods. The detector identifies them using the signatures of the methods, and the
direct predecessor instructions of their method call.
While the matching of method signatures can identify most of the methods, it fails
to identify inlined or hidden logic. Some obfuscators hide the appearance of the de-
obfuscation method or integrate the deobfuscation logic into the method that used the
original string. Additionally, an obfuscator can evade the check of the direct prede-
cessor instructions of calls by using more parameters than identified by the detector.
Our Method Classifier does not have such limitations because it focuses only on the
instructions of the deobfuscation logic, not the entire method or its signature.
Dex-Oracle’s Deobfuscation Method Detector [Dex20] identifies the deobfuscation
methods of DexGuard [Dex19c] and a generic method based on method signatures.
In contrast to our Method Classifier, this detector accepts no variations of the pa-
rameter or return types. For instance, it identifies only the deobfuscation method of
DexGuard that takes three int parameters and returns a java.lang.String and can-
not handle if DexGuard inlines the deobfuscation logic. The more generic approach
of Dex-Oracle’s detector is also restrictive because it considers only method signatures
that take a single parameter and return a java.lang.String. In contrast, our Method
classifier identifies all kinds of deobfuscation logic, even the inlined logic.
Discussion To recap, all approaches that identify obfuscated strings have significant
limitations. They can only detect if an app contains obfuscated strings but fail to
pinpoint the obfuscated strings. Additionally, most approaches do not handle obfuscated
strings hidden in other data structures.
The detectors that try to identify deobfuscation methods by their signatures are re-
stricted if these signatures vary. Additionally, these detectors cannot handle inlined
deobfuscation logic.
9.2. String Classifier
The String Classifier extracts different features from a string to train a model that
separates previously unseen strings into obfuscated and cleartext classes. Figure 9.1
shows the process to classify all strings of a given APK. Before the String Classifier
can classify strings, it needs to extract all strings and their containing classes. We
extract these classes to check if they use cryptographic libraries and process the strings
to extract a feature vector for each string. Given a data set of obfuscated and non-
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Figure 9.1.: Process of String Classifier to learn and classify obfuscated strings
obfuscated strings, we calculate the feature vector for each string to train a classifier.
Afterward, the classifier decides for each unseen string if it is obfuscated or cleartext.
For the classification of individual character strings, we selected our features based
on the observations in our study (cf. Chapter 8) and basic knowledge of cryptoanal-
ysis [Kah96, cry19, LH07]. Using the combined knowledge, we extracted 49 different
features from a collection of strings. Using these features, we evaluate, in Section 9.3.1,
multiple classifiers to find the most suitable one for our approach.
We extracted the following features to train the selected classifiers:
Formats: In the study presented in Chapter 8, we observed that obfuscated strings
contain non-alphanumeric characters. Nevertheless, we cannot classify a string as
obfuscated just because it contains non-alphanumeric characters – plain strings of
certain formats may also use such characters. To avoid matching such plain strings,
we use 27 different regular expression patterns to flag format usages such as XML
(e.g. </th>) and HTML colors (e.g. #FFAE40) in the feature vector. These flags
give the model a hint that the analyzed string might not belong in the obfuscated
class. However, these hints should not be confused with filtering, as they are only
a part of the classifier’s decision.
Statistical Tests: Previous statistical analyses of encryption mechanisms [Kah96,
cry19, LH07] show that obfuscated strings often have a random (close to equal)
distribution of characters. We use random distribution as a discriminating feature
to distinguish between obfuscated and other strings with special characters. To
check whether the distribution of the characters is random, we use three different
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measures because we encountered that each one is suited for different scenarios. For
instance, previous works [LH07] used the Normalized entropy to identify encrypted
malware. We reuse it to identify encrypted strings. While the Chi-squared test
measures the deviation of the characters from the equal distribution, the average
distribution measures whether an obfuscator rotated the characters of a given string
(e.g. caesar cipher [Kah96]) or it belongs to a language.
Compression Rate: If our classifier uses only the statistical tests, it may confuse
obfuscated strings with compressed data, such as images compressed using JPEG
and stored in strings. To correctly identify such strings, we compressed them and
compared the length of the compressed string against the original string length.
Based on cryptanalysis knowledge [cry19], the comparison will show that both
lengths do not differ if the original string already consisted of compressed data.
Cryptographic Libraries: Even if a string contains seemingly obfuscated content,
it could have a legitimate use case. For instance, cryptographic libraries use byte-
encoded strings to initialize their algorithms, and this may cause false positives
because they are similar to obfuscated strings. To avoid matching such encoded
strings, we check if the code that contains such a string belongs to a cryptographic
library class. For instance, classes that implement the Java Cryptography Archi-
tecture (JCA) could contain strings which initialize cryptographic algorithms.
Word Counts: The study in Chapter 8 revealed that obfuscated strings contain few or
no words. As a result, we use dictionaries to check whether a string contains words.
To perform this check, we need to split the string into text blocks. However, some
languages (e.g. Chinese) do not use separators (e.g. white spaces). Furthermore,
some strings contain identifiers such as getLength. For the parsing of such strings,
our process uses an ICUTokenizer [ICU19] to split text blocks either by spaces or
for languages that do not use spaces by heuristics. If a string contains identifiers,
our process splits these identifiers using Samurai [EHPVS09]. It splits identifiers
by different character cases and frequently used words. Afterward, we use all
split blocks to check in multiple dictionaries if these blocks match real words and
calculate the word features based on these checks.
String Characteristics: We use five features from AndroDet [Mir18] that identifies if
an app uses string obfuscation. However, AndroDet aggregates all string features
over the app and is therefore not able to classify individual strings. Additionally,
we combine the features of AndroDet with eight additional ones that calculate
different character distributions, e.g., character counts, digits.
Table 9.1 shows all features that are used in String Classifier to decide whether a string
contains obfuscated content. Given the descriptions of all features and their extraction
procedure, we describe in the next section the data set used for training and evaluation
of our String Classifier.
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Table 9.1.: Feature list for the detection of obfuscated strings
Category Name Description
Formats 27 Known Formats User Agents,
URLs,
Character set of regular expressions,
Network protocols (e.g., WiFi),
Common OS commands,
JSON format,
Encodings (e.g., UTF-8),
E-Mail format,
DTD,
HTML Colors,
Class Path Format,
SQL Queries,
Keywords for seven programming languages,
country names,
XML format,
IP format,
HTTP state format,
Multiple Date formats,
Numeric formats,
Cryptographic primitives,
Mobile phone brands,
HTML special characters (e.g., uuml),
String-encoded certificate format,
String-encoded Android certificate format,
Private/Public key format,
String signatures of social network apps,
String-encoded images (e.g. JPEG),
Statistical Tests Chi-squared Test Tests if all chars in the given string are equally,
distributed indicating a random distribution.
Average Distribution The average distribution which is close to the
Gaussian distribution for plain strings,
Normalized Entropy The normalized entropy of the strings.
Compression Rate GZIP The rate of the GZIP compression,
Cryptography Library JCA The string is used in a known crypto library.
Word Counts Dictionaries of The shortest word length,
the 54 Languages the largest word length,
[Mil95, dic20] the number of words,
the number of unique words from a
multiple language dictionary.
String Characteristics AndroDet[Mir18] Number of equals,
Number of dashes,
Number of slashes,
Number of pluses,
Sum of repetitive characters.
Character Counts Number of vocals,
Number of consonants,
Number of digits,
Number of characters,
Number of unique characters,
Number of non letters,
Maximum number of consecutive characters,
Maximum occurrences of the same character
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For the evaluation of String Classifier, we investigated the following research questions:
RQ1: What is the most suitable classifier for our data?
RQ2: How effective is our model on unknown strings?
RQ3: What strings are incorrectly classified?
To answer these questions, we conducted three experiments. In the first experiment,
we trained eight classifiers whose capabilities enable the processing of our data. The
second experiment calculates the precision, recall, and F1-measure on our data using
the chosen classifier from the first experiment. Lastly, we use regular expressions to
investigate the false positives and false negatives of the second experiment.
We performed our experiments using a server with two AMD(R) EPYC(R) 7542 @
2.90 GHz (32 cores / 64 threads each) CPUs and 512 GB RAM. The experiments were
executed on the server using OpenJDK 1.8_212 64-bit VM with 20 GB of heap memory
for Weka 3.9.4.
For the training and evaluation of all used classifiers, we downloaded the newest ver-
sions of all 1,879 apps from F-Droid [F-D19]. We chose the F-Droid store because it
consists only of open-source software. While this data set should be free from string
obfuscation, we also ensured its absence by checking all strings following the technique
in Chapter 8. Given these apps, we use them as ground truth of plain strings. The ab-
sence of other string obfuscation allows us to perform our experiments without dealing
with the influence of previously existing string obfuscation artifacts. While the standard
configuration of the Android build process might obfuscate names due to the integration
of ProGuard, it does not use string obfuscation [Pro20b].
To extract our final data set, we generated 1,918,687 obfuscated and the same amount
of non-obfuscated strings. We extracted the non-obfuscated strings from all downloaded
F-Droid apps and obfuscated the apps using the 21 obfuscation schemes identified in
our study (cf. Chapter 8) to get the obfuscated strings. The usage of the schemes
yielded 32,379 obfuscated apps 1 from which we extracted all strings. As a result of
the obfuscation process, we acquired significantly more obfuscated strings than cleartext
strings. To avoid a bias towards obfuscated strings, we took all strings from the non-
obfuscated apps and randomly selected the same number of strings from the obfuscated
ones. For our experiments, we used 80% of these strings for training and testing and
20% for validation.
9.3.1. Classifier Comparison
For the comparison of the most suitable classifier, we analyzed Naive Bayes, Multilayer
Perceptron, Logistic Regression, Random Tree, Random Forest, and REP Tree from
1We could not obfuscate every app with each obfuscation scheme due to version incompatibilities
between acquired tools and APKs.
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Weka’s [WF02] collection. While we trained most classifiers using their default values,
we evaluated the Multilayer Perceptron using three different epoch values because of
their impact on the classifier’s performance.
We trained and tested the eight classifiers using 10-fold cross-validation [HTF09] on
the training set of strings. Given the statistics of the cross-validation, we compare the
correctly-classified instances, and their root mean squared error of the classifiers. The
root mean squared error is a measure for the false classifications of a model.
Table 9.2.: Selection of classifiers for obfuscated strings
Classifier Correctly Classified Root Mean Squared Error
Naive Bayes 79.17% 42.1%
Multilayer Perceptron (one epoch) 84.43% 28.16%
Multilayer Perceptron (five epochs) 91.13% 20.67%
Multilayer Perceptron (10 epochs) 85.09% 26.89%
Logistic Regression 95.04% 19.68%
Random Tree 98.18% 12.67%
Random Forest 98.35% 11.56%
REP Tree 98.37% 11.51%
Table 9.2 shows the correctly classified and falsely classified measures of each of the
eight classifiers. While the Multilayer Perceptron seems to improve after five epochs, the
classification performance with more epochs decreases with each epoch until it reaches
a similar value as with one epoch. Both the Random Tree and Random Forest achieve
more than 98% correctly classified instances.
Observation 20 Using the REP Tree yields the best score with our training data.
The correctly classified instanced of REP Tree amounts to 98.37% and the false
classification rate (root mean squared error) to 11.51%. The results in Table 9.2
show that REP Tree is the most suitable classifier to process our data (RQ1), and
therefore, we select it to classify if strings belong to the obfuscated or cleartext class.
9.3.2. Effectiveness of the String Classifier
Given that in the previous section, the REP Tree model yielded the best results, we
evaluate it on the validation data set to measure its performance on new strings.
Table 9.3.: Results on the validation set
Measure Percentage
Precision 98.79%
Recall 89.75%
F1 94.05%
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Observation 21 The validation results in Table 9.3 reveal that the REP Tree model
has a precision of 98.79%, a recall of 89.75%, and a F1-measure of 94.05%. These
results show that our model is very effective (RQ2).
While our REP Tree model is very powerful in classifying unknown strings, it still has
false classifications that we examine in the following section.
9.3.3. Falsely Classified Strings
The results of the validation set contain 4,600 false positives and 26,780 false negatives,
which we show in Table 9.4 grouped by regular expressions. While we group the false
negatives (FN) by regular expressions that identify the encodings used by the obfuscation
schemes, we group the false positives (FP) by patterns that categorize their data.
Table 9.4.: False-classified strings grouped by regular expressions
Regular Expression Percentage Category
Base64 3.33 FN
URLEncoder 4.73 FN
BigInt33 14.18 FN
Short Strings 77.76 FN
JSON Format 0.02 FP
Numbers 0.09 FP
IP 0.13 FP
Country Sings 0.24 FP
Encodings 0.48 FP
Paths 0.61 FP
Hash Sums 2.2 FP
HTML 2.63 FP
Cryptographic Algorithms 4.2 FP
Commands 5.63 FP
Brands 7.7 FP
Date Formats 11.63 FP
Regular Expressions 13.96 FP
Mix of Languages 50.48 FP
During our analysis, we identified two root causes for false negatives. The first cause
is that our approach cannot distinguish between legitimate usage of hash sums in clear-
text or the usage of hash sums in obfuscated strings such as produced by the BigInt33
encoding. The same issue we observed for false positives of hash sums. For instance,
a human reader cannot distinguish if a hash sum, such as AB123FF10C, belongs to an
obfuscated string or not.
The second, more prevalent cause results from the obfuscation of short strings. These
obfuscated strings may contain digits, valid words, or characters, which is similar to short
cleartext strings. As a result, String Classifier cannot distinguish short cleartext from
short obfuscated strings. For instance, an obfuscated string may accidentally contain
valid words because some obfuscation schemes use bit operations that might change the
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value of a character so that the new character lies in the code point section of Chinese
characters. Since some Chinese characters represent entire words, the classifier cannot
distinguish between obfuscated and cleartext strings.
As the leading causes of false positives, we identified strings containing regular expres-
sions, date formats, and known abbreviations such as WIFI mixed with foreign languages
(e.g. Chinese). Since our dictionaries do not contain abbreviations and not all foreign
languages, their appearance causes 50.48% of the false positives. In addition to the
previously-mentioned categories, short strings such as HTML tags, cryptographic algo-
rithms, commands, and brands cause 20.16% of the false positives because the classifier
confuses them with obfuscated strings. For instance, the brand name of the LG smart-
phone LG G8X ThinQ can be confused with an obfuscated string.
Observation 22 Given this analysis, we identified short strings, hash sums, and
the mix of foreign languages with short brand names as root causes for false positives
and false negatives (RQ3).
While the String Classifier identifies obfuscated strings represented by string con-
stants, we introduce in the next section our approach that can identify obfuscated strings
hidden in other data structures. For this purpose, it identifies deobfuscation logic that
processes such strings.
9.4. Method Classifier
Inspired by the statistical text analysis [cry19], we assume that deobfuscation methods
use specific instructions more often than other methods. Statistical analysis of text
identifies English sentences by the high number of ’e’ characters in it. Likewise, based
on the observations of deobfuscation logic (cf. Chapter 8), we assume that it uses specific
instructions more frequently than other logic. One example of such an instruction is XOR.
In order to compare the instructions of two methods, we build our Method Classifier,
whose process is shown in Figure 9.2. The process extracts all methods, abstracts their
content to SPR (cf. Section 3.2.1), and correlate the distribution of the SPR tokens with
the ones of known deobfuscation methods.
In detail, we extract all instruction sets used in the deobfuscation methods, which we
identified in Chapter 8, and use these instruction sets to identify the usage of obfus-
cated strings hidden in other data structures. After the extraction of all instruction sets
per method, we transform the instructions into the Structure-preserving Representation
(SPR) described in Section 3.2.1 to compare the resulting tokens with those of known de-
obfuscation methods. This representation preserves the structural tokens of a method’s
instructions but abstracts away information that gets changed in obfuscated code and
would produce noise for the classification. E.g., we remove all name and type-information
that does not occur in the Android standard library. Additionally, we identified during
the analysis of the token distributions that store- and load-tokens of non-array variables
are distributed randomly. As a consequence, we removed them from our considerations.
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Figure 9.2.: Process of Method Classifier to identify deobfuscation logic
Due to these changes, the representation is robust against most of the obfuscation
techniques described in Table 3.4 except the Code Restructuring and Hide Functional-
ity. Using only the SPR, we cannot handle the two exceptions. However, we handle Code
Restructuring by defining a clear structure and an order for the SPR-tokens. For the
order, our Method Classifier sorts all SPR-tokens by their names and counts the occur-
rence of each token. We extract this structure for each deobfuscation method that was
identified in Chapter 8. Afterward, the structures are stored in a database to compare
the token distribution of these structures with the ones of a method under analysis.
1 byte[] b(byte[] p1, byte[] p2) {
2 byte[] r;
3 try {
4 Key key = null;
5 DESedeKeySpec des = new DESedeKeySpec(p1);
6 key = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("desede").generateSecret(des);
7 Cipher cp = Cipher.getInstance("desede/ECB/PKCS5Padding");
8 cp.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key);
9 r = cp.doFinal(p2);
10 } catch (Exception exception) {
11 r = null;
12 }
13 return r;
14 }
Listing 9.1.: Java method to decrypt Triple DES.
Listing 9.1 shows an example method that uses the DESede (Triple-DES) algorithm
[Cry20] to decrypt a byte array that was encrypted using the same algorithm. This
method takes a decryption key and an encrypted string as a byte array (i.e., parameters
p1 and p2) and returns the decrypted string using an additional byte array (line 13).
Given the bytecode of this method, the Method Classifier abstracts the method using
the SPR and counts each token occurrence in it.
Table 9.5 shows each SPR-token and its occurrence constructed from the method
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Table 9.5.: Feature list for the Triple DES decryption method in Listing 9.1
Token # of Token Comment
<init> 1 new of DESedeKeySpec
along 1 introduced by goto in exception
byte[] 6 3 signature, 1 DESedeKeySpec,
2 doFinal
const 2 null for key & exception
doFinal 1
dup 1 new of DESedeKeySpec
generateSecret 1
getInstance 2
if 1 introduced by goto in exception
init 1
int 2 signature & Cipher.init
invoke 6 5 calls & new of DESedeKeySpec
java/lang/String 2
java/security/Key 1
java/security/spec/KeySpec 1
javax/crypto/Cipher 4
javax/crypto/SecretKey 1
javax/crypto/SecretKeyFactory 3
javax/crypto/spec/DESedeKeySpec 2
ldc 2
load 8 omitted for correlation
new 1
return 1
store 7 omitted for correlation
void 2 1 by <init> and 1 by init
in Listing 9.1. Since Listing 9.1 shows only the Java source code, we describe in the
following all tokens that result from the bytecode to SPR transformation:
• The <init>, dup, and new tokens are constructed for each call of the new keyword
in Java.
• The JVM handles all temporary variables using store- and load-instructions that
we omit for the comparison.
• Branch tokens such as if replace all conditional and unconditional jumps. These
tokens are followed by the direction of the jump. For instance, along is used for
forward, and back for backward jumps.
• Each string constant is replaced by an ldc token and each constant value such as
null is replaced by a const token.
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• Finally, we replace all method calls by an invoke token.
Using all deobfuscation methods in the database, Method Classifier compares each
of them with each app method. For the comparison, it calculates the Spearman corre-
lation [MS04] between the tokens of the deobfuscation method and the method under
analysis. It does not use all tokens for the correlation, but only the ones that the method
under analysis shares with the method in the database. The Spearman algorithm [MS04]
calculates the correlation between two distributions, even if they are not normally dis-
tributed. If one method correlates at least 85% (very strong correlation) with a known
one, we consider it as a deobfuscation method.
Using this procedure, we identify even inlined deobfuscation logic because we correlate
only the intersection of tokens from both methods. Therefore, if the deobfuscation
method is inlined into another method, we extract only the tokens that are relevant for
our comparison.
9.5. Evaluation
For the evaluation, we investigated the following research questions:
RQ1: How precise/accurate is the Method Classifier in identifying variations of known
deobfuscation logic?
RQ2: How precise/accurate is the Method Classifier compared to the state-of-the-art
deobfuscation method detectors?
RQ3: What kind of methods are falsely classified by the Method Classifier?
In order to answer these questions, we conducted three experiments. For the first
experiment, we obfuscated apps using DexGuard [Dex19c] and ZKM [Zel19] that produce
variations of their deobfuscation logic. Afterward, we execute Method Classifier on the
obfuscated apps and measure the precision, recall, and F1-measure of it. The second
experiment compares the outputs of two deobfuscation method detectors with the output
of the Method Classifier. Lastly, we analyze methods that were falsely classified by our
Method Classifier to identify potential issues for future work.
We performed our experiments using a server with two AMD(R) EPYC(R) 7542 @
2.90 GHz (32 cores / 64 threads each) CPUs and 512 GB RAM. The experiments were
executed on the server using OpenJDK 1.8_212 64-bit VM with 20 GB of heap memory.
9.5.1. Identification of Deobfuscation-Method Variations
Method Classifier’s primary purpose is to locate deobfuscation schemes that represent
obfuscated strings as other data structures. As reported in Chapter 8, only two tools
produced variations of their deobfuscation logic in our analyzed data set (cf. BA in
Table 8.1). For that reason, we use these tools to generate variations of their obfuscation
schemes. Nevertheless, this experiment not only uses the representations that identify
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the generated variations but also all other representations that were identified in Chapter
8. If we used only the representations that handle other data structures, this would lead
to a bias towards lower false-positive occurrences. This bias can occur because the usage
of fewer representations can lead to less falsely classified methods.
As mentioned above, we use two tools to generate variations of deobfuscation methods.
In the following, we describe the different variations used by these tools. First, the
tools vary the obfuscation keys by using random numbers. Second, they permute the
order of formal parameters or change the method’s signature. Third, they alter the
position of code blocks, whose execution order does not matter. Finally, they inline the
deobfuscation logic based on the context of the string usages. For instance, if a class
contains only one string usage, one tool inlines the deobfuscation logic at the string
usage site. In other cases, the tool places this logic in a separate method.
To prepare our variation experiment, we applied both tools on 1,879 apps from the F-
Droid data set (cf. Section 9.3). However, we were only able to generate 2,127 obfuscated
apps, creating at least 1,000 apps for each obfuscator1. The deobfuscation methods in
the resulting obfuscated apps constitute our ground truth to evaluate our classifier’s ef-
fectiveness on variations of known obfuscation schemes. However, the extraction of these
methods is not straightforward since obfuscators do not provide explicit information.
Nevertheless, since we obfuscated the apps on our own, we can extract this information
for each app using the produced mapping files provided by the obfuscators. These
mapping files enable app developers to find all original names in the source code for
crash reports if they use obfuscated names. Consequently, if an obfuscated app contains
methods or fields with no entry in its corresponding mapping file, the methods contain
deobfuscation logic.
While the added methods contain the extracted deobfuscation logic, the methods
with inline logic are unknown. However, we can identify the inline logic using the added
fields by obfuscators. These fields contain all obfuscated strings in an array, and the
deobfuscation logic accesses these fields. As a result, we constitute our ground truth by
adding all new methods and all methods that access the newly added fields.
Given the mapping files, we obtain for our ground truth a list of 144,190 methods
that contain deobfuscation logic, either in a separate method or inlined into previously
existing methods.
To evaluate our classifier’s effectiveness, we measure its precision, recall, and F1-
measure on the methods in the ground truth. Table 9.6 shows the comparison of this
list with the Method Classifier’s output.
Observation 23 Method Classifier identifies the analyzed variations of deobfus-
cation logic with a precision of 99.66%, a recall of 97.42%, and a F1-measure of
98.53%. Whit these results, we conclude that our classifier is very accurate for
variations of logic, missing only a few methods with deobfuscation logic (RQ1).
1We could not obfuscate every app due to version incompatibilities between obfuscators and APKs.
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Table 9.6.: Results of the variation experiment
Measure Percentage
Precision 99.66%
Recall 97.42%
F1 98.53%
9.5.2. Comparison With Other Detectors
In this section, we compare the deobfuscation method detectors of Dex-Oracle 1.0.5
[Dex20] and JMD 1.61 [Jav20a] against our Method Classifier.
In the last experiment, we identified all deobfuscation methods to compose a ground-
truth. However, the identification of deobfuscation methods in all obfuscation schemes
was impossible because of missing mapping files.
Since we cannot compose a ground truth for comparing the precision and recall of
all approaches, we compare all approaches using an alternative notion of precision and
recall, which uses the consensus metrics outlined by Lamiroy et al. [LS11]. The research
community for graphic recognition uses these consensus metrics to compare various tools
if no ground truth is available. However, before calculating the precision and recall based
on the consensus metrics, we have to meet two requirements.
The first requirement demands that the output of each examined tool is treated
equally. Since it is unknown to what extent the individual tools are accurate with
the output of their calculations, this requirement ensures that each tool has an equal
share of the potential truth. For instance, if five tools are compared, and only one tool
reports a finding, it has a 20% chance to be true.
We can fulfill the first requirement for our evaluation scenario without any further
efforts since we do not know which tool produces the most accurate results and therefore
have to treat the outputs of these tools equally.
The second requirement demands that the analyzed data has to be equally distributed
and equally probable. This requirement states that if we have a data set with two unique
entries and one of the entries is present 50 times in our data set, the other must also be
present 50 times to have an equal distribution. For an equal probability of entries, one
needs to ensure that each entry represents a hit as probable as a miss.
To meet the second requirement, we analyzed the method distribution of multiple apps
and identified that numerous methods occur more frequently across apps than others.
For instance, multiple library methods can occur in different apps, but the methods of
the main-app code occur most likely only in the one app that defined it in its code. All
methods that appear more frequently have a higher distribution and a higher probability.
Since we want to have a data set in which all methods are equally distributed, we filter
out all methods that exist multiple times in the data set so that only one method of each
kind remains in the data set. For the filtering, we use a cryptographic hash to build a
signature of a method’s bytecode and use only a single occurrence of this signature for
our comparison.
167
9. Detection of Obfuscated Strings
To get an equal probability of deobfuscation methods and other ones, we use external
knowledge of code and the tools under analysis. First, we exclude all methods that
contained no strings before the obfuscation, and no tool classified them as deobfuscation
methods. The remaining methods were classified as deobfuscation methods by at least
one tool and most likely contained deobfuscation logic. Finally, to get our evaluation data
set, we combined all unique methods from the set of potential deobfuscation methods
with the same number of methods that contained no strings before the obfuscation.
Using the single occurrence of each method and the split into potential deobfuscation
methods and non-deobfuscation methods, we achieve an equal distribution and an equal
probability as demanded by the second requirement.
For the comparison of all tools, we randomly chose 1,000 obfuscated apps from the
F-Droid data set described in Section 9.3. Afterward, we performed the above-described
procedure and acquired 47,255 potential deobfuscation methods and the same number of
unique methods randomly chosen from the set of excluded methods. For the comparison,
we used the precision consensus metric in Equation 9.1 and for the recall the one in
Equation 9.2 [LS11].
Precision(Sk) =
∑
i=1...d P (δi)Sk(δi)∑
i=1...d Sk(δi)
(9.1)
Recall(Sk) =
∑
i=1...d P (δi)Sk(δi)∑
i=1..d P (δi)
(9.2)
P (δi) =
1
s+ 2
∑
k=1...s,⊥,⊤
Sk(δi) (9.3)
The variable Sk defines in our scenario one of k tools under analysis that given δi
and one of d methods returns either 1 if the method contains deobfuscation logic or
0 otherwise. P (δi) defines the consensus probability in Equation 9.3 [LS11] that the
given method is truly a deobfuscation method. Whereas S⊤ defines the tool that always
returns 1 and S⊥ always returns 0 for any given method.
Next, given our evaluation data set, we calculate for each tool the consensus metrics
for precision, recall, and the resulting F1-measure, and show the results in Figure 9.3.
While the results do not reflect the actual precision and recall for methods that contain
deobfuscation logic, we can use the results to compare the tools. As shown in Figure 9.3,
Method Classifier has a precision of 43.16%, which is 12 percentage points lower than the
precision of the best tool (JMD detector). However, the recall of the Method Classifier
is 60.34%, which is 44.8 percentage points higher than the recall of the second-best tool
(Dex-Oracle detector).
Since these results do not reflect the real distribution of methods, we also executed all
tools on all methods of the 1,000 obfuscated apps. The results show that all tools filtered
out 945,315 unique methods, which do not contain deobfuscation logic and amount to
95% of the methods in all apps. Since these methods contained no string before the
obfuscation, the Method Classifier achieves a true negative rate of at least 95%.
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Figure 9.3.: Consensus precision, recall and F1-measure for all tools
Observation 24 Given the filtered out 95% of the non-deobfuscation methods, the
Method Classifier identifies more than twice as many deobfuscation methods as iden-
tified by any other tool with a precision loss of only 27.8 percentage points (RQ2).
To explain the differences in precision and recall between the two previous experiments,
we present, in the next section, our manual analysis of false positives and false negatives.
9.5.3. Falsely Classified Deobfuscation Methods
Given all unique methods from the previous section, we analyze in this section, only
the ones that potentially contain deobfuscation logic. Since all tools filtered out 95% of
the unique methods, we have 47,255 methods left for our analysis. However, a detailed
analysis of all these methods is not feasible. Consequently, we excluded all methods that
are either flagged by all three tools as deobfuscation methods or are identified using the
mapping procedure from Section 9.5.1. From the remaining methods, we randomly chose
100 methods that our Method Classifier flagged as deobfuscation methods and manually
identified 41 false positives.
To analyze false negatives, we used all methods that were not flagged as a deobfusca-
tion method by the Method Classifier and excluded all methods that contained no string
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before the obfuscation. Only 75 methods remained for our analysis, and we identified
only four false negatives.
Table 9.7.: Sample of false-classified methods
Description Category Percentage Number of Methods
Calls Deobfuscation Method FP 69.49 41
Previous Usage of Byte Arrays FP 30.51 18
Variations of Known Obfuscation Schemes FN 76.67% 23
Split of Deobfuscation Logic FN 23.33% 7
A detailed analysis of false positives and false negatives separates each of them into
two categories, which we show in Table 9.7. The analysis of the chosen 100 methods
revealed that 59 methods were false positives with 69.49% of these methods contain calls
to deobfuscation methods, and the remaining 30.51% contain byte arrays used to encode
text to a portable document format (PDF) or implement low-level communication layers
via data-grams. The usages of byte arrays add noise to the measured token distribution
and cause a higher correlation between the method under analysis and our set of known
deobfuscation methods, resulting in false positives.
The analysis of false negatives shows that out of 75 methods, 30 methods are indeed
false negatives. The Method Classifier has not identified seven of the methods because
their deobfuscation logic is split into multiple methods, and our classifier identified the
other methods of the logic. Therefore, these methods would not cause missing obfuscated
strings. Nevertheless, the remaining 76.67% of the 30 methods are indeed false negatives
caused by variations of known obfuscators.
Observation 25 Given these results of all experiments, we conclude that the Method
Classifier has a low false-negative rate and is suitable to identify all analyzed deob-
fuscation methods. The analysis shows that most of the false positives are caused by
integrating calls to deobfuscation methods (RQ3).
9.5.4. Discussion
In the previous experiments, the Method Classifier identified variations of deobfuscation
methods with a precision of 99.66% and a recall of 97.42%. Compared with other
tools, it identified deobfuscation methods with a precision of only 43.16% and a recall
of 60.34%. However, many methods that are flagged as false positives manipulate an
obfuscated string before propagating it to a deobfuscation method. Consequently, these
methods are no real false positives but belong to a deobfuscation logic that is split across
multiple methods. Since the other tools cannot detect inlined deobfuscation logic, they
flag methods containing such logic as non-deobfuscation methods and cause a higher
probability of a false positive.
The same applies to false negatives since some obfuscators move the entire code into
another method and add a delegate method with a deobfuscation-method signature.
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Consequently, the other tools flag it as a deobfuscation method, while the Method Clas-
sifier does not. It flags only the methods that contain the actual deobfuscation logic.
As a result, the consensus metrics for precision and recall under-represent the identi-
fication capabilities of Method Classifier but show that Method Classifier prefers recall
over precision compared to other tools.
9.6. Threats to Validity
We identified the following threats to the validity of our experiments. If an obfuscator
adds random words to a string, it can eventually evade the detection using the String
Classifier because the proportion of the non-obfuscated content will increase. However,
for this technique to be effective, more than half of a given string need to consist of
non-obfuscated words because the String Classifier decides at this threshold that the
string might be non-obfuscated. During our analysis of obfuscation techniques, we never
found more than one dictionary word in an obfuscated string.
Another threat could be that a new obfuscator manipulates a string that does not
share any commonalities with known techniques. In order to identify this new technique
in the future, we would need to extend the approach. Nevertheless, we do not need to
train our classifiers from scratch because we can train an additional REP Tree for this
technique and consider a string as obfuscated, as long as at least one of the REP Trees
classifies it as such. Similarly, we can add the SPR of the new technique to the list of
our Method Classifier to adapt its classification.
Finally, if an obfuscator hides all obfuscated strings in an encrypted class, neither
the String Classifier nor the Method Classifier can detect these strings. Additionally,
if obfuscators use probing [XQE16] to identify vulnerabilities of classifiers that identify
obfuscated strings, we would need to identify features that are not affected by probing.
However, currently, no other string obfuscation detector handles such techniques.
9.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced two approaches that complement each other to identify
obfuscated strings in apps. The first approach, String Classifier, directly analyzes strings
with a classifier that identifies obfuscated strings based on their characteristics. The
second approach, Method Classifier, compares methods with the ones that contain known
deobfuscation logic to identify obfuscated strings hidden in other data structures.
String Classifier analyzes strings for words from different natural languages and uses
different features from cryptanalysis, known formats, and word characteristics to identify
obfuscated strings. Whereas, the Method Classifier extracts a specific representation of
each method and compares the instructions of it with known deobfuscation logic using
the correlation between the occurrences of different instructions.
Since most other tools cannot detect obfuscated strings on an individual basis, we
evaluated the String Classifier’s effectiveness only on our data set without comparing
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it with other tools. However, with a F1-score above 94%, the String Classifier is well
suited to identify obfuscated strings in the wild.
While for the String Classifier, we had a well-defined data set and no comparison
tools, we have for the evaluation of the Method Classifier tools for the comparison, but
no well-defined data set. The collection of a well-defined data set was impossible be-
cause many obfuscators do not document the methods which they use for deobfuscation.
Consequently, we used a technique from graphic recognition that assesses multiple tools
without the necessity of a ground truth.
After establishing the necessary conditions for the usage of this technique, we could
analyze the relations between each tool’s precision and recall. The results indicate that
the Method Classifier identifies most of the deobfuscation logic.
In this chapter, we evaluated the String Classifier, and the Method Classifier individ-
ually. In the next chapter, we use both of the classifiers to evaluate their performance in
the wild. For instance, we show that the usage of both classifiers yields the best coverage
of obfuscated strings in the wild.
172
10. String Deobfuscation
In this chapter, we introduce StringHound, an analysis that combines the detection
approaches of the previous chapter with a light-weight slicing technique that extracts
and executes the deobfuscation of a string.
StringHound utilizes the fact that the entire code necessary to deobfuscate a string
resides in the deployed application [WHA+18]. We use this code by applying slicing
to retrieve all necessary instructions that compute the original deobfuscated string.
Weiser [Wei81] introduced slicing in 1981 and since then various other approaches [Cha17,
RAMB16, LLTX17, MW17, ZWWJ15, GZZ+12, HUHS13] use it.
The usage of Weiser’s slicing algorithm on its own does not solve the entire deobfus-
cation problem. Our approach faces three challenges to deobfuscate strings. The first
challenge is the increased complexity of the obfuscated code. Obfuscation tools produce
more complex code by transforming the syntax while keeping the semantics unchanged.
Consequently, all algorithms that are only processing not obfuscated bytecode are not
suited to handle the complexity produced by obfuscators. For instance, in contrast
to standard compilers, obfuscators can produce irreducible control-flow graphs. These
graphs may contain multiple entry points to loops by using goto statements.
The second challenge consists of countermeasures that are implanted into the bytecode
and checked during runtime to evade simple string inspections. For instance, as described
in Chapter 8, countermeasures check whether an app is executed in a false environment.
While the first two challenges focus on code transformations, the last one focuses
on the scope of the deobfuscation analysis. The number of analyzed strings directly
affects the runtime of StringHound. Therefore, the more strings StringHound can filter
out that do not represent an obfuscated-string usage, the less time it spends with the
deobfuscation. While StringHound can reduce the number of analyzed methods by
leveraging the identification capabilities of our classifiers, the reduction of string usages
in these methods requires detailed knowledge about the capabilities of obfuscators. Since
their deobfuscation logic cannot manipulate methods contained in the Android class
library, we reduce the number of string usages by analyzing only code structures that
do not direct constant strings into these methods of the Android class library.
Given such a code structure, StringHound primarily performs backward slicing inter-
leaved with forward-phases if necessary to get an executable slice. For example, the
creation of new objects in Java bytecode requires forward phases during the slicing
process. In contrast to approaches that reconstruct high-level code structures such as
for-loops, StringHound directly processes low-level bytecode instructions. As a result, it
avoids issues caused by obfuscators, such as irreducible control-flow graphs.
In addition to the processing of low-level bytecode, StringHound circumvents dynam-
ically invoked countermeasures that are applied by current obfuscation tools. For in-
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stance, StringHound does not change the information in stack traces that are checked
by known deobfuscation logic.
We evaluated StringHound and four available state-of-the-art deobfuscation tools
[Dex20, sim20, Jav20a, Dex19b] by applying them to a set of apps that we obfuscated
with 21 different techniques. The evaluation shows that StringHound yields significantly
better results than the other tools. We also applied StringHound to four sets of benign
and malicious real-world apps: (a) a random sample of 100,000 apps, (b) popular apps
based on AndroidRank’s Top 500 [And19], (c) malware from Contagio [Con19b], and
(d) apps from the Google Play store in 2018 classified as malicious by VirusTotal [vir19].
The classifiers in Chapter 9 were vital in enabling a study of more than 100,000 apps
by using them to filter out apps that do not contain any obfuscated strings to avoid
unnecessary slicing and deobfuscation steps.
Our study shows that apps contain string obfuscation at least 12 times more often than
claimed by previous studies [Don18, Mir18, WR17]. We give insights into the found
obfuscated strings that we categorize by a list of common security-related patterns.
Besides expected results, such as obfuscated URLs and commands in malware sets, we
surprisingly found that 76% of the 100,000 apps contain obfuscated strings. An in-
depth analysis revealed that ad libraries integrated into apps contain several obfuscated
strings. Moreover, we identified two apps in the Top 500 set that conceal suspicious
behavior through string obfuscation. They collect sensitive information from a user’s
mobile phone, such as call logs and location information, to build a user profile for
tracking. Furthermore, they also check for the SuperUser.apk that grants root access
to the mobile phone. These apps are installed on over 20 million devices and are not
flagged as malicious by VirusTotal [vir19].
In the next sections, we discuss state-of-the-art string deobfuscators in Section 10.1,
our approach StringHound in Section 10.2, a detailed evaluation of StringHound’s capa-
bilities in Section 10.3, threats to the validity of our experiments in Section 10.4, and
draw a conclusion in Section 10.5.
10.1. State-of-the-Art String Deobfuscators
In this section, we discuss all deobfuscators, even though not all were available for empir-
ical comparison. First, we discuss Dex-Oracle [Dex20], Simplify [sim20], JMD [Jav20a],
and DEX2JAR [Dex19b] which we also use for empirical evaluation. Furthermore, we
examine CredMiner [ZWWJ15], Harvester [RAMB16], ARES [BP18], TIRO [WL18],
FlowSlicer [MW17], SAAF [HUHS13], Tiger [CYL+17], and AGRIGENTO [CFL+17],
which are not publicly available or can only deobfuscate strings in a restricted setting.
Dex-Oracle [Dex20] searches for deobfuscation methods and executes them in an em-
ulator as a part of an app. As described in Section 9.1, it uses fixed method signatures to
filter the app code for deobfuscation methods. Dex-Oracle misses inlined deobfuscation
code and signature variations of deobfuscation methods. For instance, we found in our
study of cn.pro.sdk (cf. Chapter 8) inlined deobfuscation logic produced by a known
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obfuscator. Moreover, it assumes that all constant values needed for the execution of
the deobfuscation method are provided directly before the specific call of that method,
while the latter can also be the result of field accesses or other computations.
Simplify [sim20] applies semantic-preserving transformations to optimize an app’s
code. Example transformations are constant propagation and dead code removal. To en-
able transformations, it executes each method on a virtual machine sandbox and returns
a graph with all possible register and class values for every execution path.
Simplify can only deobfuscate strings that do not depend on any state. In such
cases, the constant propagation of Simplify can uncover hidden information. Due to
two reasons, Simplify’s support for string deobfuscation is limited. First, it is not able
to decide which operations or values are necessary to deobfuscate a string. Second, it
cannot handle deobfuscation methods that use keys stored in fields.
JMD [Jav20a] re-implements deobfuscation logic of known obfuscators [Zel19, All19,
Das19] to execute it with directly-propagated constants. JMD extracts these constants
from identified immediate callers of the known deobfuscation methods. After executing
the deobfuscation logic, JMD replaces calls to deobfuscation methods by revealed strings.
However, JMD does not consider field accesses or other ways to retrieve the propagated
values. It identifies obfuscated strings by searching for specific loading instructions (LDC).
Consequently, JMD misses almost all obfuscated strings, which would be produced by
the obfuscation techniques from Chapter 8 because the techniques load them by using
another instruction. Additionally, as described in Section 9.1, JMD uses a fixed set
of method signatures without considering variations or inlining of deobfuscation logic,
which also leads to significant misses of obfuscated strings.
DEX2JAR [Dex19b] transforms Dalvik bytecode to Java bytecode. However, it also
has a sub-module that executes methods with a certain signature for deobfuscation
purposes. Similar to our approach, DEX2JAR executes code in the underlying JVM.
However, DEX2JAR needs the user to identify and provide the deobfuscation methods.
Additionally, DEX2JAR has similar drawbacks as JMD and Dex-Oracle, such that it as-
sumes all inputs for the deobfuscation-method call directly above it. Unfortunately, none
of the obfuscation techniques that we surveyed in Chapter 8 matches these conditions.
CredMiner [ZWWJ15] extracts and deobfuscates developer credentials (e.g., user-
names, passwords) from Android apps by performing backward slicing starting from
known methods that take credentials as parameters. Since CredMiner’s extracted slices
are not directly executable, they miss constructor calls of objects. To make them exe-
cutable, CredMiner creates mock objects and uses a custom runtime environment. Since
the mocked objects cannot reproduce the whole behavior of the real objects, CredMiner
cannot handle advanced countermeasures that, for instance, rely on the shape of the
stack. Furthermore, CredMiner uses a manually crafted list that needs to be maintained
to identify current methods that use user names and passwords as parameters. Lastly,
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CredMiner cannot handle obfuscated strings in char or byte arrays since its custom
runtime environment models only Java’s String API.
Even though CredMiner is highly related to our work, we were not able to acquire
it for an empirical comparison even in the restricted setting of deobfuscating credential
strings because it is not publicly available.
Harvester [RAMB16] implements a combined static and dynamic analysis to extract
obfuscated runtime values from Android malware. It uses SuSi [RAB14] to identify
sources and sinks needed for Harvester’s slicing technique. Since SuSi relies on the
names of methods and classes, it is not suited to identify name-obfuscated methods.
Harvester starts with the identified sinks and performs backward slicing to identify
if statements that potential malware may use to prevent the exposure of its payload.
Harvester rewrites the identified statements so that it can systematically enumerate
all paths to the sink while the Android simulator executes the sliced app. Using this
procedure, Harvester circumvents countermeasures relying on if statements. However,
because Harvester does not preserve stack information, it cannot handle the usage of
this information as a deobfuscation key.
Since Harvester is not publicly available, an empirical comparison is not possible for
the kind of obfuscation schemes that can be handled by Harvester. Even if Harvester
would be available, it is not suited to deobfuscate all strings because it cannot detect
deobfuscation logic.
ARES [BP18] identifies and executes unexplored paths to malware payload hidden
by countermeasures. To identify these paths, ARES starts with methods specified in a
static list of sources and sinks and performs backward slicing. ARES tries to identify if
statements that prevent the exposure of potential malicious payload by using environ-
mental values. As Harvester, ARES rewrites the identified statements to systematically
enumerate all paths to the sink while the Android simulator executes the sliced app.
Given this procedure, the approach circumvents countermeasures relying on if state-
ments. However, because ARES does not preserve stack information, it cannot handle
the usage of this information as a deobfuscation key. Additionally, due to the usage of
a static list, ARES is not suited to identify obfuscated methods used for deobfuscation
because this list relies on class and method names.
While ARES is publicly available, it is not suited to deobfuscate all strings because it
cannot detect deobfuscation methods.
TIRO [WL18] applies instrumentation for Android apps to identify runtime obfusca-
tion that hides data or the execution order of code. For the identification, it instruments
a specified list of methods, uses fuzzing to execute these methods with various input val-
ues, and observes the resulting outputs. TIRO uses IntelliDroid [WL16] to identify call
paths to the specified list of methods in the app. Nevertheless, IntelliDroid is not suited
to identify obfuscated methods used for the deobfuscation of strings because it relies on
method and class names. After detecting call paths, TIRO instruments the entire app
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and the Android runtime to extract values during execution. However, for the instru-
mentation, TIRO still needs a static list of methods and therefore suffers from the same
drawbacks as ARES.
Since TIRO is not publicly available, an empirical comparison is not possible for the
kind of obfuscation schemes that can be handled by TIRO. Even if TIRO were available,
it is not suited to deobfuscate all strings because it cannot detect deobfuscation methods.
FlowSlicer [MW17] combines static and dynamic analyses to detect sensitive informa-
tion leaks in Android applications. The static analysis locates source and sink methods
related to potential information leaks. By backward-slicing, the approach determines if
the information passed to a sink method potentially originates from a relevant source.
If so, FlowSlicer instruments the code such that it can track and observe information
flows at runtime. To track the information flows, FlowSlicer executes the instrumented
application on an Android simulator. This procedure enables FlowSlicer to check if an
app indeed leaks sensitive information.
While not designed for string deobfuscation, we could use FlowSlicer for that purpose,
given appropriate sources and sinks. However, it executes only the original code with the
instrumentation to track information flows. Hence, even the simplest countermeasures
are sufficient to hinder the deobfuscation of a sensitive string. Furthermore, it is only
possible to get a deobfuscated string if we can trigger the path to a specific sink. However,
to trigger such paths, we would require specific test cases or user inputs.
Since FlowSlicer is not publicly available, an empirical comparison is not possible for
the kind of obfuscation schemes that can be handled by FlowSlicer. Even if FlowSlicer
would be available, it is not suited to deobfuscate all strings because it cannot detect
deobfuscation logic.
The Static Android Analysis Framework (SAAF) [HUHS13] was designed to facilitate
the analysis of Android malware. It is a generic slicing-approach that tracks the flow of
constant values, in particular, string constants. SAAF uses use-def chains for its slicing
to identify sources of the constants. SAAF uses interleaved backward forward-slicing to
identify all relevant instructions but does not aim at extracting or executing the slice
and, therefore, would not deobfuscate strings. It just identifies the sources related to
their usage. As a consequence, users would have to perform the deobfuscation manually.
Since SAAF is not publicly available, an empirical comparison is not possible. Even
if SAAF were available, we would need to perform the deobfuscation manually.
Tiger [CYL+17] generates a network-traffic signature to categorize apps as malicious
or benign. Tiger constructs the signature by slicing all constant information belonging
to a selected list of Android’s network methods. Afterward, it partially executes the
slices to reduce the size of each signature. Tiger starts constructing the signature at a
list of methods instead of automatically analyzing the app’s codebase. As a result, Tiger
misses methods from new Android versions. Moreover, it misses reflectively called net-
work methods when the targets are obfuscated strings. While the extraction of network
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signatures may reveal many obfuscated strings, Tiger cannot deobfuscate strings that
are not related to networks.
Since Tiger is not publicly available, an empirical comparison is not possible. Even if
Tiger would be available, it is not suited to deobfuscate all strings because it does not
identify obfuscated strings.
AGRIGENTO [CFL+17], similar to Tiger, generates a network-traffic signature to
categorize apps as malicious or benign. In contrast to Tiger, AGRIGENTO constructs a
signature by instrumenting specific methods and executing the entire app multiple times
to explore more and more constants in each iteration. It starts constructing the signature
at a static list of methods instead of automatically analyzing the app’s codebase. As
a result, it misses methods in new Android versions. As Tiger, AGRIGENTO misses
reflectively called network methods when the targets are obfuscated strings. While the
extraction of network signatures may reveal many obfuscated strings, AGRIGENTO
cannot deobfuscate strings that are not related to networks.
Since AGRIGENTO is not publicly available, an empirical comparison is not possi-
ble. Even if AGRIGENTO would be available, it is not suited to deobfuscate all strings
because it does not identify obfuscated strings.
Discussion Given the five concepts of string obfuscation in Section 8.4, and the descrip-
tions of the deobfuscators, we show in Table 10.1 the connections between the concepts
and the approaches. The five concepts include the hiding of strings (Hide Strings), keys
(Hide Keys), logic (Hide Logic), the data flow of the logic (Hide Data Flow), and the
protection of the deobfuscation execution (Protect Execution). Additionally, we add the
automatic identification of obfuscated strings to the table (Identification). The handling
of all concepts varies between fully (+), partially (±), and not handled (-).
We observe multiple commonalities and discrepancies between different groups of ap-
proaches. First, SAAF and DEX2JAR cannot handle any of the obfuscation concepts.
While SAAF requires the entire slicing, DEX2JAR needs only an extension with a string-
obfuscation detector to enable deobfuscation. Second, the tools Dex-Oracle and JMD
have similar capabilities to handle the string-obfuscation concepts. Nevertheless, each
of them handles the identification of hidden strings differently.
Third, Tiger and AGRIGENTO have not only similar capabilities but also the same
shortcomings to handle string-obfuscation concepts. They can only deobfuscate strings
related to network functionality.
Fourth, besides the missing automatic identification of ARES, it shares all capabilities
with Harvester and TIRO. While these tools do not handle hidden strings and logic, the
tools can deal with the highest number of obfuscation concepts.
Last, the tools Simplify, CredMiner, and FlowSlicer have either a particular focus or
are not able to handle advanced concepts of string obfuscation.
While all tools deal with different string obfuscation concepts, none of them can handle
all of the concepts. As a result, we need an approach that does not only automatically
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Table 10.1.: String obfuscation concepts vs. detection and deobfuscation approaches
Approaches Automatic Hide Hide Hide Hide Protect
Identification Strings Keys Logic Data Flow Execution
Dex-Oracle + + - - - -
Simplify - ± - - - -
JMD + + - - - -
DEX2JAR - - - - - -
CredMiner + - + - - -
Harvester ± - + - + ±
ARES - - + - + ±
TIRO ± - + - + ±
FlowSlicer - - ± - ± -
SAAF - - - - - -
Tiger - ± ± ± ± -
AGRIGENTO - ± ± ± ± -
identifies obfuscated strings but also uses a specially targeted slicing technique. In the
next section, we present StringHound that possesses both capabilities.
10.2. StringHound
StringHound processes bytecode in five steps. Figure 10.1 shows a high-level view of this
process. To reveal obfuscated strings, we need to identify the methods that potentially
use them. For locating usages of obfuscated strings, we use the String Classifier and
Method Classifier from the Chapter 9. Given the output of the classifiers, we find the
starting point for the slicing (slicing criterion) in the methods that contain the usage
of the obfuscated strings. Next, we use a specially targeted slicing technique that com-
putes all program statements that affect the state of a given slicing criterion. Finally,
StringHound injects the slice into the execution context of the deobfuscation logic. Af-
terward, it executes the resulting slice to obtain deobfuscated strings. The injection of
the slice into the context renders countermeasures introduced by analyzed obfuscators
ineffective. Our detailed description of StringHound shows the design decisions taken to
address the obfuscation schemes presented in Chapter 8.
10.2.1. Slicing Relevant String Usages
In order to extract and execute the logic from deobfuscation methods, we need to define a
criterion from which StringHound starts the slicing. We define as slicing criterion (scrit)
any instruction within a set of selected methods, which we call candidate methods, that
produces a string value. A method m is in the set of candidate methods if (a) it contains
instructions that consume a char sequence as a parameter (method calls, but also field
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Figure 10.1.: Overview of StringHound’s process
writes, array stores, and return instructions), called locations of interest (LoIs), and (b)
satisfies one of following conditions: (i) the String Classifier found obfuscated strings in
m, (ii) m calls a method n that the Method Classifier classified as a deobfuscation method,
or (iii) m itself is classified as a deobfuscation method (inlined deobfuscation logic).
Since the classifiers identify neither LoIs nor slicing criteria directly, we have to
search for them in the candidate methods. We use OPAL [EH14] to find all instruc-
tions that operate on values of type CharSequence, or a subtype thereof, in particular
java.lang.String. We consider all expressions as scrit that LoIs consume and may re-
sult in a string. Given a candidate method that contains LoIs, we identify all scrit while
ignoring constant string expressions. With all identified scrit, we describe our targeted
slicing in the following section.
10.2.2. Our targeted Slicing
Our slicing algorithm (cf. Figure 3) performs backward slicing [BG96, AARUJ86] with
forward-phases to collect all instructions necessary for the execution of other relevant
instructions. For instance, if the slice contains a new instruction, we collect their cor-
responding constructor invocation in forward-phases. Additionally, if several potential
sources for a given string parameter are present, we start from each of them as a separate
slicing criterion.
For example, Listing 10.1 shows two sources of msg (Line 2) corresponding to the two
branches of the tertiary operator (Line 1), which load either "US()" or "INT()". In such
cases, StringHound would start the slicing process for each source.
1 String msg = simCountryIso().equals("US") ? US() : INT();
2 invoke("+01234", msg);
Listing 10.1: Example with two sources
Traditional slicing algorithms (cf. Binkley et al. [BG96]) inspired our technique that we
adapted to our particular needs and implemented it using OPAL with definitions (cf.
Aho et al. [AARUJ86]) of the functions defined in Table 10.2.
Given a method body along with its control-flow graph (CFG), a LoI and a slicing
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Algorithm 3: Slicing algorithm
Input: m a method with a body
I the instructions of the method m
g the CFG of m where each i ∈ I
corresponds to one node n ∈ N of g
LoI ∈ I the location of interest
scrit ∈ I the slicing criterion
Output: Nslice ⊆ I
1 Nslice := {}
2 W := {scrit}
3 cdcrit := cd(scrit)
4 brLoI := br(LoI)
5 while W ̸= ∅ do
6 currInstr := head(W )
7 W := W \ currInstr
8 if currInstr /∈ Nslice then
9 Nslice := Nslice ∪ { currInstr }
10 D := {d | x ∈ use(currInstr) ∧ d ∈ ud(x, currInstr)}
11 cdcurrInstr := cd(currInstr) \ cdcrit
12 U := {u | x ∈ def(currInstr) ∧ u ∈ du(x, currInstr)
13 ∧ u ∈ brLoI}
14 W := W ∪ D ∪ cdcurrInstr∪ U
criterion scrit, our algorithm initializes the worklist W (Line 2 of Figure 3) with the
slicing criterion scrit. Afterward, it performs for each instruction in W (Line 6) that is
not already part of the slice (Line 8) the following steps:
1. It adds the current instruction currInstr to the slice (Line 9).
2. In the backward phase (Line 10), it determines the set D of all definition sites related
to currInstr, i.e., D consists of instructions that initialize variables used by currInstr.
3. Also in the backward phase, it determines the set cdcurrInstr of instructions on which
the current instruction is control dependent on (Line 11). From this set, it removes
the instructions cdcrit that could prevent the execution of scrit. This backward phase
adds instructions to W that (in)directly affect scrit. With this addition, the algorithm
includes condition instructions that do not control the execution of the criterion itself.
This step is required to, e.g., ensure that we add loops manipulating byte arrays to the
slice. If the backward phase adds instructions that define a new reference-typed variable,
Table 10.2.: Definitions of helper functions for the algorithm
def Instr → P(V ar) variables defined by an instruction
use Instr → P(V ar) variables used by an instruction
du V ar × Instr → P(Instr) definition-use instructions
ud V ar × Instr → P(Instr) use-definition instructions
cd Instr → P(Instr) transitive control dependency instructions
br Instr → P(Instr) set of backwards reachable instructions
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CharSequence x = new ConstantCharSequence("C");
CharSequence sb = createMutableCharSequence();
if (conditionA){
sb.append(x);
} else {
 sb.append("D");
}
if (conditionB){
CharSequence s = sb.toString();
       sb.append("E");
useString(s,2);
}
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Figure 10.2.: Example of the slicing process for the parameter s of useString—Showing
LoIs and first backwards step
i.e., an object, the algorithm performs an additional forward phase to include those
instructions in W that potentially affect the state of the object after its initialization
and which are relevant w.r.t. the LoI. Hence, the algorithm only adds instructions that
are still backward reachable from the LoI.
4. In the forward phase (Line 12, 13), the algorithm determines the set of all instructions
U that use a variable defined by currInstr and which are backward reachable from the
LoI. This phase includes all instructions that potentially mutate the state of the defined
variable, e.g., filling an array with actual values or calling a method of the object.
5. In the last step (Line 14), W is updated with the following three sets of instructions.
The set of instructions on which currInstr is control dependent (cdcurrInstr), those using
the variable defined in it (U ), and those initializing the variables used by it (D).
Given our slicing algorithm, the example in Figure 10.2 illustrates the process of
determining scrit and the algorithm’s backward phase, divided into four steps. In step 0,
the algorithm determines candidates for LoIs statements. Here, it selects the constructor
in Line 1, the calls in the Lines 4, 6, 10, and 11. Given a LoI, the algorithm considers
the definition sites (def-sites) of the instructions that load the LoI ’s string parameters as
slicing criteria (without including the LoI itself). For illustration purposes, we assume
that the currently processed LoI is the call in Line 11. Its only string parameter s (the
int parameter is ignored) is defined by the result of the call in Line 9. Hence, this call
is our slicing criterion. On the contrary, we do not consider instructions that load string
constants as slicing criteria, e.g., the call in Line 6 is a LoI, but the instruction that
loads the string constant "D" is not a slicing criterion. The rationale behind this is that
in this case, no deobfuscation can happen before reaching the LoI. In Figure 10.2 such
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CharSequence x = new ConstantCharSequence("C");
CharSequence sb = createMutableCharSequence();
if (conditionA){
sb.append(x);
} else {
 sb.append("D");
}
if (conditionB){
CharSequence s = sb.toString();
       sb.append("E");
useString(s,2);
}
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Figure 10.3.: Example of the slicing process for the parameter s of useString — Showing
the necessary forwards steps
LoIs are pointed at by dashed arrows. Consequently, we establish in step 1 that the
call in Line 11 is the LoI, and the call in Line 9 is the scrit. In step 2, the algorithm
determines the receiver object on which toString() is called, i.e., sb. Hence, in step 3,
the algorithm adds the definition site of the receiver to the slice, which is the call in
Line 2. The if-condition in Line 8 is not added to the slice because it would potentially
prevent the execution of the slicing criterion (scrit).
Having shown the steps 0 to 3, we continue our example in Figure 10.3 by showing
the forward phase of the algorithm. Starting from Line 2, we perform a forward phase
since no backward phase is necessary.
In step 4, the algorithm identifies the use-sites of sb and, since all of them are backward
reachable from the LoI, it adds the Lines 4, 6, 9, and 10 to the slice. The algorithm
conservatively adds Line 10 to the slice because it does not anticipate that after Line 9,
nothing mutates the string.
In step 5(a), the algorithm processes the calls in Lines 4 and 6 as follows. The first call
in Line 4 uses the variable x and, therefore, our algorithm adds the defining instruction
in Line 1 to the slice. Additionally, it adds the if-instruction in Line 3 to the slice
because both Line 4 and 6 are control dependent on the instruction, but not scrit.
When the algorithm processes in step 5(b) the call in Line 10, it identifies that the
if-condition in Line 8 would prevent the execution of scrit and thus does not add the
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condition to the slice. Step 6 is not explicitly shown because it repeats the steps 2 to 5
but starts with the variable x in Line 4.
To summarize the steps 0 to 6, the resulting slice is the entire code from Figure 10.3,
except the Lines 8 and 11 which we crossed out in Figure 10.3. In contrast to our
approach, traditional slicing algorithms would include the condition in Line 8 into the
slice, which may prevent the execution of the relevant code.
Step 7 creates the executable code, including a method to retrieve the value that the
LoI would have used. The following section explains this step in more detail.
10.2.3. Executing Sliced String Usages
In order to obtain the deobfuscated string that would flow into the LoI, our algorithm
extends the slice with a method call that logs the string. This call effectively replaces
the LoI by a call to the logging method that retrieves at this point the deobfuscated
string. Nevertheless, if necessary, the algorithm adds a return statement to the slice to
ensure that the signature of the sliced method can remain unchanged. Consequently,
depending on the declared return type, either null or the numeric value 0 is returned.
Given the extended slice, the algorithm replaces the body of the original candidate
method with the slice. By changing only the method body, the algorithm evades coun-
termeasures that use the name of the declaring class as well as the name of the sliced
method in their logic. For instance, the obfuscation schemes Stack Calls and Key is the
Signature of Stack Calls (cf. chapter 8) use this information to prevent the unintentional
execution of their deobfuscation logic.
Even though the algorithm does not change the names of the class and the sliced
method, it has to change multiple other context information to execute the desired
method. For instance, if the class is abstract, the algorithm has to change it to concrete.
As a result, all abstract methods are made concrete by returning default values of the
declared return type. Additionally, the algorithm generates a superclass that implements
all methods transitively called by the sliced method, and the class of the method extends
the superclass. The extension of the superclass includes the changing of the class static
initializer and calls to super. With this step, the algorithm evades the countermeasures
Static Initializer, and Object Initializer (cf. Chapter 8). It also increases the likelihood
that the initialization of our class containing the sliced method does not abort with an
exception. Recall that we have no means to determine appropriate parameter values
and, therefore, the algorithm always uses default values if required.
Given the execution environment of the sliced classes and methods, the algorithm
includes all classes from the original application, except the modified ones to ensure that
the slice is self-contained. Furthermore, as a replacement of the original android.jar,
the algorithm uses an artificial JAR with method stubs that have to return default values
of their return type (e.g., null or 0). All these transformations with our slicing approach,
enable StringHound to circumvent all obfuscation schemes discussed in Table 8.1. Even if
an obfuscator uses reflection, the slice runs successfully as long as the targets are part of
the execution environment. However, the algorithm cannot execute native methods since
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most Android applications do not compile their native parts for the x86 architecture on
which StringHound performs its the slicing.
Finally, the algorithm reflectively calls the sliced method in its execution environment
using default values for the parameters. Thus, the sliced method calls our logging method
that records the deobfuscated string. By using a separate execution environment for each
sliced method, the algorithm can continue the execution of other sliced methods if one
crashes or its runtime exceeds a specified time limit. This procedure ensures that no
other slices are affected, and only the affected results will be missing. We chose to call
the sliced methods with default values because they cause no overhead. Nevertheless,
our approach does not depend on them and can also support more advanced methods
for determining the parameter values such as fuzzing.
In order to demonstrate the creation of our execution environment, Listing 10.2 shows
an abstract class that contains in its constructor an obfuscated string embedded into
a call of the deobfuscation method. The deobfuscation method decodes the obfuscated
string using the Base64 class from the Android class library. Additionally, the construc-
tor of the code calls an abstract method that takes the deobfuscated string and another
string as parameters.
After the slicing and preparation for execution, Listing 10.3 shows the resulting class.
First, the algorithm slices the constructor by replacing the call to the abstract method
with a call to our SlicingLogger and the removal of the assignment to the class field
o. Since the deobfuscation code does not need the abstract method and the field, our
algorithm removes them from the class. Additionally, because the JVM cannot call
methods in abstract classes using reflection, the algorithm removes the abstract access
flag of the class under analysis. Furthermore, it adds an extension to OurSuperClass
to manipulate the execution of the constructor and execute the constructor reflectively
using the empty string as a default value. If the algorithm needs more complex objects
as default values, it transitively creates objects using constructors of the object classes
that take no or a few parameters.
1 abstract class AbstractClass {
2
3 String o;
4
5 public AbstractClass(String s) {
6 this.o = doSomething(decrypt("QzovV2luZG93cy9TeXN0ZW0zMi8="), s);
7 }
8
9 public String decrypt(String cipherText) {
10 try {
11 return new String(Base64.decode(cipherText, 0), "UTF-8");
12 } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) {
13 e.printStackTrace();
14 return null;
15 }
16 }
17
18 public abstract String doSomething(String f, String s);
19 }
Listing 10.2: Java code of string deobfuscation in an abstract class before slicing
1 class AbstractClass extends OurSuperClass {
185
10. String Deobfuscation
2
3 public AbstractClass(String s) {
4 SlicingLogger.log(decrypt("QzovV2luZG93cy9TeXN0ZW0zMi8="));
5 }
6
7 public String decrypt(String cipherText) {
8 try {
9 return new String(Base64.decode(cipherText, 0), "UTF-8");
10 } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) {
11 e.printStackTrace();
12 return null;
13 }
14 }
15 }
Listing 10.3: Java code of string deobfuscation in an abstract class after slicing
Given StringHound’s classifiers and its slicing and execution procedure, we evaluate
its performance in the next section.
10.3. Evaluation
For the evaluation of StringHound, we investigated the following research questions:
RQ1: How effective is StringHound compared to state-of-the-art deobfuscation tools?
RQ2: What is the prevalence of string obfuscation in the wild?
RQ3: Which classifier identifies most of the obfuscated strings?
RQ4: What kind of data is hidden using string obfuscation?
RQ5: Does string obfuscation hamper security analyses?
RQ6: What runtime performance does StringHound have?
To answer these questions, we performed three studies (a) comparing StringHound
with other string deobfuscators, (b) assessing the performance, and (c) runtime of
StringHound on real-world apps.
The setup consisted of a server with two AMD(R) EPYC(R) 7542 @ 2.90 GHz (32
cores / 64 threads each) CPUs and 512 GB RAM. The analyses were executed using
OpenJDK 1.8_212 64-bit VM with 20 GB of heap memory and a 5s timeout for a single
string deobfuscation.
For our studies, we used five different sets of APKs. The first set consists of the
validation set of apps from the F-Droid used in Section 9.3. The second set consists
of 100,000 APKs randomly selected from AndroidZoo [HAB+16]. The third data set
consists of the Top 500 most common apps based on AndroidRank [And19]. The fourth
set consists of apps that were available on the Play Store in 2018 and were classified as
malicious by at least 10 AV vendors in VirusTotal [vir19]. Finally, the last set consists
of 230 Android malware samples from Contagio [Con19b], containing current and past
malware families.
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10.3.1. Comparison with Other Deobfuscators
We evaluated StringHound against Dex-Oracle 1.0.5 [Dex20], Simplify 1.2.1 [sim20],
JMD 1.61 [Jav20a], and DEX2JAR 2.0 [Dex19b]. To the best of our knowledge, these
are the only freely available tools suited to deobfuscate string values.
As input for the deobfuscators, we randomly picked 1,000 apps from the data set
described in Section 9.3, which we have not previously used to train our classifiers. Two
comparison metrics are used: (a) percentage of APKs processed without termination
errors; and (b) recall, which we define as the percentage of unique deobfuscated strings
over all unique strings in the original apps. We discard the precision metric since our data
set contains only obfuscated strings. Therefore, no false positives could occur (i.e., plain
strings identified as obfuscated). However, the false positives produced by the String
Classifier and the Method Classifier restrict also StringHound’s false positive rate. The
results are summarized in Figure 10.4. In the following, we discuss each deobfuscator
individually.
As described in Section 10.1, Simplify [sim20] is limited for deobfuscation methods
that do not depend on any state and use only constants. Unfortunately, Simplify’s re-
engineered APKs were completely broken and could not be analyzed to produce results.
Hence, Figure 10.4 reports 0% for both values. In order to get any viable result, we
tried all possible configurations of Simplify, executed it on different operating systems,
and tried to process different kinds of APKs. However, Simplify produced only broken
APKs that contained no strings and were not executable.
DEX2JAR [Dex19b] needs the deobfuscation methods to be executed as user input.
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We applied our classifiers to each app and used its output as input for DEX2JAR. Pro-
viding the same deobfuscation methods to DEX2JAR and StringHound enables a fair
comparison of the two. However, DEX2JAR processed only 30% of the APKs with-
out errors, and it was unable to deobfuscate a single string, resulting in a 0% recall.
DEX2JAR’s assumption that deobfuscation methods are in the same class as the ob-
fuscated string caused these weak results. Moreover, DEX2JAR assumes that all values
flow without any indirections into a provided deobfuscation method. However, the val-
ues can also be the result of other accesses or computations. Unfortunately, none of the
obfuscation techniques from Chapter 8 matches DEX2JAR’s required conditions.
Since JMD [Jav20a] has many restrictions for the search of deobfuscation method
signatures, the usage of only one constant string instructions, and the usage of constant
keys, these restrictions lead to its poor performance. While JMD successfully processes
94% of the APKs, it only deobfuscates 0.01% of the strings.
As JMD and DEX2JAR, Dex-Oracle [Dex20] assumes that all values flow without any
indirections into a deobfuscation method. As a result, it does not consider additional
computations or accesses. Additionally, it supports only a fixed set of possible signatures
of deobfuscation methods. As a result, Figure 10.4 shows that even though Dex-Oracle
processed all APKs without errors, it recovered only 2.5% of all obfuscated strings.
Its strict assumptions match only very few deobfuscation methods found in the wild,
leading to its low recall. However, these matches could also be coincidences since the
used obfuscator has various other method templates (cf. Chapter 8).
StringHound was able to process all APKs with a recall of 73.9%. A detailed analysis
of the 26.1% missing cases showed that every obfuscation scheme listed in Table 8.1
occurred in the false-negative set. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that either the
execution environment, surrounding the sliced method, is too complex to be modeled
with our default values (cf. Section 10.2.3) or the classifiers were not able to identify the
obfuscated strings (cf. Section 9.5.3). However, the high recall confirms the effectiveness
of our approach, which does not suffer from the various limitations of the state-of-the-art
deobfuscators.
Observation 26 Unlike StringHound, other deobfuscators do not ’automatically’
identify all analyzed obfuscated strings. As a consequence, other deobfuscators ei-
ther use all methods of the app or get the deobfuscation methods as user input.
Such a brute-force approach does not scale to large data sets. Given these results,
StringHound is more effective than all other analyzed deobfuscators (RQ1).
10.3.2. Findings in the Wild
In this section, we use StringHound to assess the prevalence of string obfuscation in
the wild and the categories of obfuscation string usages. For this study, we use the
100,000 apps from AndroidZoo [HAB+16], the Top 500 most common apps based on
AndroidRank [And19], the apps that were available on the Play Store in 2018 and were
classified as malicious by at least 10 AV vendors in VirusTotal, and the 230 Android
malware samples from Contagio [Con19b].
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Prevalence of Obfuscated Strings in the Wild
We begin with a study to measure the prevalence of obfuscated strings in the wild. For
the measurement, we apply StringHound to 100,000 apps from Section 8. In order to
avoid false positives, we exclude all constant strings from our findings and count the
remaining ones, which we refer to as newly revealed strings.
For the identification of newly revealed strings, we delete all constant strings in the
analyzed app from the substrings of the deobfuscated string. In order to measure the
rate of the newly revealed content, we use the length of the remaining string divided
by the length of the original deobfuscated string. Removing shorter substrings hinders
the removal of longer ones. For instance, given a deobfuscated string “Hello”, if “el”
is removed then, we end up with “Hlo” and can no longer remove a string like “ello”.
To avoid this effect, we first remove longer substrings before we remove the others by
lexicographical order.
Given the measure of the newly revealed content per deobfuscated string, we calculated
the number of APKs containing newly revealed strings. In our study in Chapter 8, we
discovered that obfuscators may manipulate only parts of the strings in an app, and
may also hide obfuscated strings in other data structures. These two findings lead to
the following observation:
Observation 27 StringHound invalidates the claims of previous studies [Don18,
Mir18, WR17] that less than 5% of the apps contain obfuscated strings because we
discovered that 76% of the 100,000 apps contain obfuscated strings (RQ2).
Table 10.3.: Percentage of obfuscated strings identified by both classifiers
Classifier Percentage
String Classifier (MC) 28%
Method Classifier (SC) 77%
Overlap (Both) 5%
In the scope of our investigations, we also measured the ratio of newly revealed strings
per classifier. The results in Table 10.3 indicate that the String Classifier detected 28%,
and the Method Classifier 77% of the newly revealed strings.
Observation 28 These findings provide empirical evidence that both classifiers are
needed since their findings only overlap with 5% of the newly revealed strings. The
Method Classifier (MC) identifies most of them (RQ3). However, the String Classi-
fier provides at least (SCnew −Bothnew =) 23% of newly revealed strings and, thus,
it is also necessary for StringHound to achieve a higher total recall.
Categorization of String Obfuscation
In order to understand the usage of string obfuscation in the wild, we used regular ex-
pressions to categorize all deobfuscated strings in different classes. Table 10.4 shows the
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Figure 10.5.: Categories of string obfuscation in the 100k apps.
regular expressions we used to categorize deobfuscated strings. Our regular expressions
for URLs are not limited to the typical HTTP(S) form but also matches any scheme,
such as content URLs. Furthermore, we use a pattern for IPs to match non-URL re-
lated communications. The regex for paths describes absolute paths of the Android
operating system matching not only directories and file paths but also absolute paths
to executables. The patterns for intents and permissions match Android’s standard
definitions. The regular expression for SQL statements matches strings with common
keywords for querying and manipulating tables. Finally, we identify certificates by their
Base64 encoded prefix of the first three characters.
Altogether, we defined 12 regular expressions for matching URLs, file system paths
(Paths), IPs, intents, SQL statements (SQL), permissions (Perms), certificates (Certs),
cryptography algorithms (crypto), credentials, system services (Services), commands,
and API keys [MMR19]. We applied them to all deobfuscated strings in our data sets
(discarding apps without newly revealed strings) and counted their matches to quantify
the prevalence of each kind of usage.
Figure 10.5 shows a categorization of the resulting deobfuscated strings in the 100,000
apps. We divide the bar chart into critical and benign apps with obfuscated strings.
Many of the critical strings we identified by counting the following facts. First, we
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Table 10.4.: Regular expressions for the evaluation of deobfuscated strings in the wild.
Name Regex
URL \w+://[^/\”]+.*
Paths /\w+[\./].+
IP .*\b([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\b.*
Intents android.intent\..*
SQL .*(select.*from | update.*set | insert into |
delete from | create table | drop table |
truncate table).*
Permissions android.permission\..*
Certificates MII.+
Cryptography algorithms MD2|MD5|SHA\-?1|ECB|DES
Credentials .*user.*|.*passw.*
System Services List of System Services with wild cards (e.g. .*power.*)
Commands List of Commands with wild cards (e.g. .*su.*)
Youtube API Key [MMR19] AIza[0-9A-Za-z\-_]{35}
identified more HTTP requests than HTTPS, which may lead to security issues [Pro19].
Second, developers request permissions but are not aware that these permissions are
also used by ad libraries to access private data via obfuscated strings. Third, some apps
use insecure cryptography algorithms such as DES, AES with ECB mode, or MD2 via
obfuscated strings. Fourth, some apps send credentials hidden in obfuscated strings using
the HTTP GET method to login to their services. Fifth, some apps provide dangerous
accesses (e.g., the location of the device) via services that are requested using obfuscated
strings. Sixth, rooted phones execute commands, hidden in obfuscated strings, to grant
root access. Last, YouTube API keys, hidden in obfuscated strings, can be used to
consume the developer’s API quotas.
Observation 29 Using StringHound on the 100,000 apps, we identified in the ob-
fuscated strings critical usages of URLs, piggy-backed permissions, insecure cryptog-
raphy algorithms, hard-coded credentials, dangerous services, root commands, and
API keys (RQ4).
Due to this study, we identified many vulnerabilities that hamper the security of
the app user or developer (RQ5).
Context Analysis of the Categories
While the 100,000 apps contain a large variety of statistical findings, we have no insights
into apps that belong to the extreme fields of the Android ecosystem. To get more
insights about such apps, we chose three different data sets to get an understanding of
these kinds of fields and the context of StringHound’s findings. These data sets consist
of the top 500 most installed apps in the Play store, and two malware sets to analyze
current (malware 2018) and past (Contagio) obfuscated malware. Figure 10.6 shows a
categorization of the deobfuscated strings. Each bar corresponds to the percentage of
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APKs from a data set containing at least one deobfuscated string in the given category.
Each category comprises a group of three bars, where each corresponds to one data set.
The first bar shows that 60% of the Contagio malware obfuscates strings, mostly
paths (40%), URLs (12%), or intents (5%). A detailed analysis revealed absolute paths
of commands trying to open a command shell or of further APK or DEX files hidden in
the resources of the app containing the malware’s actual payload. One path establishes
a connection to a Command & Control server (AnserverBot [GZZ+12]). Furthermore,
we found paths to files on the SD card and to DHCP settings, which are exploited
by the DroidKungFu2 malware [KCS16]. Our regex for URLs matched locations of
browser settings that attackers may use to build a profile of the underlying mobile
phone. Additionally, we found URLs whose sites provide the geolocation of the accessing
IP address. We also found URLs to ad networks that may profile the user’s phone.
The regular expression for intents matched an action that resets the default page of the
browser to either show pages of ad networks or to track the user’s behavior. Furthermore,
the intent regex discovered an action, which queries the cell phone number to reveal the
identity of the user. Finally, we also found an action that performs phone calls.
In the malware set from 2018, 35% of APKs use string obfuscation to hide various
interactions with the Android operating system. We matched URLs that lead to ad
networks, which can track the user’s interactions and build profiles of users. Additionally,
some URLs access the user’s calendar and can reveal detailed information about their
schedules. The tracking of interactions, in combination with profiling, violates the user’s
privacy. We also found hidden paths of an APK holding its malicious payload. Moreover,
we revealed paths to operating-system commands that access hardware and sensor data
to profile a phone. Findings regarding intents and permissions indicate that malware
uses intents to call or send SMS to premium numbers. Additionally, the malware tries
to locate or profile a user by accessing personal calendars, accounts, or states of a phone.
Compared to the Contagio malware-set, more recent malware focuses on leakages of
private data, causing financial damage to the unknowing user.
Observation 30 Current malware in the Play store makes less use of string ob-
fuscation (35% compared to 60%) and focuses more on hiding leakages of private
data. Without StringHound, one would miss information that is essential to detect
remote command execution, even causing financial damage to the user, and leakages
of private data in at least 35% of recent malware.
Surprisingly, string obfuscation is more frequently used in the Top 500 apps than in
the 100,000-set of apps (89% vs. 76%), even more frequently than in malware. Our
evaluation shows that 33% of the apps use obfuscated URLs. Some of those URLs track
user’s IDs and IP through an ad network.
These actions directly violate users’ privacy. A detailed review of the findings showed
that all ad libraries contain obfuscated URLs and paths. We also analyzed how many
apps use string obfuscation only in ad- and third-party libraries1. This analysis revealed
1To this end, we filtered our findings by the list of ad-library package names from Chapter 8 and by a
list of common libraries [LKLT+16].
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Figure 10.6.: Categories of string obfuscation in the wild.
that ad libraries contain 63.52%, other libraries contain 10.64%, and the remaining
25.84% of all obfuscated strings in the Top 500 data set are in the app itself.
Observation 31 We found that all sorts of apps frequently contain string obfusca-
tion. Ad libraries are responsible for over 63% of these strings that hide the tracking
of users. This result is alarming since neither the user nor the developer of the app
is aware of the added functionality. With StringHound the developer could check the
content of the used ad library and choose an appropriate alternative.
During our analyses, we found two games for children that contained obfuscated pri-
vacy violations in the Top 500 data set. We manually analyzed their code and found
that they collect and transmit sensitive information on the user’s mobile phone. The
leaked information includes build, connectivity, debug, runtime, telephony, Android
version, and hardware data, which may build a user profile. Code related to this data
collection functionality resides in a stealthy package mixed into the integrated Android
support library. The app additionally checks for the SuperUser.apk that grants root
access to the mobile phone. We reported both apps to the app store since, according to
AndroidRank [And19], at least 20 million devices installed these suspicious apps.
Additionally, we uploaded both apps to VirusTotal [vir19] to test them and made the
following observation:
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Observation 32 Virus scanners do not flag suspicious privacy violations, since the
scanners of VirusTotal showed no findings, besides the usage of dangerous permis-
sions. StringHound equips an analyst to search for more kinds of violations than
provided by virus scanners.
10.3.3. Runtime Performance
In order to evaluate the runtime performance of StringHound, we measured the average
runtime per APK and per slice by running it on the Top 500, and the two malware data
sets from Section 10.3.2. While the first measure shows the runtime of our approach for
different APK sizes, the second one can be used to approximate the analysis time for a
given APK. All performance measures indicate that StringHound is fast and ready for
practical use.
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Figure 10.7.: Average runtime for the top 500 and the two malware data sets
Figure 10.7 shows the average runtime per APK. Each bar corresponds to one data
set, and we split it into the time needed (a) for analysis loading, (b) String Classifier
execution, (c) Method Classifier execution, and (d) the building and execution of slices.
With the results in Figure 10.7, we show the runtime for different APK sizes. As
shown, the processing of the Top 500 data set needs, on average, up to 20 times more time
per APK than processing the Contagio data set. The reason for this high discrepancy
is a large amount of library code in the APKs of the Top 500 data set. As mentioned
in Section 10.3.2, 74.16% of the obfuscated strings are found in libraries (i.e., ad +
other libraries), and these are up to 14 times larger in code size than APKs from the
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Contagio data set. We can reduce the time it takes to analyze such apps by using
tools that separately analyze the library code and reuse these analysis results. Another
observation is that across all three data sets, slicing consumes most of the execution time.
Hence, improving the performance of the slicing would speed up the entire analysis.
Figure 10.8.: Runtime per slice for the top 500 and the two malware data sets
For the calculation of the average runtime per slice, we measured the mean, median,
and also the 95%-quantile for each slice of all three data sets. While Figure 10.8 shows
that all these measures are below 250 ms, we have many outliers that are not only caused
by the different code sizes but also by the complexity of the code.
Observation 33 From the values of the median and quantiles, we conclude that
building and executing a single slice takes on average less than 250 ms (RQ6).
Given the observation that slicing consumes most of the execution time and the ex-
ecution of a single slice takes less than 250 ms, the only improvement to speed up the
performance is to parallelize the building and execution of single slices.
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10.4. Threats to Validity
In this section, we discuss threats to the validity of StringHound that can be subject to
further consideration in future work.
Driven by the study of obfuscation schemes, StringHound uses intra-procedural slicing
and default values for parameters to recover automatically obfuscated strings. As a
result, the slice’s execution may fail if it expects values, which differ from our injected
defaults. However, we can address this limitation by fuzzing the expected values. Given
a field or parameter, fuzzing guesses their values by their data-dependencies or using
symbolic execution to discover possible value ranges. Additionally, If a decryption key is
not present in the app code, we cannot deobfuscate strings that obfuscators encrypted
using this key. For instance, if the app code needs to download a deobfuscation key over
a network, and the download is only executable under particular circumstances.
Furthermore, obfuscators can use fields and parameters to perform inter-procedural
obfuscation. However, to perform it automatically, they need to identify the call order
of the fields and parameters. This call-order is not readily identifiable because of the
limitations of current call graph analyses for Android. Of course, making StringHound
inter-procedural is an obvious alternative, but coping with potential inter-procedural
obfuscation schemes is a trade-off between soundness and performance.
Further threats for StringHound are the dynamic usage of external packages or re-
sources, encrypted classes, and native code. While these techniques would evade our
approach, the combination of other tools [KKR15] with StringHound can mitigate these
threats. However, obfuscators may use developer certificates [ZLQ+18] or other external
resources from the app to prevent the execution of the extracted code. Currently, no
deobfuscator can handle such techniques.
10.5. Conclusion
This chapter shows how and why string obfuscation is used in real-world Android and
Java apps. We presented StringHound, our approach to recover obfuscated strings.
StringHound significantly improves over state-of-the-art deobfuscation tools. We also
presented a large-scale study on the use of string obfuscation in benign and malicious
apps, revealing highly relevant findings.
We provide empirical evidence that string obfuscation is commonly used across mal-
ware, and 100,000 apps from Google’s Play Store. This evidence invalidates statements
by previous research, suggesting that string obfuscation is rarely used in practice. By
undoing string obfuscation, we revealed abundant problematic string usages in the wild:
Critical internet accesses, piggy-backed permissions, insecure usage of cryptography al-
gorithms, hard-coded passwords, and available YouTube API keys. We have found
malware concealing hidden commands and communication endpoints and spyware-like
behavior in two apps in the Top 500 set. Our studies have shown that libraries account
for a significant amount of obfuscated strings in benign apps. Many findings in the ad
libraries reveal serious privacy issues.
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The presence of obfuscated strings impedes the analysis of apps, e.g., to check their
compliance with privacy regulations or to inspect them for detecting malware [RAMB16,
MW17]. String obfuscation can hide paths, URLs, and intents that can be used to track
the activities of a user or open shells on the user’s device to activate malicious payload
remotely. To address the issues with string obfuscation, we conducted a study of string
obfuscation techniques in the wild. Using the results of the study, we developed two
detectors to identify obfuscated strings, and our deobfuscator StringHound that uses
both detectors to reveal the content of obfuscated strings.
In Chapter 8, we analyzed 640 unique ad libraries extracted from 100,000 randomly
selected apps of the AndroZoo [HAB+16]. We examined the ad libraries for techniques
that obfuscate strings. According to previous works [SGC+12, RNVR+18, DMY+16,
SKS16, CFL+17], many of the ad libraries contain such strings, and therefore, we use
the libraries for the identification of string obfuscation techniques. To identify obfus-
cated strings, we analyzed all constant strings for abnormal usage of non-alpha-numeric
characters. Additionally, we analyzed all code locations that get non-string arguments
but return strings to identify deobfuscation code.
Using this procedure, we discovered 21 unique string obfuscation techniques and an-
alyzed their functionalities for further experiments. In particular, we focused on mech-
anisms used to protect obfuscated strings from unauthorized deobfuscation. Our study
showed that all identified string obfuscation techniques place their deobfuscation logic
in the same class as the obfuscated string, making its logic easy to target.
We also discussed the different mechanisms that protect obfuscated strings and the
shortcomings of their current implementations against automatic analyses. Furthermore,
we argued that fully-automated string obfuscation is challenging without additional in-
put from the obfuscator’s user.
In Chapter 9, we introduced two approaches based on the analysis from Chapter 8.
These approaches complement each other to identify obfuscated strings in apps. The
first approach String Classifier directly analyzes strings with a classifier that identifies
obfuscated strings based on their characteristics. Furthermore, the second approach
Method Classifier compares methods with ones containing known deobfuscation logic to
identify obfuscated strings hidden in other data structures.
String Classifier analyzes strings for words from different natural languages and uses
different features from cryptanalysis, known formats, and word characteristics to identify
obfuscated strings. Whereas, the Method Classifier extracts a specific representation of
each method in an app and compares the instructions of this representation with known
deobfuscation logic using the correlation between the numbers of different instructions.
Since most other tools cannot detect obfuscated strings on an individual basis, we
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evaluated the String Classifier’s effectiveness only on our data set without comparing
it with other tools. However, with a F1-score above 94%, the String Classifier is well
suited to identify obfuscated strings in the wild.
While we had for the String Classifier a well-defined data set and no comparison
tools, we had for the evaluation of the Method Classifier tools for the comparison, but
no well-defined data set. The collection of a well-defined data set was impossible be-
cause many obfuscators do not document the methods which they use for deobfuscation.
Consequently, we used a technique from graphic recognition that assesses multiple tools
without the necessity of a ground truth. After we established the necessary conditions
for the usage of this technique, we could analyze the relations between each tool’s pre-
cision and recall. The results indicate that the Method Classifier identifies most of the
deobfuscation logic.
Finally, Chapter 10 shows how and why string obfuscation is used in real-world An-
droid apps. We presented StringHound, our approach to recover obfuscated strings.
StringHound significantly improves over state-of-the-art deobfuscation tools. For the
deobfuscation, StringHound uses String Classifier and Method Classifier to detect ob-
fuscated strings. Afterward, it extracts all necessary values and logic to trigger the
string’s deobfuscation and executes it. For the execution, StringHound integrates the
logic is in an environment that is sliced from the original one to evade techniques that
try to protect the obfuscated string from unauthorized deobfuscation.
In our large-scale study on the use of string obfuscation in benign and malicious apps,
we also revealed highly relevant findings for the security and privacy of app users.
We provide empirical evidence that string obfuscation is commonly used across mal-
ware and 100,000 apps from Google’s Play store. This evidence invalidates statements
by previous research, suggesting that string obfuscation is rarely used in practice. By
undoing string obfuscation, we revealed abundant problematic string usages in the wild:
Critical internet accesses, piggy-backed permissions, insecure usage of cryptography al-
gorithms, hard-coded passwords, and available YouTube API keys. We have found
malware concealing hidden commands and communication endpoints and spyware-like
behavior in two apps in the Top 500 set. Our studies have shown that libraries account
for a significant amount of obfuscated strings in benign apps. Many findings in the ad
libraries reveal serious privacy issues.
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11. Conclusion
In this chapter, we present an overview of this dissertation’s findings. We start reviewing
the contributions of this dissertation and close with a discussion about open challenges
for future research.
Deobfuscation Tool Set
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LibMapper
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Classifier
Method 
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Figure 11.1.: Overview of contributions
Figure 11.1 shows the topics to which we contributed our tools and the analysis di-
rections that are affected by our contributions. The topics of library detection and app
code separation contribute to the ones of repackaging detection and library mapping.
For this reason there are connections from the two tools LibDetect and AppSeparator to
the others CodeMatch and LibMapper. The topic of library mapping contributes to the
one of obfuscated name detection. Finally, the topic of obfuscated string detection is
performed by two tools used as pre-analyses for the deobfuscation of these strings.
In the following section, we summarize our contributions to each topic. In the closing
discussion, we explain how our contributions affect the analyses depicted in Figure 11.1.
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11.1. Summary of Results
In this dissertation, we contribute to the fields of obfuscation detection and deobfusca-
tion. Analysts can discover the library code that is mixed with app code by using our
library detection tool LibDetect. If they are not interested in the specific libraries, they
can filter out library code with AppSeparator. Both tools can be used to filter library
code for repackaging detection with CodeMatch.
Furthermore, our tool LibMapper supports security analysts in understanding the
internal structures of obfuscated library methods that might be used for malicious pur-
poses. Since we only deobfuscate library code, an analyst might use a name inference
approach to understand obfuscated app code. However, it is hard to find appropriate
code samples to train such a name inference approach because many of the samples
contain obfuscated names. Moreover, analysts do not have suitable tools to identify
obfuscated names in those code samples. For this purpose, we developed ObfusSpot that
not only identifies that an app contains obfuscated names but can also pinpoint the
exact location of an obfuscated name.
Besides obfuscated names and libraries, analysts scan the app’s data for potential
vulnerabilities or known signatures of malware. However, obfuscated strings hinder such
analyses. As a consequence, we developed String Classifier and Method Classifier which
complement each other in the detection of obfuscated strings. Furthermore, we pro-
posed a string deobfuscation tool called StringHound. While String Classifier identifies
obfuscated strings by anomalous characteristics, Method Classifier examines logic used
to deobfuscate these strings.
11.1.1. Library Detection
For the detection of obfuscated libraries, we developed LibDetect that uses five represen-
tations for its detection algorithm. Each representation abstracts additional informa-
tion from the code to identify more obfuscated methods without losing precision. After
matching methods, LibDetect aggregates the methods to identify the classes of known
library versions.
For the evaluation of LibDetect, we compared its precision, recall, and F2-measure
with an approach that uses a white list of Common Libraries [LKLT+16] and a library
detection approach that is more advanced than a white list called LibRadar [MWGC16].
To compare the approaches, we downloaded 1,000 apps from five different app stores and
manually identified all library classes. The comparison showed that LibDetect identifies
more than six times more library classes, and its F2-measure is five times higher than
the ones of the best tool LibRadar. However, in contrast to the other tools, LibDetect
focuses on a high recall. Consequently, its precision is up to 24% smaller than the values
of the other tools.
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11.1.2. App Code Separation
Since many approaches need to separate app code without detecting all individual li-
braries in the code, we developed AppSeparator that separates app code without the
need for a database of all library method representations. The design of AppSeparator
is based on the separate compilation assumption [AL12], which states that libraries were
already compiled before their integration into apps; therefore, libraries have no depen-
dency on any specific app. Using this assumption, AppSeparator performs the following
steps to separate app code.
First, it extracts all classes containing entry points and all classes from the main
package of an app. With these classes, AppSeparator transitively identifies all additional
classes that access the ones identified earlier.
Second, obfuscation can blur the lines between app and library code by inserting into
the library code false references to app classes. To mitigate this effect, AppSeparator
calculates the fan-in and fan-out values of all classes to train a classifier that decides
whether some of the classes only belong to the main app code.
Last, AppSeparator uses this classifier to get a binary decision whether a class belongs
to the app code or the library code.
For the evaluation of AppSeparator, we used the 1,000 apps from the evaluation of
LibDetect and split them into 80% training set and 20% validation set. We used the
former set to train our classifier and the latter to compare AppSeparator with LibDetect
and LibRadar. The results suggest that AppSeparator is at least 11.55% more accurate in
separating app code than the other approaches. Comparing our tool with and without
classifier showed that the use of the classifier is responsible for the better results of
AppSeparator, which has a 42.19% higher F1-measure than without the classifier.
11.1.3. Repackaging Detection
For the detection of repackaged apps, we developed CodeMatch that filters out library
code and compares the remaining code with the code of original apps. If one app has
a high similarity to an original one and is not produced by the same developer, it is
considered repackaged. Before comparing the apps, CodeMatch also filters out small
apps and apps generated by App Makers [app17a] because these apps are very similar
without being repackaged.
For filtering library code, CodeMatch uses, depending on the code size of an app,
either library detection or app code separation to reduce the library code’s influence on
the similarity measurement of the approach. CodeMatch performs the filtering using
the integrated tools LibDetect and AppSeparator. While LibDetect has a large runtime,
AppSeparator is not suited for small apps. After filtering, CodeMatch evades obfuscation
techniques using the most abstract representation from LibDetect.
We evaluated CodeMatch by manually analyzing 1,000 app pairs based on their appear-
ance and their code and comparing the results of CodeMatch with FSquaDra [ZGC+14],
ViewDroid [ZHZ+14], DroidMOSS [ZZJN12], and Centroid [CLZ14] on this data set.
The results show that CodeMatch outperformed all other approaches at least by 3.58%
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because it handles large and small repackaged apps. Finally, we discovered that, on
average, 15% of all analyzed markets contained repackaged apps.
11.1.4. Library Mapping
For the library mapping, we presented our approach LibMapper that maps the original
names of classes, fields, and methods in libraries to their obfuscated counterparts. It uses
AppSeparator to identify all library classes in an app and LibDetect to identify possible
name candidates for library classes. Afterward, LibMapper determines the matching
field and method names and combines each mapping for each of the suggested class can-
didates. Finally, LibMapper assigns the name mapping that has the highest probability
to be the original counterpart of the obfuscated class.
For the evaluation of LibMapper, we compared its precision, recall, and F1-measure
with the ones of DeGuard [BRTV16], the currently state-of-the-art name deobfuscation
approach. To compare both approaches, we downloaded non-obfuscated apps from the F-
Droid store [F-D19] and obfuscated them with different name-obfuscation configurations
of ProGuard [Pro17]. The results show that LibMapper recovers up to seven times more
obfuscated names than DeGuard.
11.1.5. Obfuscated Name Detection
Since many apps contain obfuscated names, it is tedious to find non-obfuscated and
up-to-date libraries to supply a database for library mapping. As a consequence, we
developed ObfusSpot that identifies obfuscated names in three steps. First, it performs
an anomaly detection of names that do not conform to learned patterns of non-obfuscated
names. Second, it measures each name’s occurrence frequency to identify names that
have a higher frequency than non-obfuscated names because these are mostly unique.
Finally, ObfusSpot uses LibMapper to identify the naming patterns of obfuscated library
names and generalize these patterns to identify obfuscated names that were not found
with the previous steps.
For the evaluation of ObfusSpot, we downloaded mapping files from GitHub reposi-
tories to train and test its classifiers. Obfuscators generate these files during the ma-
nipulation of names to enable developers to map names back to their origin, and some
developers publish their mapping files to GitHub [git20]. We evaluated whether Ob-
fusSpot generalizes on the app codebase allowed to identify more obfuscated names than
the ones found by LibMapper. All results suggest that ObfusSpot is an accurate detec-
tor of obfuscated names and identifies at least 18% more obfuscated names than other
approaches because they identify only names that are obfuscated with standard naming
schemes. In the end, we analyzed the percentage of libraries that are only available in ob-
fuscated form by analyzing 100,000 randomly selected apps from AndroZoo [ABKLT16].
Our analysis discovered that, in particular, ad libraries are mostly released in obfuscated
form.
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11.1.6. Obfuscated String Detection
To detect obfuscated strings, we first analyzed ad libraries to examine techniques used to
obfuscate strings. According to previous work [SGC+12, RNVR+18, DMY+16, SKS16,
CFL+17], many ad libraries contain such strings. To identify obfuscated strings, we
analyzed all constant strings for abnormal usage of non-alpha-numeric characters. Ad-
ditionally, we analyzed all code locations that get string or non-string arguments but
return strings to identify deobfuscation code.
Using this procedure, we discovered multiple string obfuscation techniques and focused
on mechanisms used to protect obfuscated strings from unauthorized deobfuscation. Our
study showed that all identified string obfuscation techniques place their deobfuscation
logic in the same class as the obfuscated string, making this logic easy to target.
We developed two approaches to target obfuscated strings that complement each other.
The first approach, String Classifier, directly analyzes strings with a classifier that iden-
tifies obfuscated strings based on their characteristics. String Classifier analyzes strings
for words from different natural languages and uses different features from cryptanalysis,
known formats, and word characteristics to identify obfuscated strings.
We evaluated String Classifier’s effectiveness on an app data set that we obfuscated
using the identified techniques from our study. The results indicate that String Classifier
is well suited to identify obfuscated strings in the wild.
The second approach, Method Classifier, compares the instructions of methods with
ones from known deobfuscation logic to identify obfuscated strings hidden in other data
structures. Method Classifier extracts the Structure Preserving Repsentation (cf. Section
3.2.1) of each method in an app and compares this representation to the one of known
deobfuscation logic by using the correlation of instructions between both representations.
For the evaluation of Method Classifier, we used a technique from graphic recognition
to assesses multiple tools without the necessity of a ground truth. After we established
the necessary conditions for the usage of this technique, we could analyze the relations
between each tool’s precision and recall. The results indicate that Method Classifier
identifies at least twice as many deobfuscation methods as the other tools.
11.1.7. String Deobfuscation
Since obfuscated strings may hinder the analysis of data privacy concerns, we recover
obfuscated strings using our tool StringHound. StringHound uses String Classifier and
Method Classifier to detect obfuscated strings. Afterward, it extracts all necessary val-
ues and logic to trigger the string’s deobfuscation and executes it. For the execution,
StringHound integrates the logic in an environment that is sliced from the original one
to evade techniques that protect the obfuscated string from unauthorized deobfuscation.
Our evaluation shows that StringHound outperforms the other deobfuscators by or-
ders of magnitude. Additionally, it provides empirical evidence that string obfuscation is
commonly used across malware and many apps from Google’s Play store. This evidence
invalidates statements by previous research [Don18, Mir18], suggesting that string obfus-
cation is rarely used in practice. By undoing string obfuscation, we revealed abundant
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problematic string usages in the wild. Our studies further show that libraries account for
a significant amount of obfuscated strings in benign apps. Many findings in ad libraries
reveal serious privacy issues.
11.2. Closing Discussion
While obfuscation has some advantages such as reduction of the disc space of apps, it still
poses a significant threat for app analysts since it renders the identification of private
data leaks or security vulnerabilities harder.
To support analysts in their tasks, we contributed in this dissertation our tool set
for the automatic detection and recovery of obfuscated apps. The tool set can assist
in detecting obfuscated repackaged apps, identifying the use of obfuscated vulnerable
libraries, or recover obfuscated strings for data-flow analyses. Additionally, using Ob-
fusSpot, it supports several approaches in finding non-obfuscated code for their analy-
ses. For instance, analysts can use CodeMatch to detect repackaged apps. Furthermore,
they can use StringHound to identify vulnerabilities in obfuscated strings. Moreover,
as we showed, StringHound can identify the disclosure of the geo-location by checking
piggy-backed permissions. Additionally, with LibDetect or LibMapper, they can detect
vulnerable libraries on different granularities. Both tools can reduce the effort for data-
flow analysis by identifying all flows in a specific library and reusing the results in all
apps that use the library.
In addition to the developed tool set, we analyzed multiple data sets in this disserta-
tion. Using our analyses, we revealed the significant prevalence of obfuscated strings and
the fact that about 4% of the libraries are released only in obfuscated form. We pub-
lished these data sets to support future research. Although this dissertation addressed
many of the threats caused by obfuscation, future research still faces several challenges
that we have identified during our studies.
The first challenge is the rising number of apps that need to be analyzed. The Google
Play store alone in 2020 already contains about 3 million apps [num20], and there are
many more app markets in the world. As we mentioned in Section 10.3.3, tools need to
process apps as fast as possible to handle these large numbers of apps.
Second, many approaches need to maintain a database to process current apps. As we
mentioned in Section 3.4 and Section 6.5, keeping these databases up-to-date is a very
challenging task since there exists no central register that contains all needed artifacts.
Third, in order to work properly, many approaches need an unchanged structure
of an app. For instance, our tools need this condition to use the structure-preserving
representation. However, current obfuscation techniques could change the code structure
by flattening all methods’ control flow.
Fourth, if an obfuscator encrypts a class, virtualizes the code, or performs another
technique to hide the actual code of an app, many analysis approaches become useless.
For instance, as mentioned in Section 9.6, if an obfuscator hides all obfuscated strings
in an encrypted class, then neither the String Classifier nor the Method Classifier can
detect these strings.
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Finally, as mentioned in Section 10.4, obfuscators could improve their techniques to
evade current analysis approaches. For instance, an obfuscator could use the devel-
oper certificate as a decryption key to protect an obfuscated string [ZLQ+18]. Since
most analysis approaches do not extract the developer key during the deobfuscation
process, they cannot reveal such strings. Another way to improve the techniques of ob-
fuscators is to manipulate code and data until all analysis approaches can no longer be
performed [XQE16].
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In this chapter, we point out future challenges that we consider particularly interesting
and give suggestions on how these challenges could be addressed. Additionally, we
provide an outlook of current obfuscation techniques that drive the described challenges.
12.1. Increasing Processing Efficiency
A future direction to process more apps is to split a data set into multiple subsets and
start many instances of an analysis to process these subsets. However, some approaches
process internal representations sequentially instead of parallelizing their processing.
Approaches need to meet the tradeoff between both parallelization strategies to speed
up data processing. To meet this tradeoff, we suggest as future direction an analysis
platform that measures the parallelization opportunities of an approach and the hard-
ware that should be used for the execution of an approach. With such a platform, an
analyst could optimize either the internal structures for multithreading or the approach
and its analysis data for multiprocessing.
Furthermore, since many analyses have an extended processing time, another future
direction could be the development of multiple preprocessing filters with a short runtime,
almost perfect recall, and precision as good as possible [WGMC15]. Such filters do not
need to be separate approaches but could also be a simple categorization of continuous
values in a database to improve the query speed for such values. For instance, LibDetect
checks whether the matched class contains at least half of the number of instructions
as the class under analysis. It could also use the number of instructions as a prefilter
to consider only classes that meet this requirement by categorizing all classes in the
database by their instruction number. A possible categorization for this count could be
analogous to the collision rate of the method representations in Section 6.2.
Another further direction could be the automatic identification of possible candidates
for such filters. For instance, if we have multiple approaches that can be used as filters,
we can use machine learning to identify the best combination of filters based on the
performance values of these approaches.
12.2. Keeping Representations Up-to-Date
We identified two sub-challenges to keep representations for library detection, library
mapping, and repackaging detection up-to-date. The first one is to find an representation
that can identify new artifacts even when they are obfuscated, and the second one is to
support analysts with tools for their manual analysis.
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Integrating New Obfuscated Artifacts To integrate a new artifact into the database
of a tool, analysts need to identify and capture all associated elements of this artifact.
For instance, if a library is not obfuscated, it might be easily captured by collecting all
classes that have the same package name. However, as we have shown with app code in
Chapter 4, capturing associated elements might not be straightforward. Consequently,
one future direction could be to capture all associated elements of artifacts from obfus-
cated code. In many cases, it is desirable to find artifacts in a non-obfuscated form.
As a result, future work needs to find a representation that captures the associated ele-
ments and develop a tool that can compare between the obfuscated and non-obfuscated
forms of an artifact. For instance, LibDetect as well as LibMapper need non-obfuscated
libraries to identify obfuscated ones in apps. We can check with ObfusSpot whether the
code of a library is obfuscated. However, we cannot check whether an obfuscated and a
non-obfuscated library represent the same code until we deobfuscated their names and
checked with a previously found non-obfuscated library version. It would be useful to
construct a representation that can identify obfuscated and non-obfuscated libraries as
belonging to the same artifact.
As we have shown in Section 7.3, some libraries are only released in obfuscated form.
To identify such libraries in the wild, we need to integrate them into our database.
However, suppose we integrate obfuscated libraries into LibMapper. In that case, it
does not help analysts to understand the code under analysis because it is hard for
them to differentiate between obfuscated libraries and other obfuscated app code. As a
consequence, future work could use name inference to assign names to the obfuscated
code entities. Additionally, it could identify similar non-obfuscated libraries to transfer
similar names to the obfuscated library, which would avoid assigning too generic names
to the code entities.
Tool Support for Manual Analysis We manually analyzed many data sets for our
experiments because many of the available analysis frameworks rely on complex lan-
guages or do not support the necessary capabilities such as navigation through code.
Consequently, a future research direction could define a language that allows expressing
complex static or dynamic analyses in a simple script-like fashion. Such a language could
be similar to BOA [DNRN13]. However, instead of providing only data from source code
and text files, it processes the sophisticated static and dynamic analyses of Android apps
in the background and provides the results for further processing. A simple example of
such a language could be XPath-like. In such a language, one could identify all methods
with ten instructions using the expression /Methods/Method[@instructionCount=10].
12.3. Handling Underlying Structural Changes
Obfuscators can change the code structures used by our approaches. Different ways
to cope with this should be investigated in future directions. Suppose an obfuscator
changes structures by manipulating some instructions or code entities such as control-
flow flattening or virtualization of API methods. In that case, future work could use
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automatic and safe refactoring to keep these structures stable. Furthermore, if obfus-
cators use translingual obfuscation [WWM+16] or virtualizes the code completely into
another language, future work could try to hook the interpreter instructions to extract
known structures as done by Coogan et al. [CLD11] for the C language.
The authors analyzed interpreters that virtualized software and were integrated into
code to execute a guest language. Their tool removed conditions that would hinder the
interpreter’s execution, instrumented the interpreter’s instructions, and executed the
resulting interpreter with the guest code to get an execution trace of the host language.
A similar approach could be used in future work to resolve translingual and virtualized
obfuscation for Android apps. However, instead of extracting the execution traces, future
approaches need to create stable code structures to identify libraries or repackaged apps.
12.4. Handling the Hiding of Functionality
If obfuscators encrypt or compress a part of the code and load it from an external
resource, many of our approaches cannot identify libraries or the repackaged part of
the code. Consequently, future work needs to extract the hidden code from the exter-
nal location. Future approaches have to remove potential countermeasures that would
hinder the extraction and hook the classloader for the extraction. While Dongwoo et
al. [KKR15] already developed an approach that hooks classloaders, this approach could
be evaded by state-of-the-art obfuscators.
For the evasion of the hooking approach, obfuscators may use the developer certifi-
cate [ZLQ+18] or other external resources from the app to prevent the execution of
the extracted code. Future work could emulate the android.jar to counter such tech-
niques. For the emulation of an entire device, analysts need to collect all information
about a device. In contrast, the emulation of the android.jar would enable a future
approach to execute only the necessary instructions without caring for the entire device.
For instance, the emulated android.jar could use the same functionality as used in an
app to extract the developer certificate. However, while such an approach could involve
considerable engineering effort, it would benefit many future works.
12.5. Eliminating the Arms Race
The deobfuscation and obfuscation of code is an arms race against each other—both
deobfuscation and obfuscation benefit attackers and analysts. Attackers use better ob-
fuscation to hide malicious payloads and better deobfuscation to uncover developers’
intellectual property. In contrast, analysts profit from better obfuscation to protect de-
velopers’ intellectual property and better deobfuscation to uncover malicious payloads.
Therefore, working on each of the techniques is handling a double edge sword.
If obfuscation distributes data across boundaries of methods, future work could collect
such data using interprocedural analyses. Furthermore, if obfuscators remapped the
names in an app randomly, future works would need to find a way to reverse it. When
obfuscators use probing [XQE16] to identify vulnerabilities of classifiers that identify
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obfuscation, future approaches need to use features that are not affected by probing.
What seems an endless arms race could be stopped by future obfuscation research that
focuses on protecting intellectual property combined with analysability for malicious
payloads. With such an obfuscation, the developers would separate themselves from
malicious actors, and the apps of such actors would be easy to identify.
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In this dissertation, we have developed several research prototypes and collected and
analyzed multiple data sets. We provide these prototypes and data sets to support
future research. We believe that this is good scientific practice and want to encourage
other researchers to do the same.
All tools are developed in Scala, and as mentioned in the background, we used Enjar-
ify [enj17] to transform APKs into JAR files and analyzed it using OPAL [EH14].
12.6. CodeMatch & LibDetect
We provide the implementation of CodeMatch and LibDetect in the following repository:
https://github.com/stg-tud/CodeMatch-LibDetect
Both tools can be started from the command line with the necessary parameters. To
use LibDetect, one needs to store all known libraries in LibDetect’s database. To get
started, we provided all libraries used in our experiments in a text file.
Additionally, if CodeMatch is used with F2S2, one needs to store all original apps into
F2S2’s database.
12.7. StringHound, String Classifier & Method Classifier
In order to use StringHound along with the two classifiers, one needs to download their
code from the following link.
https://github.com/stg-tud/StringHound
The classifiers are already trained on the data from our experiments, and all tools
can be used from a single command line by using different flags. However, to install the
String Classifier, one needs to merge the dictionary containing the 54 natural languages.
12.8. AppSeparator, LibMapper, & ObfusSpot
To use AppSeparator, LibMapper or ObfusSpot, one need to download their code from
the following repository:
https://github.com/stg-tud/ObfusSpot
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While the database of LibMapper needs to be filled with non-obfuscated libraries, the
code of AppSeparator and ObfusSpot are directly usable.
Study Artifacts
In addition to the developed prototypes, we provide all necessary data to reproduce
our experiments from the evaluation of CodeMatch and LibDetect at the following page:
http://www.st.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/artifacts/codematch
The hash sums of the 100,000 apps that we used for the evaluation of StringHound,
String Classifier, Method Classifier, and ObfusSpot can be found in a text file of the
following link.
https://github.com/stg-tud/StringHound/blob/master/SHA256ForF-DroidApks.
txt
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A. BOA Script for ProGuard Mapping Files
We used the following BOA script to search all GitHub repositories from 2019 for map-
ping files. With these files, ProGuard shows developers how it manipulated the code
entities and under which entry a name can be found in an obfuscated app. Developers
often use these files to understand the names from crash reports received from users.
By default, the Android build system uses the folder proguard to store these files, and
they are often named mapping.txt. Therefore, we check for similar patterns of these
two default settings and transform the location of such files into a link, which makes the
file downloadable.
1
2 p: Project = input;
3 counts: output set of string;
4 c:CodeRepository;
5 r:Revision;
6 visit(p,visitor {
7 before codeR: CodeRepository -> c=codeR;
8 before rev: Revision -> r=rev;
9 before f:ChangedFile -> {
10 if(match(".*proguard.*.map.*$",f.name))
11 counts << format("%s/blob/%s/%s",c.url,r.id,f.name);
12 }
13 }
14 );
Listing 12.1: BOA script for name obfuscation mapping files
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B. Bytecode Instructions to SPR
We used the following mappings, from bytecode (BC) instructions to Structure-Preserving
Representation (SPR), as representations for our tools.
Table 12.1.: Part I of the mapping from Bytecode to SPR
BC SPR BC SPR BC SPR
putstatic put i2d to lload_2 load
putfield put i2f to lload_3 load
getfield get i2l to aaload arrayload
getstatic get i2s to baload arrayload
ldc ldc l2d to caload arrayload
ldc2_w ldc l2f to daload arrayload
ldc_w ldc l2i to faload arrayload
invokeinterface invoke aload load iaload arrayload
invokespecial invoke aload_0 load laload arrayload
invokestatic invoke aload_1 load saload arrayload
invokevirtual invoke aload_2 load astore store
new new aload_3 load astore_0 store
anewarray newarray dload load astore_1 store
multianewarray newarray dload_0 load astore_2 store
newarray newarray dload_1 load astore_3 store
arraylength arraylength dload_2 load dstore store
athrow athrow dload_3 load dstore_0 store
bipush push fload load dstore_1 store
sipush push fload_0 load dstore_2 store
nop nop fload_1 load dstore_3 store
checkcast check fload_2 load fstore store
instanceof check fload_3 load fstore_0 store
d2f to iload load fstore_1 store
d2i to iload_0 load fstore_2 store
d2l to iload_1 load fstore_3 store
f2d to iload_2 load istore store
f2i to iload_3 load istore_0 store
f2l to lload load istore_1 store
i2b to lload_0 load istore_2 store
i2c to lload_1 load istore_3 store
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Table 12.2.: Part II of the mapping from Bytecode to SPR
BC SPR BC SPR BC SPR
lstore store ddiv div ifgt if
lstore_0 store fdiv div ifle if
lstore_1 store idiv div iflt if
lstore_2 store ldiv div ifne if
lstore_3 store dmul mul ifnonnull if
aastore arraystore fmul mul ifnull if
bastore arraystore imul mul jsr if
castore arraystore lmul mul jsr_w if
dastore arraystore ishl mul goto if
fastore arraystore ishr mul goto_w if
iastore arraystore iushr mul dup dup
lastore arraystore lshl mul dup_x1 dup
sastore arraystore lshr mul dup_x2 dup
areturn return lushr mul dup2 dup
dreturn return dneg neg dup2_x1 dup
freturn return fneg neg dup2_x2 dup
ireturn return ineg neg iand and
lreturn return lneg neg land and
return return drem rem ior or
ret return frem rem lor or
aconst_null const irem rem ixor xor
dconst_0 const lrem rem lxor xor
dconst_1 const dsub sub lookupswitch switch
fconst_0 const fsub sub tableswitch switch
fconst_1 const isub sub monitorenter monitor
fconst_2 const lsub sub monitorexit monitor
iconst_m1 const dcmpg if pop pop
iconst_0 const dcmpl if pop2 pop
iconst_1 const fcmpg if swap swap
iconst_2 const fcmpl if wide wide
iconst_3 const lcmp if
iconst_4 const if_acmpeq if
iconst_5 const if_acmpne if
lconst_0 const if_icmpeq if
lconst_1 const if_icmpge if
dadd add if_icmpgt if
fadd add if_icmple if
iadd add if_icmplt if
ladd add if_icmpne if
iinc add ifge if
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